893.00B/6–1049
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wallace W. Stuart of the Division of Chinese Affairs
| Participants: | Mr. Owen Davis, First Secretary, Australian Embassy |
| Mr. Philip D. Sprouse, Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs | |
| Mr. Wallace Stuart, Division of Chinese Affairs |
Mr. Davis stated that he had called to outline informally the views of the Australian Government with respect to relations with the Chinese Communists.
The Australian Government appreciates that the Chinese Communists have as yet established no central government for China and believe that this will not occur until fall or possibly the end of the year. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Australian Government, the Chinese Communists will establish a new government controlling substantially all of the country. This is a fact which must be faced.
The usual satellite pattern does not fit the Chinese Communists. The Australian Government is not conviced of their dependent relationship with Moscow. There are many factors in this situation which could make for Titoism.80 The Australian Government believes that to close the door either with respect to recognition or to economic cooperation would drive the Chinese Communists into closer relationship [Page 37] with Moscow whereas they would probably be responsive to evidence on the part of the Western powers of willingness to cooperate. The Australian Government accordingly favors initiative on the part of the Western powers in bringing about such cooperation rather than a policy of letting the Chinese Communists stew in their own juice.
Mr. Sprouse stated that our view of the relationship between the Chinese Communists and Moscow differs somewhat from the Australian view. The Chinese Communists have clearly shown through all their public statements and propaganda, particularly with respect to the Cominform-Tito dispute, that they follow the Kremlin line. If the Chinese Communists evidence independence from Kremlin control, this development would probably arise from factors inherent in relations between China and the USSR rather than from actions by the Western Powers, for example, respecting recognition. The US has not embarked upon economic warfare vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists, and trade channels have not been closed. We believe that recognition may provide a lever for obtaining acceptance by any new government that may be established of China’s international responsibilities. We realize that mere acceptance of its international responsibilities does not guarantee fulfillment, but if acceptance is not obtained prior to recognition we fear that it would probably be impossible to obtain even this subsequently. The value of this lever depends to a considerable degree upon common approach to the matter by countries having similar interests. We consider the question of common approach very important in order to guard against Chinese Communists’ following the traditional Chinese pattern of playing one country against another to the ultimate disadvantage of all.
- Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Premier and head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and State, broke with Moscow in June 1948.↩