893.00/11–649
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to China (Stuart)
On the afternoon of November 6 General Cheng30 called on me. He had arrived the day before in New York, directly from China, and stated that Chiang Kai-shek had sent him to me as still the Ambassador to China to convey the readiness of the Chinese authorities to accept any suggestion or advice that we might care to give in our common struggle against the spread of Communism. I pointed out that to do so would be to take a responsibility we were not in a position to assume and that before anything else could be seriously considered the Chinese leaders ought to be able to unite more effectively than had been the case for some time. Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen had been [Page 413] openly at odds for almost a year and, as far as I could see, this was becoming even more irreconcilable. On the island of Formosa, Governor Chen and General Sun Li-jen were entirely uncooperative and although the latter had recently been given an imposing title, yet the indications seemed to be that the real authority continued with Governor Chen as the agent of Chiang Kai-shek.
He replied that General Sun with whom he had had a thorough discussion just before his departure felt convinced that if he could have the equipment to train 12, or better still 15, M–strength divisions (13,000 men each) he was confident that he could not only defend the island but could defeat the Communists. He said that the native islanders because of their Japanese training made better soldiers and could be willingly recruited. Between the ages of 21 to 30 years 320,000, or if extended to 36 years, 420,000 recruits could be enlisted on the island.
He said that the 4 men closest to Chiang Kai-shek now are: Wang Shih-chieh, K. C. Wu, T’ang Tsung,31 Huang Hsiao-ku32 and that he depended chiefly on their advice. The C–C clique33 had lost influence and were now working chiefly with President Li.
I reminded him that we had given last year, U.S. 125 million dollars which did not seem able to enable them to defeat the Communists whose advance had become increasingly successful and looked as though it would soon cover the mainland of China. Could it be expected that any more assistance of this nature would be of any value at this late date, or that General Sun or anybody else would not have the personal difficulties to which I referred, in addition to complications with all other top level army officers? Americans might be of help in technical matters and material aid but if the Chinese could not settle these personal relations among themselves, any American attempt to do so would merely aggravate the problem. He admitted that they had made serious mistakes and tried to minimize the personal tensions but not very convincingly. He urged that they had determined to institute a number of far-reaching reforms but I remarked that the area in which these could be carried out was rapidly diminishing and that they had announced their intention of doing this more than once before. He said that the plan now was to hold bases on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, in Yunnan and Sikang. In view of Pai Ch’ung-hsi’s defeats he would probably go to Hainan.
[Page 414]Hu Tsung-nan would withdraw when necessary to Sikang. This latter statement seemed to be a vital admission that Szechuan would soon be lost. He said that General Hu had 11 armies, 7 of which were relatively well-equipped. He understood that the Russians would press the CCP34 to collectivize farms beginning next year and that this would doubtless lead to a great deal of rural discontent and resistance, with the possibility of effective guerrilla warfare. I inquired about the amount of military materiel still on the island of Formosa and he said that the strictly military part of it was practically exhausted, there still were medical and other supplies. As to gold reserves, he estimated that these had dwindled to about 80 million U.S. dollars.
I also referred to the crowded condition on the island, the dissatisfaction of the natives because of the arrogance of mainland visitors, the increased cost of living, etc. and the instability of the naval and air-trained personnel which made them easy victims of CCP infiltration.
He did not stop in New York to see T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung or Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but he came straight to Washington. He will not be in the country more than a month. He intends to keep very quiet and is using the name of Mr. Chen. General P’i35 is acting as his interpreter here. He would like to talk with officers in the Department at their convenience.
After my conversation with him had continued some time, I invited Admiral Badger36 to join us and because of another engagement left them talking together. The Admiral has more than once recommended two tankers of fuel oil and gasoline and some spare parts as the principal need of the Navy and said as much in this interview.
My impression is that Cheng has come on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek in a last desperate effort to get American military aid by playing up General Sun and that while he is personally honest and loyal, yet he has failings which might be summed up as being excessively Chinese and has not grasped the reality of the outlook from the American standpoint. A lengthy cable was sent the same evening to Chiang Kai-shek reporting the essence of this conversation and recommending that K. C. Wu be made the Governor of Formosa which might have been an easy inference from my repeated questionings about the present Governor and the esteem in which K. C. Wu is known to be held by Americans.
- General Cheng Chieh-min (Cheng Kai-ming), Chinese Vice Minister of National Defense.↩
- Director-General of Police in the Chinese Ministry of Interior.↩
- Chief Secretary of Generalissimo Chiang’s office of Leader of the Kuomintang.↩
- Faction of the Kuomintang led by the brothers Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu.↩
- Chinese Communist Party.↩
- Brig. Gen. Peter T. K. Pee, Chinese Military Attaché in the United States.↩
- Vice Adm. Oscar C. Badger, Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs, Navy Department, and former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific.↩