894A.00/7–2749

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)90

Taipei’s telegram no. 292 of July 1891 (attached as Tab A) reported a suggestion made to Consul Edgar at Taipei, Taiwan, by K. C. Wu, one of the Generalissimo’s and Governor Chen’s closest advisers and former Mayor of Shanghai. Wu said in effect that those Chinese leaders who are working for internal reform would be greatly assisted if you would call in the Chinese Ambassador and indicate those lines of reform which the United States believes would improve the situation on Taiwan.

I recommend that we act upon this suggestion. It will enable us usefully to place again on record our concern over the conditions which the Chinese have permitted to develop on the Island. And, coming from you, it may bring some constructive results.

Accordingly, I suggest that you call in Ambassador Koo and hand him the aide-mémoire attached as Tab B, preceded by an oral statement along the following lines:

“In response to a suggestion recently made to the American Consul at Taipei by one of the Governor’s close advisers, I desire to present to you certain considerations which have been of concern to the Government of the United States of America with respect to the administration [Page 366] of the Island of Taiwan. It is unnecessary, I am sure, to remind your Excellency of the special interest of this Government in that Island arising from the part which American armed forces played in its liberation, as well as from the fact that the final determination of the Island’s status necessarily awaits a peace settlement with Japan. The United States is deeply concerned lest the chaos on the Mainland spread to Taiwan. The United States hope is that the inhabitants of the Island should live in peace, security and prosperity under a regime which reflects their legitimate aspirations. Unhappily, the history of Chinese administration since VJ Day in Taiwan has fallen far short of the hopes of its people and of the expectation of the United States at the time that administrative responsibility was turned over to the Republic of China.”

In order to assure that contents of the Aide-mémoire and the gist of your oral statement reach the Generalissimo in accurate form, I recommend that immediately after you have seen the Ambassador, the Department telegraph a report of the conversation and the text of the Aide-mémoire to our Consul General in Taipei for informal transmission to K. C. Wu.

[Annex—“Tab B”]

Draft Aide-Mémoire Prepared in Office of Far Eastern Affairs

The United States Government has watched with deep concern evidence of the deteriorating political and economic situation on Taiwan. There seems, however, much that could be done by resolute, liberal and far-seeing administration on Taiwan, to improve the people’s livelihood and to render it secure against attack, either from within or without. In a spirit of friendly advice, there are listed below certain measures of self-help which the United States believes are necessary of achievement for the tranquility of Taiwan.

First, and foremost, it would seem that the numbers of civilian émigrés and mainland troops which have come to the Island in recent months should be reduced to the maximum extent possible in order that the self-sufficiency of Taiwan, with respect to food, should be restored and the Island spared the frictions and difficulties inherent in the presence of large numbers of idle troops. Your military authorities will know best the numbers necessary to assure law and order on the Island and to provide an adequate defense against any external assault. In the event that these requirements fall short of the total military personnel now on the Island, then an essential first step would appear to be the transfer elsewhere of the excess, accompanied or followed by their families, together with other civilians who are economically non-productive. This would correspondingly reduce the burden now placed on the food and other resources of Taiwan.

[Page 367]

Secondly, it would seem that a concerted effort is necessary to stabilize the value of the Island’s currency and thereby halt the inflation which by all reports has so drastically disrupted the economy of the Island in recent months. Such measures should include the increased taxes and improved tax collections methods to the end that all governmental expenditures, including those on behalf of the National Government, would be covered by revenue; a careful control of the extension of credit to truly productive loans and a conscious draft on the gold or other foreign exchange assets held on the Island in order to achieve an import surplus, with particular concentration on the importation of fertilizer and consumers goods.

Thirdly, an intensive effort should be made to increase and diversify the Island’s exports in order to restore its position as an important earner of foreign exchange which should then be applied for the overall benefit of the Island’s economy. This will require realistic pricing of export commodities, a drastic removal of restraints on the initiative and ingenuity of individual exporters and the assurance that the full foreign exchange value of such exportation will, in fact, accrue to the benefit of the exporters.

Fourthly, the land reform measures already instituted should be pushed forward vigorously and expanded to the end that tenancy is reduced and the net return of the individual producer increased.

Fifthly, steps should be taken to ensure the utilization of competent administrative personnel in all positions and effective delegation of authority and responsibility, particularly with respect to those civilian officials dealing with financial, economic and other matters requiring specialized knowledge and importantly affecting the economy and administration of the Island. Military participation or interference in the civil administration should not be permitted except in matters of internal and external security.

Finally, if the natives of Taiwan are to enjoy in fact the progressive achievement of their understandable and legitimate aspirations for an enlarging measure of self-government, then they must be increasingly and promptly brought into the political life of the Island and into positions of responsibility in its administration.

Washington, ______

  1. Prepared for the Secretary of State but not presented to him; for explanation, see memorandum of August 3, p. 368.
  2. Vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter VI.