501.BB/6–949
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs (Butterworth) to the Deputy Under
Secretary of State (Rusk)
[Washington,] June 9, 1949.
At a meeting yesterday afternoon attended by Mr. Sandifer69 and Mr. Gerig,70 it was tentatively agreed that the most promising
United Nations action which could be taken to deal with the urgent problem
of Formosa was to request a special meeting of the General Assembly early
this summer. The request would be accompanied by a full statement of the
United States position, including an explanation of the basis for revoking,
in part at least, the Cairo Declaration,71 and making plain that the
United Nations’ action envisioned was to call for and supervise an election
on the Island in which the people of Formosa could vote on a return to the
Mainland or some alternative trusteeship arrangement pending their
qualification for independence. This would require prompt and skillful
diplomatic spadework, first with the British, and then with all members of
the United Nations who might be expected to view the proposal
sympathetically. It seems to me that our position before the world would be
morally unassailable. Moreover, this course would avoid a long period of
delay in which the Communists might be expected to step up their activity on
the Island.
In view of the urgent nature of this problem, I trust that we can get
together to discuss it in the immediate future. I recommend that the
attached paper be submitted to the National Security Council Secretariat as
promptly as possible in the form of a working paper, and that concurrently
we open informal exploratory discussions with the British Embassy here.
W. W[alton] B[utterworth]
[Page 347]
[Annex 1]
Draft Memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council (Souers)72
Subject: Formosa
Analysis
It is believed that United States policy with respect to Formosa should
be re-examined. This Government’s representatives in Formosa have sought
to implement this policy but the situation as it has developed indicates
that, notwithstanding their efforts, there is little prospect that our
objectives can be achieved by following the course laid down in NSC
37/273 and NSC 37/5.74
The fact is that we face on Formosa today a situation analogous to that
which confronted us on the mainland of China a year ago. The government
in power is corrupt and incompetent. It lacks the wisdom and the will to
take the necessary political and economic steps to modify the deep and
growing resentment of the Formosans. The burden of supporting the mass
of nationalist troops and other governmental establishments is so great
as to accelerate the economic disintegration of the island. Moreover,
economic aid from outside can not in the absence of a basic change in
the government alter or cure this situation, and so long as it endures
the passage of Formosa under Communst control, by external or internal
action, is only a matter of time.
There appears to be three courses of action open as alternatives to the
present one.
The first would require not only the assumption of military
responsibility for the security of the island but also a large measure
of responsibility for its civil administration and the conduct of its
economy. We could not hope otherwise to compensate for the incapacities
of the existing government. The assumption of these responsibilities,
needless to say, would be widely regarded by the mainland Chinese as an
aggressive American action. In fact the reaction might be considerable
not only throughout Asia but in the world at large. Traditional United
States policy toward China has always been to assist as possible the
establishment of a democratic, united and genuinely independent China.
In pursuit of this basic policy, we must seek to exploit fissures
between China and the U.S.S.R. The Soviet position in Manchuria and Port
Arthur has created irredentist issues which we can use to advantage. To
provide the Communists with an issue which
[Page 348]
they can propagandize in irredentist terms against
us seems extremely unwise. In addition to the political costs of such an
action, it is estimated that the United States would have to provide
economic support in the neighborhood of fifty million dollars over the
next eighteen months as an essential to the success of such a policy.
Funds are available for such a program from unexpended ECA balances and
the figure might be reduced if an arrangement could be negotiated with
the Formosan Government whereby it would match from its own gold
holdings any U.S. contributions on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Finally, this course of action would implicitly, even if it did not
explicitly, commit U.S. military forces to the defense of Formosa in the
event of a Communist military assault from the mainland. This would
require a reversal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the position they
took in NSC 37/3.75 Politically, financially
and militarily, the cost of such a course of action appears extremely
high.
The second alternative course is essentially a policy of calculated
inaction, providing a modicum of economic aid but relying primarily upon
the self-interest of the present Chinese governing group to safeguard
our own strategic interests. The length of time that our interests and
theirs will coincide or that they will have the will and ability to
resist any external or internal attack which the Communists may mount
against them is unpredictable. It should safeguard our interests for,
possibly, six months in which time much can happen there and elsewhere.
A corollary, however, of such a policy would be to vigorously press
forward with the necessary spadework for a later presentation of the
problem of Formosa before the United Nations. This course would protect
our reservoir of goodwill among the Formosans, among the mainland
Chinese, and presumably throughout Southeast Asia. It has, however, the
unhappy characteristic of passivity in the face of an active threat.
The last and third alternative is an immediate committal of the problem
of Formosa to the United Nations. There are several methods by which
this might be accomplished. Of the two most likely possible methods, the
first would be to persuade a friendly and interested power, such as
India or the Philippines, to place on the agenda of the United Nations
Trusteeship Council which meets on June 15, a request that a temporary
trusteeship be established by the United Nations over Formosa. Such
action, however, would involve creating a precedent in that hitherto the
Trusteeship Council has only acted on matters referred to it by the
General Assembly. Moreover, even assuming the Trusteeship Council placed
this matter on its agenda, it would probably
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restrict itself to a recommendation to the General
Assembly at its meeting next Fall, which would result in an undesirable
time lag before any positive action by the United Nations could be
initiated. An alternative and more appealing procedure would be to have
the United States, preferably in company with several other friendly and
interested powers, request a special session of the General Assembly to
consider the problem of Formosa, with the recommendation that a
plebiscite be held on Formosa under the supervision of the United
Nations in order to enable the people of Formosa to express their wishes
as to their future status. This request to the United Nations would
explain in some detail the responsibility which the United States feels
toward the people of Formosa. It should also forthrightly point out that
the post-war conditions in so far as Formosa is concerned, as envisaged
at the time of the Declaration of Cairo, have not in fact materialized
and that the record of misrule by the Chinese authorities on the Island
requires that the people themselves should have the opportunity to
decide their own destiny. A draft statement along these lines is
attached as Tab “A”.
As a party to the Cairo Declaration, the British Government should be
immediately informed of the direction of our thinking with a view to
securing parallel action and the concurrent issuance by it of a similar
statement. There are disadvantages to this course. The Formosans might
vote to return to China. While improbable, the risk has to be
recognized. Another difficulty is the possibility that the Chinese
authorities on Formosa might refuse to accept the decision of the United
Nations and block the entry of a Plebiscite Commission, thereby
challenging the United Nations and raising the question of backing the
decision with force. On balance, however, this course of action appears
to carry fewer risks and a higher promise of success than the other
lines of action considered. The moral position of the United States
would seem to be unassailable. The right of self-determination is
difficult to quarrel with and is certainly appealing throughout Asia.
Certainly the United States would be relieved of any accusation that it
was acting unilaterally and imperialistically.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
- 1.
- Alternative three above be adopted.
- 2.
- The United States Government request a special meeting of the
General Assembly in the immediate future and concurrently issue
a statement along the lines of that contained in Tab “A”, having
first assured parallel action and support from the British
Government and at least one other interested nation.
[Page 350]
[Subannex—Tab “A”]
Proposed Statement To Be Issued by the Secretary of
State at Time United States Government Requests Special Session of
the General Assembly
(This statement would be accompanied by a White Paper on
the subject of Formosa)
The United States Government with the support of the Governments of the
United Kingdom and______ _______, has requested the immediate calling
for a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to
consider the problem of Formosa toward the people of which Island, the
United States feels an especial responsibility by reason of the part it
played in the liberation of the Island. At the special session of the
General Assembly, the United States Government will propose that a free
and secret plebiscite be held on the Island under the supervision of a
United Nations Commission, in order to enable the people of Formosa to
express their wishes with respect to a return to China or some
alternative under which they would assume independence either
immediately or after some preparatory period of United Nations
trusteeship.
Under the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, to which both the United
States and the United Kingdom were parties, the intention was expressed
to restore to the Republic of China the territories, such as Manchuria
and Formosa, which had earlier been lost to Japan. The Cairo
Declaration, however, further declared that the determination of the
final status of Formosa must await the conclusion of a peace settlement
for Japan. Having watched with mounting concern the misrule of Formosa
by the Chinese governing authorities since VJ Day, the United States has
reached the conclusion that the Chinese Government has forfeited the
right to a perfunctory confirmation of sovereignty at the time of
concluding a peace settlement with Japan, and that the people of Formosa
are entitled to express freely and by secret ballot, their desires with
respect to their own destiny.
The United States Government has no designs on Formosa. It does not seek
military bases or special privileges of any character whatsoever on the
Island. The United States Government, however, is rightfully concerned
for the peace, prosperity and future of those whose home is on Formosa,
and in conformity with its traditional espousal of the principle of
self-determination, is laying before the United Nations the proposal
described above.
