893.01/5–2749: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 27—7:14 a. m.]
1123. Deptel 589, May 13, paragraph 1. Accords Embassy’s understanding.
Paragraph 2–b. Embassy without access Oppenheim and unaware US precedents this point, unless perhaps in case where new state created in portion of territory formerly controlled by de jure government, latter retaining sovereignty over remainder. Is British action Spain example? While it may have offered political expediency, it seems to us poor precedent from legal standpoint (see American Journal of International Law, section 2, 1939, volume 33, page 689).
Paragraph 2–c. Embassy concurs. Believed de facto recognition if accepted would be advertised by Communist-controlled press and radio as equivalent de jure and consequently so regarded by public. This particularly true if de facto recognition “granted” or “extended” by any documented action authority US Government such as exchange representatives or joint note December 9, 1924 by Peking envoys quoted Hackworth Digest, volume 1, page 317.68 Moreover Embassy believes extremely difficult especially for some our allies resist falling into de jure recognition after establishing de facto relations.
Paragraph 3–a. Such formal grant or extension recognition of de facto authority would probably lead to more correct Communist attitude but only if US action treated as tantamount de jure recognition. If on other hand we insisted on emphasizing informal aspects of recognition, we believe Communist would reject such arrangement altogether, insisting on whole loaf of [or] nothing.
Paragraph 3–b. Best hope protecting American interests lies in growth Communist recognition own needs for American goods and technical assistance. As these needs become more acute, Communist manners and policy toward Americans may be expected improve regardless degree progress toward de jure recognition. Despite racial, political and commercial hostility toward Americans, their property and business interests, Communist moving with caution and sins are to date chiefly omission not commission.
Paragraph 3–c. See foregoing paragraph. In Embassy’s view (informal relations with de facto authority should be permitted to develop without ceremony or formal act marking their initiation. While [Page 31] Communists will undoubtedly continue to say that they do not recognize us as officials because we have no formal relations, that position will in fact be correct, so far as concerns our capacity to make formally binding representations, we not being accredited to their regime. If we can continue to talk to them as we are now doing with local government Nanking, we may accomplish as much as can be expected in light of fundamentally divergent policies of CCP and USA. Informal relations established by some mark of intent rather than developed through daily contacts will, we believe, be interpreted and used by Communists as formal recognition to our own embarrassment or rejected as derogatory to Chinese national dignity.
- For correspondence on the recognition of the provisional government as the “de facto” government of China, see Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. i, pp. 416 ff.↩