Department of Defense Files
Memorandum by Rear Admiral Sidney W.
Souers to the National Security
Council
Washington,
April 4, 1949.
Subject: The Strategic Importance of Formosa
References:
- A.
- NSC Action No. 189
- B.
- NSC 37/510a
- C.
- NSC 37/310b
Pursuant to NSC Action No. 189–c, the Secretary of
Defense was requested to obtain from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a
clarification of their estimate of the strategic importance of Formosa, as
contained in NSC 37/3, with specific reference to confirmation of the
Council’s interpretation that this estimate means that overt military action
by the U.S. in Formosa is not recommended either at this time or under any
foreseeable future circumstances.
The enclosed reply from the Secretary of Defense is circulated herewith for
the information of the National Security Council. No further action on the
enclosure is contemplated unless requested.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Souers)
Washington,
April 2, 1949.
Subject: The Strategic Importance of Formosa
References:
- A.
- NSC Action No. 189c
- B.
- Memo from Executive Secretary, NSC, Subject: The Strategic
Importance of Formosa, dated 4 March 1949
- 1.
- Pursuant to NSC Action No. 189c and in
accordance with your memorandum of 4 March 1949, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have considered the request for confirmation of
the National Security Council’s interpretation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff’s estimate regarding the use of overt military
action by the United States in Formosa.
- 2.
- The National Security Council’s interpretation that this
estimate means that overt military action by the United States
in Formosa is not recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
either at this time or under any foreseeable future
circumstances, is generally correct, subject to the following
considerations.
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the strategic
importance of Formosa justifies overt military action at this
time or in the event that diplomatic and economic steps prove
insufficient to prevent Communist domination so long as the
present disparity exists between our military strength and our
global obligations. However, it should be pointed out that there
can be no categorical assurance that other future circumstances
extending to war itself might not make overt military action
eventually advisable from the overall standpoint of our national
security.
