894A.01/3–2349: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 24—6:50 a. m.]
640. From Merchant. Looking forward and even assuming decent government established Formosa receiving US economic support, [Page 303] major decision US may well later face is what advice then to give Governor if Communist dominated coalition emerges on mainland and makes evident its intention retain Formosa as integral part China.
If we encourage separation Formosa and Governor acts accordingly, subsequent more difficult question is what support will [we] be prepared to give Governor if coalition government decides contest separation. Communist radio is already referring to US imperialistic designs on Formosa and to its impending “liberation”.
I believe if foregoing situation developed, we could not intervene directly by military means without inflaming vast majority mainland Chinese as well as some Formosans and grievously injuring US moral position all Asia. Consequently we could not advise or encourage Governor to declare separation unless sure he possessed, as seems unlikely, force necessary for successful resistance. Even to encourage semi-autonomy in National Government framework would presumably invite replacement Governor by Communist stooge backed by force.
Though my knowledge limited, my impression is that Formosan independence groups currently are disunited, politically illiterate, imperfectly organized and in general worthy little reliance. There is no doubt that general and growing discontent exists but effective leadership and organization are still absent.
On above reasoning our choice would appear to be between UN sponsored or otherwise joint intervention or alternatively contenting ourselves with temporary holding operation under which by economic and diplomatic support we contributed to improvement economic level and quality government on Formosa, thereby reducing chance lasting Formosan acceptance Communist ideology. It would seem however only matter of time before mainland Communists or coalition government installed own iron fisted regime, particularly in view Formosa’s assets in form of food, gold, foreign exchange, potential and strategic location.
Foregoing suggests possible desirability ascertaining British, French and possibly Australian and Indian attitude toward chance effective UN future move or their willingness share onus joint forceful action with regional UN framework to secure and support independent status Formosa if mainland Communist-dominated government emerges and moves to control island. In any event holding operation seems amply justified though carrying no guarantee final success (reDeptel 30, March 2 to Taipei and related messages). [Merchant.]