Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Executive Secretariat Files

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the Council

Washington, March 3, 1949.

At the request of the Secretary of State the attached statement on “The Formosan Problem”, which he made at the 35th Meeting of the National Security Council in connection with the Council’s consideration of NSC 37/5⁸⁷ on the subject, is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

Sidney W. Souers

[Annex]

Statement by the Secretary of State at the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the National Security Council on the Formosan Problem

I should like to take this occasion to comment on the problem which we face with regard to Formosa. At our meeting on February 3rd, we adopted certain conclusions now incorporated in NSC 37/2.⁸⁸ These conclusions established a policy of employing diplomatic and economic means to deny Formosa to the Communists. They were approved by the President.

At the same meeting, we asked that the Department of State should prepare a statement of specific and immediate steps which the US should take with respect to Formosa. The State Department’s recommendations are incorporated in NSC 37/4.⁸⁹ At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to furnish the Council an estimate of the extent of the threat to U.S. security in the event that diplomatic and economic steps to deny communist domination of Formosa prove insufficient, and recommendations as to what, if any, military measures should be taken in that event. The JCS reply is now embodied in NSC 37/3.⁹⁰

I have read the JCS paper which seems to me to fall into two parts. One is a general reply to the question raised by this Council. The second half of the paper puts forth explicit recommendations regarding our current policy toward Formosa.

With regard to the first half of the JCS paper, I feel that the JCS has not answered with sufficient clarity the question which we posed. I feel that it would be helpful if they would do so.

As for their recommendations regarding current policy, I cannot help but feel that their suggestion that we make a show of military force in Formosa, if accepted, would impair the efficacy of what we are trying to do through diplomatic and economic means.

Let me expand on this briefly. In attempting to develop separatism in Formosa, we are up against the potential threat of irredentism spreading throughout the great expanse of continental China. We are most anxious to avoid raising the spectre of an American-created irredentist issue just at the time we shall be seeking to exploit the genuinely Soviet-created irredentist issue in Manchuria and Sinkiang. We cannot afford to compromise an emerging new US position in China by overtly showing a pronounced interest in Formosa. It is a cardinal point in our thinking that if our present policy is to have any hope of success in Formosa, we must carefully conceal our wish to separate the island from mainland control.

Now the question may be raised whether Formosa is not so great a prize that we are justified in risking a show of force even though it may incite strong irredentist sentiments in China proper. Our feeling is that, given the tactics employed by the Communists in seizing power, the use of our military power, short of complete blockade and occupation, will be ineffective to prevent Communist control of Formosa. We have alluded to this principle in the NSC 34 series⁹¹ and in NSC 11/2⁹² and NSC 37/1.⁹³

We are under no illusions that we can through present diplomatic and economic measures guarantee a denial of Formosa to the Communists. The defection to the Communists of the only cruiser in the Chinese fleet is symptomatic of the uncertainties in the present situation, particularly with respect to political conspiracy and “deals” in the higher echelons. At some date in the future, we may conclude that it is impossible to accomplish our aim by present measures and shall then recommend a reexamination of the problem. When that time comes, I shall place the problem of Formosa once more before this Council.

Meanwhile so long as we pursue our present policy I would ask for two things.

Firstly I trust that we may count on disciplined cooperation within the Government in seeking to accomplish this sensitive operation. I hope that the Members of the Council will bear in mind the necessity for restraining evidences of zeal with regard to Formosa.

Secondly I hope that the Military Establishment will not exclude from its thinking and planning the possibility that it might later be called upon to employ modest military strength in Formosa in collaboration with other friendly forces. If we are to intervene militarily on the island, we shall, in all probability, do so in concert with like-minded powers, preferably using UN mechanisms and with the proclaimed intention of satisfying the legitimate demands of the indigenous Formosans for self-determination either under a UN trusteeship or through independence.

[Washington,] March 3, 1949.

87. March 1, p. 290.
88. February 3, p. 281.
89. February 18, p. 288.
90. February 11, p. 284.
91. See memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, September 7, 1948, and footnote 11, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. viii, p. 146.
92. See annex to memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, December 14, 1948, and footnote 58, ibid., p. 339.
93. Dated January 19, 1949, p. 270.