The enclosed report by the Executive Secretary on the subject, prepared with
the advice and assistance of representatives of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the National Security
Resources Board and the Central Intelligence Agency, is submitted herewith
for consideration by the National Security Council as Item 2 on the Agenda
for its next meeting on Thursday, March 3, 1949.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed report, it be
forwarded to the President with the recommendation that he approve the
conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all
appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under
the coordination of the Secretary of State.
[Annex]
Draft Report by the National Security Council on
Supplementary Measures With Respect to Formosa
Analysis
1. At its 33rd Meeting the National Security Council directed that a
report supplementary to NSC 37/279 be prepared on the
basis of: (a) the discussion at the meeting; (b) the JCS estimate of the threat to U. S.
security, in the event diplomatic and economic steps to deny communist
domination of Formosa prove insufficient, and the military measures, if
any, which should be taken in that event (NSC 37/380); and (c) a Department of
State statement of the specific and immediate steps which the United
States should take with respect to Formosa (NSC 37/481).
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any overt military
commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of
Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our
military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable
to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might,
particularly if diplomatic and economic steps had already failed, lead
to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it
impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Formosa’s strategic importance
is, nevertheless, great. Consequently, they are of the opinion that:
(a) some form of military support should be
made available now for assistance in vigorous prosecution of the
approved diplomatic and economic steps set forth in NSC 37/2 for
developing and supporting in Formosa a non-communist Chinese regime,
(b) This support should not involve
commitment to the employment of force, but should consist of the
stationing of minor numbers of fleet units at a suitable Formosan port
or ports, with such shore activity associated therewith as may be
necessary for maintenance and air communication and for the recreation
of personnel.
4. It has been the consistent position of the Department of State, as set
forth in the NSC 34 Series,82 in NSC
11/283 and NSC
37/1,84 that the establishment of
U.S. military forces on Formosa in the present
[Page 292]
situation would be not only diplomatically
disadvantageous but also, and far more importantly, a heavy political
liability for us. A show of military strength would be of dubious
efficacy in preventing communist agitation and infiltration or
conspiratorial negotiations between communist emissaries and Nationalist
commanders on Formosa. A show of military strength would have serious
political repercussions throughout China; it might create an irredentist
issue just at the time we may wish to exploit Soviet action in Manchuria
and Sinkiang.
Conclusions
5. The Department of State should strengthen and increase its
representation on Formosa, and to that end should immediately detail a
high-ranking officer to Taipei.
6. Upon the arrival of this high-ranking officer at Taipei, he should
approach the Governor of Formosa, along the lines set forth in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of NSC 37/2 of February 3, 1949.
7. Following these representations to the Governor of Formosa and the
receipt of assurances from the latter that the governing authorities on
Formosa are prepared to implement such assurances, the ranking
Department of State officer should inform the Governor that the United
States Government is prepared, under legislation approved by the
Congress and by such other means as may be feasible, to give economic
support for the economy of Formosa, designed to assist in developing and
maintaining a viable, self-supporting economy on the island.
8. Upon receipt of appropriate assurances outlined in paragraph 7 above,
the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to China should proceed
with arrangements for completing the pre-project engineering surveys of
the industrial projects on Formosa which will contribute to the
above-mentioned objectives and the Economic Cooperation Administration
should undertake procurement for such of these projects as are approved
after completion of the surveys.
9. The Economic Cooperation Administration should also make a study of
and submit recommendations to the Secretary of State for an over-all
program of economic assistance to Formosa.
10. In the initial stages every care should be exercised to minimize the
appearance of United States official activities on Formosa and every
effort should be made to discourage the further influx of refugees from
the mainland.
11. Units of the U.S. fleet should not now be stationed at or off
Formosan ports in support of the political and economic measures
envisaged above. This conclusion is without prejudice to a reexamination
of this possible course of action should developments on Formosa so
justify.
