The enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared in the Department of
State, is submitted herewith at the request of the Acting Secretary of State
for consideration by the National Security Council.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed report, it be
submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve the
conclusions contained therein and direct that they be implemented by all
appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under
the coordination of the Secretary of State.
[Annex]
Draft Report by the National Security Council on the
Position of the United States With Respect to Formosa
[Washington,] January 19, 1949.
The Problem
1. To determine U.S. policy with respect to Formosa and the
Pescadores.
Analysis
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded in NSC 3729 that it would be in the interest of U.S.
national security if Communist domination of Formosa could be denied by
the application of appropriate diplomatic and economic steps. The
Department of State associates itself with the general sense of this
conclusion.
3. The present legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that they
are a portion of the Japanese Empire awaiting final disposition by a
treaty of peace. The U.S. position regarding the status of the islands
is qualified by the Cairo Declaration by the Chiefs of State of the
U.S., U.K. and China30 and the policy
which the U.S. has followed since V–J Day of facilitating and
recognizing Chinese de facto control over the
islands.
4. The elements involved in the Formosan situation are:
- (a)
- the indigenous population;
- (b)
- the ruling Chinese class from the mainland; and
- (c)
- the Communists.
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5. The indigenous population has a strong sense of regional autonomy
steming back to the nineteenth century when Formosa was independent. The
Formosans are anti-Chinese, as well as anti-Japanese, and would welcome
independence under the protection of the U.S. or the UN. But the
indigenous population is without political experience, organization or
strong leadership. The Japanese prevented the development of native
political life and the Chinese liquidated most of the developing native
leaders in the abortive revolt of 1947. At least one small group of
Formosan autonomists of dubious quality is known to exist now on the
islands. The present refugee Formosan group in Hong Kong and on the
mainland is vocal but small and incapable of organizing by itself a
successful revolution on its home islands.
6. The ruling Chinese class in Formosa has since V–J Day displayed a
genius for mis-government. However, the present Governor of Formosa,
General Chen Cheng, may be able to develop a stable non-Communist
Government over the islands. But this is by no means certain. The
greatest obstacle to his accomplishing this is the influx of refugee
politicians and militarists from the mainland—many of them men whose
gross incompetence has played into the hands of the Communists in China.
The arrival of the Generalissimo, who seems intent upon building up
Formosa as his final stronghold, would be particularly unsettling
locally.
7. The Communists in the islands are now a weak, small group. There would
seem to be two methods through which they might eventually obtain
control over the islands. One is through infiltration and organization
not only of the native population but also of the Chinese armed forces
on the islands. The other is through a deal whereby the
Communist-dominated successor government on the mainland successfully
negotiated with the Chinese regime on Formosa for a take-over.
8. Alternative courses of action which the U.S. might pursue with regard
to Formosa and the Pescadores are:
- (a)
- To occupy the islands under the terms of the Japanese
surrender31 either through
negotiations with the National Government or by direct action
after the collapse of that Government. It is unlikely that the
Nationalists would negotiate any such transfer. Whether or not
direct action encountered Chinese armed resistance on the
islands, there is no doubt that it would galvanize all mainland
Chinese opinion in support of the Communists, the very thing we
must avoid if our political warfare is to have any degree of
success in China. And no matter how earnest our protestations of
good faith, such a move would be cynically viewed by the
international community and might very well lead to a case being
brought against us in the Security Council by China, which would
be politically exceedingly damaging to us.
- (b)
- To negotiate an agreement with the National Government
providing for U.S. extra-territorial and base rights in Formosa.
While the National Government might be willing to grant the U.S.
base rights in Formosa, it would probably do so only in extremis for the purpose of obtaining
U.S. assistance in maintaining its hold on the island. It is,
however, doubtful that it would even in its present extremity
grant the restoration of extra-territoriality in view of the
fact that every Chinese regime for several decades has sought to
abolish such special privileges for foreigners in China and
since these privileges were relinquished by foreign powers so
recently, the U.S. having taken the lead in negotiations to that
end resulting in the Sino-American Treaty of 1943 for the
Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights and Related
Matters.32 Any successor government of
any complexion would probably cancel treaty rights of both these
categories and would eventually probably be supported in the UN.
In any event, such concessions would be an illusory defense
against Communist capture of power through either penetration or
a deal. Military bases are not a sovereign remedy against
Communist infection in a foreign country. As often as not they
are an aggravating factor. U.S. national interests would only be
served by Formosa’s being controlled by a government not
friendly to the USSR.
-
- Also, as in (a) above, the Communists
would be able to exploit the granting of bases to the U.S. in
Formosa to rally public support of mainland Chinese to
themselves with the result that the U.S. position on the
mainland would be jeopardized.
- (c)
- To support on Formosa the National Government or a rump
thereof as the recognized Government of
China. This would increase risks of
immediate local instability, provide the most fertile
environment for the growth of Communism, greatly complicate our
position on the mainland and hamstring our tactical flexibility
toward China Proper.
- (d)
- To support continued local
non-Communist Chinese control, using our influence wherever
possible to discourage the use of Formosa as a refuge for
National Government remnants. Working against efforts to prevent
an influx of these remnants is the increasing tendency of a
great many Kuomintang officials and their families to seek
refuge on the island. Furthermore, the Generalissimo has
recently appointed as governor a general personally loyal to him
and there are ample indications that the Generalissimo is
building up the island as a fortress to which he may eventually
repair. However, support of local non-Communist control in
Formosa would permit greater freedom of U.S. action in China,
although it would involve considerable risks of failure through
several factors. An important factor is that which has
contributed so to our inability to bring positive influence to
bear effectively in China—our lack of a counter-force in hand,
an alternative to the National Government leaders which we could
use as a pressure to influence Nationalist policy and
administration. Lacking such a force we may find that the
Chinese would continue to ignore
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our recommendations and endeavor to
blackmail us with their in-dispensability in preventing
Communist control of the island. Other factors would be the
danger of a turn-over to any coalition government that might be
formed on the mainland and the possibility of Communist
infiltration of the Chinese armed forces on Formosa.
9. The U.S. cannot leave out of account the Formosan people and their
strong resentment of Chinese rule arising from Chinese maladministration
and repression. Formosan discontent provides possible material for
Communist infiltration and exploitation and the U.S. should be prepared
to make use of a Formosan autonomous movement if and when it appears
desirable in the U.S. national interest to do so.
Conclusions
10. The basic aim of the U.S. should be to deny Formosa and the
Pescadores to the Communists. The most practical means for accomplishing
this at the present time is by isolating those islands from the mainland
of China without ourselves taking any open unilateral responsibility for
them or power over them.
11. It is apparent from what has been said in the brief analysis that in
seeking to achieve this aim our choice of courses of action with regard
to Formosa and the Pescadores is much the same as in many other areas of
Asia—the choice is not between satisfactory and unsatisfactory courses
of action but rather of the least of several evils or an amalgam of the
lesser of them.
Given the uncertainties of the Formosan situation, we should maintain a
wide latitude of flexibility in our position.
12. When the situation in China has developed to the point where we know
what governing groups we will have to deal with in Formosa, the U.S.
should seek to develop and support a local non-Communist Chinese regime
which will provide at least a modicum of decent government for the
islands. We should also use our influence wherever possible to
discourage the further influx of mainland Chinese. The U.S. should also
seek discreetly to maintain contact with potential native Formosan
leaders with a view at some future date to being able to make use of a
Formosan autonomous movement should it appear to be in the U.S. national
interest to do so.
13. This Government should make it discreetly plain to the governing
authority on Formosa that:
- (a)
- The U.S. has no desire to see chaos on the mainland spread to
Formosa and the Pescadores;
- (b)
- The U.S. has not been impressed by Chinese administration on
the islands and believes that if there is continued misrule the
Chinese authorities would inevitably forfeit the support of
world opinion which might be expected to swing in favor of
Formosan autonomy;
- (c)
- U.S. support for the governing authorities of Formosa will
inevitably depend in a large measure upon the efficiency of
their regime and the extent to which they are able to contribute
toward the welfare and economic needs of the Formosan people and
permit and encourage active Formosan participation in positions
of responsibility in Government.
- (d)
- The U.S. cannot remain unconcerned over possible developments
arising from the influx of large numbers of refugees from the
mainland and the consequent effects, including the increasing
burden on the island’s economy, and is disturbed at the
indication of the Chinese belief that the building up of
military strength on Formosa will in itself provide an effective
barrier to Communist penetration;
- (e)
- The U.S. expects that the lessons to be drawn from
developments on the mainland and from previous Formosan
reactions to Chinese rule will not be overlooked by the Chinese
authorities in dealing with the problems of the island and with
the Formosan people.
