[Annex]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
Washington, 24 November
1948.
Subject: Strategic Importance of Formosa.
In accordance with the memorandum from your office dated 8 November 1948,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum attached
thereto from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council in
which an appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is requested as to the
strategic implications to the security of the United States should
Formosa and its immediately adjacent islands come under an
administration which would be susceptible to exploitation by
Kremlin-directed Communists.
[Page 262]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, under the assumption
set forth above, the strategic implications to the security of the
United States would be seriously unfavorable.
Since the basic assumption could in all probability become valid only if
we have been unable to prevent China itself from becoming largely
Communist-controlled, the strategically valuable areas of that country,
including air base sites, harbors and coastal railroad terminals, would
have little utility to the United States in the event of war. This would
enhance, from the strategic viewpoint, the potential value to the United
States of Formosa as a wartime base capable of use for staging of
troops, strategic air operations and control of adjacent shipping
routes.
Unfriendly control of Formosa and its immediately adjacent islands would
be of even greater strategic significance. Unless Formosa can be denied
to Kremlin-directed exploitation, we must expect, in the event of war,
an enemy capability of dominating to his advantage and our disadvantage
the sea routes between Japan and the Malay area, together with a greatly
improved enemy capability of extending his control to the Ryukyus and
the Philippines, either of which could produce strategic consequences
very seriously detrimental to our national security. In the latter
connection, it should be noted that the distinct possibility of
unfriendly control of Formosa makes it even more essential that
strategic control of the Ryukyus, as previously recommended by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, remain in United States hands.
An additional strategic implication of importance rests in the fact that
Formosa is capable of serving as a major source of food and other
materials for Japan, a source that would, of course, be denied under the
assumed conditions. This in turn could quite possibly be a decisive
factor as to whether Japan would prove to be more of a liability than a
potential asset under war conditions.
Based upon the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it will
be most valuable to our national security interests if, in spite of the
current Chinese situation and its obvious trends, Communist domination
of Formosa can be denied by the application of such diplomatic and
economic steps as may be appropriate to insure a Formosan administration
friendly to the United States.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
William D. Leahy
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to
the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
