898.01/12–2949: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:09 p. m.]
1612. We continue to adhere in general to views expressed in our telegram 1025, September 6, re probable reaction here to various courses of action we might take re recognition Communist China. As result of developments since September, however, we are inclined to believe that immediate recognition by US of Communist China, unless latter should sharply revise its attitude towards US, would be more injurious to our position in India than if these developments had not occurred. These developments include treatment by Communist China of our officials and other nationals, statements by responsible Communist Chinese leaders re international intentions, statements by US officials, et cetera.
Following are our further comments re estimate reaction India to three contingencies mentioned in Depcirtel December 16, 3 a. m.
Point 1. Our failure join in granting early recognition will undoubtedly subject US to considerable criticism by Indian political leaders and wide sections Indian press. In our opinion, however, it would be better for our position in India for US to face this criticism rather than to reverse our policies at this juncture and accord recognition [Page 254] of a regime maintaining contemptuous attitude towards US. We would appear weak and vacillating if after treatment accorded our nationals and after we had appealed for international hesitation in recognition we should proceed at once to recognize. Certain Indian political leaders would undoubtedly be pleased if US should follow lead of GOI thereby endorsing their position and strengthening their internal and international leadership. Such action on our part, however, would undoubtedly cause GOI to give less weight in future to our views on international problems, to have less respect for our judgment of international situation, and to create doubts re our tenacity of purpose.
Point 2. If we should accord recognition at later date after it had been granted by most of other interested countries, our position in India would not be injured so severely as it would be if we recognized immediately. Much of course would depend upon attitude taken by Communist China during interim. If after delay we should recognize regime, international attitude of which has not materially improved, some critics here would gloat because great Western Power had been compelled to capitulate to new Asian regime; others would point out that when we found that other countries were unwilling to subscribe to principles advocated by US we abandoned these principles for sake of expediency. Some circles in India disillusioned with results of Indian recognition would probably regret that US had granted recognition without extracting conditions which might also improve relations between India and Communist China. GOI understands that if we adhere our avowed policy of hesitation their recognition will contribute to problems SC16 in January. It assumes that countries recognizing, including India and UK, will support Communist China representative for seat while we support Nationalist China representative. It feels eventually majority SC will decide in favor Communist China. Split in SC placing India and UK on side Russia will not be entirely displeasing to formulators Indian foreign policy, particularly Nehru, since alignment in this respect can serve as further evidence GOI adherence to policy of following middle road between two power blocs. Nehru might also consider that such split means progress for his policy of endeavoring extricate UK from close associations US and to bring it over into a neutral bloc in which he hopes play major role. If during interim Communist China assumes attitude which indicates that it is possible for non-Communist countries including ourselves to have advantageous relations with it, we can accord recognition without loss of prestige in India, since we shall not have abandoned any position.
[Page 255]Point 3. If we withhold recognition indefinitely and if in meantime relations between India and Communist China are fairly smooth, we can expect continuing criticism on ground that our position is unrealistic, that by our stubbornness we are causing much suffering to innocent Chinese people, and that we lack sympathy for Asian peoples. Indian press and political leaders will accuse US of hindering development of genuine Chinese nationalism and rendering more difficult termination of cold war. If relations between India and Communist China are not as friendly as GOI hopes they will be, criticism our failure recognize may gradually subside and eventually GOI leaders may hope that we do not accord recognition at least until there is change in China’s attitude toward India. We do not believe that we should permit Indian criticism or press to influence too greatly such decisions as we may take with regard to Communist China. In our opinion our long-range position in India will be stronger if we refrain from recognition until it becomes more clear what Communist China plans to do re international obligations and what international policies it really pursues, particularly re countries southeast Asia, Burma, Philippines and Indonesia.
- Security Council of the United Nations.↩