893.01/12–2449: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 27—12:38 p. m.]
2350. Having reference particularly situation treated Contel 2341, December 233 (reContels 1710, October 8 and 1822, October 25), note particularly Burma recognition and reputedly impending recognition by British Commonwealth, Indian and Netherlands Governments of Peiping regime. Against this background would now stresdesirability remaining in field to permit exploitation politiction for American benefit.
Note here particularly hypothesis contained Contel December 23 that situation may now have reached stage where greater exploitation by non-Soviet states has become possible. It is basic that we can hardly exploit situation without being on ground. It seems to me probable that if American Government takes, with or without participation Congress, position that recognition is definitely not to be extended, Communists will in due course call halt to even present limited functioning Consulates and possibly call for their closure and our departure from China. This would be, as have other Communist actions in past, without regard to international law and practice but would be effective nevertheless. Such action would leave us both without representation and power act on behalf American interests since action British channels could hardly be expected bear same fruits as possible through our own action. Italian Consul has twice argued” that American interests would be best served by recognition giving us possibility contesting USSR in China or field where nonrecognition removes that possibility. It would seem axiomatic that if Communists are to turn an about-face or partially from USSR they must have somewhere to turn. Recognition British Commonwealth and other states would offer them limited but not full opportunity. This is critical period in Chinese development. It would seem best USA be present in fullest force possible in circumstances. Reiterate this would not be “support” Communist regime China in any greater degree than Communist regimes USSR and elsewhere; in fact we should avoid particularly material support for so long as Communists follow Moscow patterns, but divorce from scene seems without promise or profit.
Any contention Communists not in effective control China could hardly now be substantiated. Regarding question Communist willingness [Page 244] abide by international obligations and practice, matter is as doubtful as in cases Hungary, Poland and other satellite states but probably more so, especially in view urgent pressing needs. There remains still possibility exploring field by discussion with Communist authorities, which exploration still untried. At such time (which I should propose be no later than soon after return Ambassador Jessup to Washington) as such queries might be undertaken then would best be attempted by direct consultation with Foreign Minister Chou, without, of course, matter being given advance publicity. Interview might be possible now [that] Communists assured Ward detention could hardly be subject.4 Consultation might, of course, in event prove fruitless and due note is taken fact that British think it pointless and will presumably act accordingly. But if point is to be made in respect matter recognition, believe it is only logical and even proper that some attempt be made discover Communist attitude this regard.
Van Putten5 earlier had rumor that Communists had fixed end December as deadline for American recognition. Believe this, if true, reflected earlier more optimistic Communist estimate of their attractions, but hazard own estimate that if other governments extend recognition January–February, we could not prudently plan on being able continue Consular functions without recognition after about May 1 next.
- Vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter VIII.↩
- The Ward party left Mukden on December 7 and Tientsin on December 11.↩
- James D. Van Putten, Consul at Peiping.↩