893.01/12–2249
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton)91
Mr. MacDonald,92 who is on a three day visit to Bangkok, said yesterday that in the course of his conversations with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister,93 they had both brought up the subject of impending recognition by the UK of the Chinese Communist Government. He said that he and the British Ambassador, Sir Godfrey Thompson, had indicated to Phibun94 their personal belief that the [Page 239] Thai Government should make its own decision with respect to the problem of recognition.
I had a rather lengthy discussion with Mr. MacDonald on the subject of recognition and outlined my views, emphasizing the gravity of such a step for Thailand and pointing out that the exchange of consular and diplomatic representatives would have the most serious consequences in this country. MacDonald agreed with the latter view and pointed out if Thailand and Burma were absorbed by the Communists, Malaya’s source of food stuffs might well be lost. At this point I asked him whether the British authorities had given thought to the complications likely to grow out of a policy of killing Communists in Malaya and shaking hands with them in China in order to trade and protect British interests in that country. I said it seemed likely to me the Communist Government in China would seek to pressure them to cease the campaign against the Communists in Malaya and that if they refused, retaliatory action would be taken against British subjects and interests in China. MacDonald replied this particular point had not previously occurred to him but one could only hope the Chinese Communist Government would follow a wiser policy.
I said from my conversations with the Thai, in Government and other circles, that early UK recognition of the Chinese Communist Government would be greeted with dismay and cause many Thai to feel that it was useless to attempt to stand against the Communists and therefore it would be better to come to terms with them as soon as possible. I pointed out the UK and U.S. had tried in various ways to impress upon the Thai the necessity for “holding the line” against Communism, and that they would inevitably regard UK recognition as a serious and substantial breach in that line. MacDonald said he fully realized the seriousness of the problem for the Thai but reiterated the British view that their great interest in China necessitated recognition and furthermore that without recognition and contact with the Chinese Communists, there would be no hope of weaning them away from Moscow.
I told MacDonald that for the reasons I had outlined I was personally opposed to recognition of the Chinese Communists and felt in the case of our own Government that we should insist on definite assurances regarding protection of American rights and interests, the observance of treaty rights and international obligations. I said without some such assurances I did not see on what basis diplomatic relations could be firmly established. MacDonald replied that they would have to depend upon “world opinion”.