Office of the Historian

893.01/12–1949: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigo (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

Saigon, December 19, 1949—7 p. m.
[Received December 19—8:12 a. m.]

457. Recognition Chinese Communist regime (Depcirtel December 16, 3 a. m.) has been subject endless discussions all political elements [Page 228] here for many weeks and press has filled columns with editorials, agency despatches and articles from world press. Certain basic ideas are believed to have crystallized in local public opinion:

1.
US is fundamentally opposed to recognition, has consistently used its influence to prevent action by UK and other countries, and will only recognize with extreme reluctance when it is clear that these efforts have failed.
2.
UK extremely anxious to extend recognition in order protect its commercial interests. This “shopkeeper’s[”] attitude repeatedly commented on bitterly in right-wing circles and with malicious pleasure by fellow traveling press. This belief plus repeated rumors in recent weeks that UK was on point of recognition is believed to have largely discounted any important effect on public opinion when British recognition finally comes.
3.
French will probably follow suit if UK recognizes, certainly if US does. This situation deplored by most although there is appeasement group among both French and Vietnam which hopes recognition will prevent Communist invasion or rather fears refusal to recognize may be used as excuse for invasion.
4.
Recognition by US will have following adverse effect on local situation:
a.
Ho Chi Minh and supporters will be greatly encouraged and Bao Dai correspondingly discouraged. Argument will be advanced and widely believed that determination to stop further spread Communism only half-hearted and that, if we have accepted Mao Tse-tung, we will eventually accept Ho Chi Minh.
b.
French will have to accept Chinese Communist consuls who will promptly organize influential and relatively numerous local Chinese community. This would have serious effect on political and military situation since local Chinese have till now been largely passive.

Viewed from above background, following reply to numbered alternatives paragraph 2 reference telegram.

(1).
Most adverse effect. General assumption that we had followed British lead to avoid losing China markets. Considerable loss of face among native elements because of wide publicity given here toward arrest and other Communist insults.
(2).
Somewhat less adverse effect, particularly if combined with prior recognition Bao Dai government, firm warning against Chinese direct or indirect aggression and preliminary publicity campaign emphasizing recognition granted for technical and not political reasons and implies no endorsement of Communist regime.
(3).
Best solution from Indochina point of view.

Abbott