Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.01/12–849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] December 8, 1949.

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
	The Secretary
	Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary, FE

The British Ambassador called this morning at my request and I explained to him that I wished to discuss with him the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He said he was glad that I had sent for him because he also had two or three matters which he wished to raise, particularly, the question of Formosa and the discussions at the Ceylon Conference regarding a possible Japanese Peace Treaty.

[For section of this memorandum concerning Formosa, see page 442.]

I then brought up the question of possible recognition of the Chinese Communist regime indicating that shortly after the receipt of the British note of November 1, I had gone to Paris and met with Mr. Bevin and we had discussed the matter there. I now understood that the British Cabinet was scheduled to consider the question about mid-December and that I wished to review and reiterate the point of view which this Government held on this matter. In the first place, it seemed desirable to us to act if at all possible in concert with other concerned powers to ascertain whether the Chinese Communists intended to live up to their international obligations. It seemed to us that the inclinations of the Chinese Communists were to follow the Russian example of considering themselves not an evolutionary regime which had sprung from the previous one which, therefore, entailed that they assume both the rights and the obligations of the former regime, but a revolutionary one which would seek to assume all the rights and only those obligations they choose to undertake. It was important to know what the real situation was and, if possible, to prevent such a development. Secondly, it was important to have evidence of how they proposed to conduct themselves with respect to the outer world: whether it would be in conformity with international law and usage as a civilized power, or as an uncivilized or semicivilized entity. Thirdly, we did not believe that hasty recognition would confer any permanent benefits on those who undertook it. Fourthly, as respects the U.S., it was important for us to bring Congress into our deliberations so that, at any rate, the problem would be fully talked out and the issues clarified. Therefore, regardless of the action taken by other powers, we would not act hastily. I also went on to say that I appreciated that the arrangement had been to consult but that no commitment had been made necessarily to act unitedly, it being recognized that the interests of states differed and that in matters of recognition they would, in the final analysis, be governed by their views of immediate and long term self-interest. I asked Mr. Butterworth if he had anything to add and he called Sir Oliver Franks’ attention to the presence in Washington of Mr. Lewisohn^* who had been for some twenty years the London Times representative in Peiping and had only just arrived here. Mr. Lewisohn had confirmed our own reports that the Communist regime attached great importance to being recognized by some of the Western powers though there were those among the Chinese Communists who were apparently anxious that the U.S. not recognize the regime. Given the fact that Chinese Communists do want recognition by other powers than USSR and its satellites, it would be regrettable that the powers should give up the opportunity of thus bringing pressure to bear for recognition of existing obligations. The British Ambassador said he appreciated these considerations and also the fact that if the powers were not going to act as a unit, it would be undesirable for those who were recognizing to act as a concerted body. He also wanted it understood that the British Cabinet was not merely going to consider the question in mid-December but as he understood it would probably make a decision which might well be to recognize before the year was out. I said that if this decision were taken, I hoped that we would at least be given as much advance notice as possible so as to minimize the effects that misunderstanding might well create and cause repercussions on other Anglo-American concerns. He agreed to ensure that this would happen.

[Here follows discussion of Japanese peace treaty and a military assistance agreement.]

1. Mr. Lewisohn in a talk in FE had been critical of British policy and in accord with U.S. attitude towards recognition. [Footnote in the source text.]