Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.00/11–3049

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (McFall)

[Washington,] November 30, 1949.

Participants:	Senator Alexander Smith
	The Secretary
	H—Mr. McFall

Senator Smith opened the conversation by stating that he had come to see the Secretary just to give him the benefit of some observations that he felt quite strongly about in connection with Far Eastern developments.

He first made reference to what he considered to be a “divided military authority in the Far East”. It was pointed out that General MacArthur⁴⁹ had complete control of both the economic and military problems in Japan and the surrounding islands and that the U.S. Navy was apparently in control in China, and in his and several others’ opinions this provoked a state of affairs that was most undesirable and inefficient. The Senator did not appear to be too clear in his own mind as to what he thought should be done, but the Secretary gave him to understand that we had no military control of any kind in China now (the Navy having been withdrawn) and that any military decisions affecting China rest in the Pentagon Building. The Secretary told Senator Smith that we were giving consideration to the possibility of establishing an ambassador-at-large somewhere in the general area of the Far East who might be used to tie in loose ends and serve as a focal point for representing our interest in that area. It was emphasized, however, that no decision had been made on this subject as yet.

The Senator next expressed his serious concern about the disadvantages that would accrue to the United States in the recognition of China. He stated that it was his considered opinion that the ground for the current Chinese development had been laid in Russia as long as twenty years ago and that the Russians had worked assiduously on the fulfillment of their aggrandizement in this direction since that time. He stated that he could see no possibility whatsoever of any Titoism developing in China and that he felt any commercial advantages that might be gained out of recognition of the Communist regime would not compensate for the psychological defeat that would be ours as a result of recognition. The Secretary then told him that he had read the Senator’s letter⁵⁰ to him about China with interest and that he wanted to assure him that in the first place no thought would be given to recognition until at least three factors had been served—(1) that all or substantially all of the territory of China had actually been conquered; (2) that any government to be recognized had shown its fitness to comply with international obligations; and (3) that there was an evident will on the part of the people to accept the government that had been established. The Senator then asked him what he thought England would do regarding recognition. The Secretary replied that he believed they would certainly do nothing until after the conference in January with the Dominions, upon which occasion there was a probability that this issue would be canvassed thoroughly. What they would do thereafter the Secretary indicated he could not predict. The Senator stated that he had a talk with Chiang Kai Shek and “many other influential Chinese leaders”. He stated that he had had extensive conversations with K. C. Wu^50a for whom he had a very high regard. (It appeared that he had confined himself rather closely to the Chiang Kai Shek coterie in his discussions on China.) At this point in the conversation a complete difference of opinion arose between the Secretary and the Senator as regards Chiang Kai Shek “absconding” with the Chinese government funds. The Senator opined that he felt the Generalissimo took the only feasible course open to him in taking the government funds with him to Formosa. The Secretary replied that he could not share that thought in any way, that he felt the taking was absolutely wrong and that no fair view of the situation could permit of any other judgment. After a valiant but completely unsuccessful effort on the part of the Senator to convince the Secretary that he should modify his view on Chiang, the Senator concluded by stating that it was obvious they shared different feelings on the subject but the main thing now was the future, not the past, and he then repeated his fervent hope that we would not accord any recognition to the Communist Government, certainly in the immediate present. The Secretary indicated he did not feel there was any real difference of opinion on that, that while he could not say we would never recognize the Communist Government he wanted to repeat the assurance that he would exercise every form of caution and considered study before any move in this direction was made. The Senator seemed to be satisfied with this statement.

Next the Senator brought up the question of Formosa. He stated that he had talked to “many military authorities” in the Far East who had told him that they regarded the retention of Formosa as of the utmost strategic importance to the United States. He said that his own personal view was that it was to our compelling interest to hold on to the island by any means short of actual war, and that he felt we should pursue the possibility of adopting one of two alternatives by way of protecting our interests in that area—(1) to arrange, if possible, a trusteeship of the island by the United Nations (he conceded that this was probably not practicable) or (2) a military occupation on our part of Formosa. It was his thought that such a military occupation would protect our strategic interests in that area which he regarded as “still strictly speaking a part of Japan,” even though by the Cairo Declaration⁵¹ we had permitted the Chinese to take over. The Senator stated that he felt “it would be better for Communists to try to dislodge us from the island first before we would have to come in later and try to do the same thing with them”. The Secretary said he felt the Senator should know that this subject is receiving constant consideration, that there had been a half dozen meetings with the National Defense on the subject, with another one arranged for this week, and that there is some difference of opinion among military authorities as to the strategic importance of the island. The Secretary said he hoped a firm decision concerning the matter would be forthcoming at an early date.

In passing, the Senator at this point told the Secretary he wanted to pay a tribute to the resourcefulness of Consul General Karl Rankin in Hong Kong, who, he stated, was a man of real ability and was doing a fine job under difficult circumstances.

The Senator next presented a suggestion which he asked the Secretary to turn over in his mind. He proposed the setting up of a combined sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees to go to the Far East with the idea of acting in an advisory capacity to Jessup, Fosdick and Case⁵² in their investigations of the situation in the Far East. The Senator seemed to feel this would be helpful to both Committees of the Congress in working on Chinese and other related problems in the future. The Secretary reminded him that the Department feels that a matter of this kind should be brought before the full Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees for discussion and made no commitment on the Senator’s recommendation for the creation of the special group.

The Senator told the Secretary that his report,⁵³ which he will give to the Committee, of his trip to the Far East, will be mailed to the Secretary and to me within the next day or so.

On departing the Senator expressed to me his firm resolve to do everything he possibly can to prevent any political considerations from being brought next Congressional session into questions concerning our foreign policy, as he felt it was of transcendent importance that we avoid any appearance of any domestic disaffection for our foreign policies in the trying times in which we find ourselves.

49. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.
50. November 5, p. 173.
51. Former Mayor of Shanghai.
51. For text of statement by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.
52. Raymond B. Fosdick and Everett Case on July 30 were appointed consultants to the Department on Far Eastern matters.
53. Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 29, 1949, Congressional Record, vol. 96, pt. 1, pp. 156–160, Exhibit A.