The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 8—5:51 p. m.]
2793. View possibility Secretary will have occasion Paris discuss recognition Communist China with Bevin and Schuman, Embassy has reviewed comments it has submitted this subject in light subsequent developments with particular reference British attitude (London’s telegram 4353, October 3113).
Embassy continues feel valid position taken its telegrams 2155, August 26; 2538, October 7; and 2601, October 15, that US policy China should contemplate (1) maintenance of diplomatic relations without prejudice disapproval regime, and (2) parallel economic aloofness with maximum controls of contacts contributing to enhance industrialization and thus economic-military potential Soviet bloc. Also concur desirability that establishment relations should preferably be accomplished in due course as situation develops and that it is important precipitous action that regard be avoided. Seems to us material factors pointing towards advisability postponement immediate recognition are (1) that important areas China (notably Chungking, wartime Chinese capital) not yet included Communist control, and establishment relations with government not obviously in de facto authority would appear premature, (2) that so long as Soviets have not formally raised issue, it would be unwise for West to take step likely upset and further complicate status Nationalist representatives current session GA with result Chinese case there, which we have supported, might not receive public airing to which [Page 184]at least it would appear entitled, and (3) that in face US public statements concerning Chinese policy US recognition now could be interpreted as ensuing from British and other pressures, a conclusion that would tend be corroborated if action preceded public report findings and recommendations Chinese policy committee.
We think these considerations are impressive and firmly believe that if, as implied British circularization other governments (London’s 4353), British anticipate immediate recognition, strong representations should be made to dissuade them.
We have considered possible alternative timing. Presumably indefinite delay followed by ultimate recognition would emphasize reluctance with which step finally taken and cede increasing initiative to Soviet policy China. As possibly best bet, suggest that occasion of contemplated Baguio conference or similar meeting might afford opportunity for general simultaneous Western recognition to be accomplished as logical sequence to decision such conference. Should collective representatives of free peoples Southeast Asia determine to take note situation China and, although condemning dictatorial Communist regime there, to establish diplomatic relations as practical matter, parallel US, UK, French, etc., action premised on lead Asian democracies would have merit of giving endorsement to policy of those nations most directly concerned. Manifestly participation or possibly leadership of India in such a collective determination would be important.
Sent Department 2793, Department pass Paris for the Secretary 394, London 305.