Memorandum by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Decisions Reached by Consensus at the Meetings With the Secretary and the Consultants on the Far East73
[Here follows summary of decisions in regard to the area from Japan to Pakistan as a whole, followed by summary of decisions in regard to individual countries in the area, Japan, Ryukyu Islands, and Korea.]
- The further extension of military aid, overt or covert, by the United States to the Chinese Nationalist Government or to Chinese Nationalist armies would be futile and should be ruled out as likely to recoil to our disadvantage.
- With regard to providing any anti-Communist elements in China with any kind of assistance, the burden of showing that such assistance would be effective in the specific case must lie with the proponents of such a program of aid.
- With regard to Communist China, we anticipate the possibility that great strains will develop between Peiping and Moscow. These [Page 161]strains would not only work to our advantage but would contribute to the desired end of permitting China to develop its own life independently rather than as a Russian satellite. However, rather than go out of our way to create difficulties for the Chinese Communist regime, which might drive it the more firmly into the arms of the Kremlin while failing to shorten its life, we should recognize that the ingredients of the situation in China are such as to make the task of any Chinese Government exceedingly difficult and should allow these ingredients full opportunity to operate.
- In pursuit of our aim of encouraging Chinese Communist deviation from the Moscow line, we should keep before the Chinese people the fact of our interest in their independence and welfare, and to this end should utilize the full potentialities of an expanded information program, relying upon written materials in addition to the Voice of the USA, which is of limited effectiveness.
- At the present time, we should not consider US Government financial assistance to Chinese Communist projects of an economic-developmental nature and should discourage the enlistment of private American capital in such projects. Communist China should not be made eligible for Point IV benefits. However, we should permit American business firms already in China to continue their operations and should favor the continued functioning of American philanthropical and educational missions in China in order to maintain our contacts with the Chinese people.
- We should acquiesce in trade with China of an innocent character while permitting no strategic items to reach Communist China and making no loans to encourage trade with China.
- US recognition of the Chinese Communists is not to be regarded as a major instrument for showing our interest in the Chinese people or for winning concessions from the Communist regime. Our attitude on this question should not be an eager one, but should be realistic.
- We should not seek to detach Formosa from the Communist-controlled mainland either by the application of force or by seeking jurisdiction over the island through a trusteeship arrangement on behalf of Formosan self-government, since such actions on our part would outrage all Chinese elements and as a resort to naked expediency would destroy our standing with the smaller countries of the world. However, should another nation bring the conflict involving Formosa before the United Nations as a threat to the peace, we might join with other members in supporting a cease-fire resolution and the application of the principle of self-determination.
[Here follows summary of decisions with regard to other countries in the area, the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India, and Pakistan.]
- The Secretary of State presided over two meetings with Officers of the Department and the Consultants on the Far East. On October 26, from 2:30 to 5 p. m., the following were present: The Secretary, the Under Secretary (Webb), the Deputy Under Secretary (Rusk), the Counselor (Kennan), the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGee), Ambassador Stuart, Ambassador Jessup, Consultants Robert B. Fosdick and Everett Case, and Walter Wilds, Charles W. Yost, Raymond A. Hare, John M. Allison, Philip D. Sprouse, John Davies, Jr., Kenneth C. Krentz, Dallas W. Dort, and Charlton Ogburn, Jr. On October 27, from 4 to 5:15 p. m., the following were present: The Secretary, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Butterworth, Ambassador Stuart, Ambassador Jessup, Consultants Fosdick and Case, and Messrs. Wilds, Yost, Hare, Allison, Sprouse, Davies, Lampton Berry, Krentz, Dort, Elbert G. Mathews, James L. O’Sullivan, and Ogburn.↩