893.01/10–2549: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 26–6:16 a. m.]
1822. ReDeptel 710, October 14.47 British Consul here apparently uninformed re Indian reply to recognition bid. Deduce general Indian position was probably indicated in Nehru’s October 18 statement that Indian Government like any other government “cannot ignore realities”. Note further (1) underlying Indian sympathy for another Asiatic country having many problems basically similar to India’s own; (2) probable desire Government India, possessing long common frontier with China, effect early stabilization relations with latter with aim avoiding as much trouble as possible; (3) political position of India to left both USA and UK is perhaps intimated by Indian stand in UN on both Vietnam and North Korea re ECAFE.48 Note finally India is without established interests China under attack except in Sinkiang, and in that relatively unencumbered state probably sees little promise profit, but instead some dangers in holding back on recognition for reasons they might judge connected with power politics. It would seem to appear urge in Indian Government is toward early recognition.
Take occasion refer Contel 1710, October 8, and respectfully note that seems against Peiping background be danger overstraining on Western recognition united front which has already shown signs weakness this regard. Believe attempt achieve impossible might lead to American diplomatic reverse, and that any effort cause non-Soviet powers generally to withhold recognition either indefinitely or for long period would fall in category impossible. Accepting our own view international law this regard, observe (1) by time Chinese stand against USSR in UN is terminated position Nationalist Government Chungking will in all probability be patently hopeless. (2) There has never before been exacted as prerequisite for recognition China’s various governments the position that new rule should have consent governed, there never having been general election and therefore [Page 144] popularly approved government in China’s known history, and (3) Communist willingness to abide by international law and accept international obligations is still to be clarified. In circumstances believe that maximum coordination now assured is prior consultation without necessarily prior agreement as accorded by British (Depintel October 19, 4 a. m.50) and that logical optimum achievement would be on level joint effort by interested non-Soviet governments to get principal clarification of Communist position re international obligations. Communists would be most apt make concessions this regard if there were something in nature parallel stand by interested powers, and this I believe should be undertaken early because of manifest impatience some interested governments. Such undertaking would probably incidentally slow up recognition tendency. This seems feasible move and joint effort this respect might, depending on developments, lead in due course to increased cooperation vis-à-vis Communist China, whereas to attempt more at this stage would probably overstrain patience and endurance our natural allies.
Re Depintel October 17, 8 a. m.,50 note that hypothetical recognition would not ipso facto lead of necessity to rendering economic aid to Peiping regime. Believe on contrary that any American recognition should basically be designed for purpose maintaining contact with situation for possible joint exploitation as indicated Conreftel October 8, that although trade with Communist China even as Eastern Europe should be made possible within framework statement outlined Depcirtel October 14, 5 a. m.50 There should be no gratuitous assumption of Chinese as economic burdens, that as implied Conreftel October 17 full weight of those economic burdens should be left on back USSR for so long as China maintains present political orientation and USSR thereby enjoys special political influence this country. Believe that thus qualified recognition holds no danger political or economic loss to USA, but that without recognition our maneuverbality in Asia would be more untrammeled than if political contacts were maintained.