Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.01/10–2449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Ringwalt)⁴⁰

[London,] October 21, 1949.

Under instructions from the Chargé d’Affaires I called at the Foreign Office to discuss with Mr. Dening certain aspects of the transmission by the British Consul General at Peiping of the note to the Chinese Communist authorities there, suggesting the establishment of informal relations between the two governments. I informed him that it seemed that doubt still existed in the minds of some of our people dealing with Far Eastern problems that someone in the Foreign Office might have “pulled a fast one.”

Dening replied that he had “hoped that Mr. Bevin had lain that ghost” in his conversation with Ambassador Douglas. (Embtel 4173, October 18, 1949). He denied emphatically that any skulduggery had been intended anywhere along the line, but admitted that his overworked and undermanned staff had committed two stupid errors: (1) the Foreign Office instruction to the British Embassy at Washington containing the text of the note to be shown to the Department of State had inadvertently been sent “Saving” (by air mail) instead of being telegraphed, and (2) the Far Eastern Department had blundered outrageously in not checking with its Legal Adviser who, as has already been pointed out (Embtel 4062, October 10, 1949), is of the opinion that the note as delivered amounted to de facto recognition. He reiterated what already had been stated by Mr. Bevin to the Ambassador that the delivery of the note was in fact in violation of the Bevin–Acheson agreement to consult not only with regard to recognition of the Chinese Communist regime at Peiping but on all matters of concern to the United States and the United Kingdom in the Far East.

Dening volunteered that, although the conference to be held in Singapore in November (Embassy’s telegram No. 4197, October 19⁴¹) was to have no formal agenda, one of the questions to be discussed there would be the implications of the recognition by the United Kingdom of a central Chinese Communist government on the position of the British Empire in the Far East. Certainly no recognition by the United Kingdom of the Chinese Communists would take place until the conclusion of that conference.

I mentioned that I personally was not too impressed by what seemed to me to be specious arguments, advanced by certain British officials, differentiating between de jure and de facto recognition, to the effect that whereas de facto [de jure?] recognition would under the Bevin–Acheson agreement be a matter for consultation between the two governments, de facto would not.⁴² Dening replied with some asperity that if any British official in Washington or London had advanced such an argument he had done so without authority.

In conclusion, I said that, regardless of the facts of the case, what concerned me most was that the incident was indicative of what I felt to be a distressing lack of coordination, on a working level at (Least, between our two governments and that I hoped we could do better in the future. Mr. Dening assured me of his entire cooperation.

40. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) in his despatch No. 1688, October 24; received October 29.
41. Not printed; it described the frame of reference for the forthcoming Singapore conference as “merely another regional conference of chiefs of mission, area military commanders and colonial governors” (701.4100/10–1949).
42. Marginal notation: “Scarlett of FonOff told us de facto recog. did not require consultation”. See telegram No. 4062, October 10, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 118.