026 China/8–2549: Airgram
The Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 3—4:22 p. m.]
A–84. K. C. Wu called at this office on August 23 to return the copy of the full text of the White Paper that we had loaned him. He stated that if he was U.S. Secretary of State he would be very proud of the document, but, in his own opinion, it was unbalanced since it made almost no reference to the attitude of the Chinese toward the Mao Communists or to Chinese current reaction to Communist control. I pointed out that the period covered by the Paper ended with the Yangtze campaign and that most unfavorable reaction stories had appeared since then.
He stated that he thought it a very “cute trick” that the only reference to “agrarian reformers” was in a quote from General Hurley.
As to the Canton reply, he said that I could probably see the influence of the Gimo in the final draft and that it was along the lines that he had predicted. I inquired as to what hat the Gimo had worn when he summoned George Yeh to Taiwan with the draft for his personal consideration and revision. KC said that it was Canton that had asked for the Gimo’s advice and comment, and not the reverse, that the Canton proposed draft had been querulous and contentious and that the Gimo had prepared the final text to eliminate as much of that as he could. He had objected to the statement about a “later reply at an appropriate time”, but that Canton had insisted on its inclusion.
KC then stated that what he wanted to talk about was the future of Taiwan under the White Paper “policy”. He said that there were four possible approaches by the American Government: 1) to walk out, 2) to try for trusteeship under UN auspices, 3) to make a forthright takeover, and 4) to support the Government here to help keep it from Commie hands.
[Page 1405]The first possibility he stated was out of the question for reasons of strategy and public opinion.
The second would encounter vetos by both the USSR and China in the Security Council before it could be placed with the Trusteeship Council.
The third would result in the killing of Chinese by Americans and of Americans by Chinese.
Therefore, he said, the fourth was the only alternative.
In an attempted rebuttal of my argument that it would be somewhat contradictory for the United States, after the issuance of the White Paper, to further aid the Gimo and his dicredited Kmt in Taiwan, Wu replied, as he has so often of late, that the Gimo is a changed man intent on reforms and that all of the discredited followers were gradually being sloughed off. I said that some of the Gimo’s recent appointments, decisions, and interferences in affairs of state gave no indication to the outside world that there had been any change whatsoever in his personal approach to problems, to which Wu replied that the West always wanted something dramatic whereas in China history was made gradually; there was no excuse for us wilfully to create a stumbling block, in the person of the Gimo, in our strategic path, and he again raised the question as to what I thought the United States would do about Taiwan. I replied that the Chinese always wanted to know what the United States was going to do, whereas I thought that right now it was more important to know what the Chinese were going to do, and that this office was as always prepared to transmit to Washington any ideas or proposals.
Wu claimed that the United States should come across with further aid to save Taiwan and that at the same time it should insist on certain specific reforms that must be taken. This we should have done at the time of the Marshall Mission and that our failure to take that stance had resulted in the present dilemma. I expressed the opinion that that would be placing us in the position of interventionists while relieving the Chinese of taking any initiative, or even responsibility for the end result. I said I doubted the acceptability of such a proposal.
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As though he felt that he could gain acceptance by constant drumming, Wu closed on the theme that the Gimo was a changed man, that he would do nothing dramatic to prove it; but that a close study of developments would prove it; that he was constantly making necessary reforms and plans for more reforms; and that when Canton falls we will look at the picture as it has by then developed in an entirely new light.
[Page 1406]In reply to my inquiry of whether there was any possibility that the Gimo might step out of the picture and retire to Baguio or Sun Moon Lake or Kweilin and leave matters in younger and more popular hands, he gave a decisive no, with the follow-up that there is no one to replace him.