893.01/10–1249
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
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Recognition of China
The Prime Minister21 expressed the views which he repeated the next day in his conversation with the President that are outlined in that memorandum,22 and I refer to it here. His talk was clearly slanted toward early recognition. I told him that that was not our view, that we thought it important in this case not to believe that any advantage could be gained for the country in according early recognition, [Page 125] and that our primary concern here was to indicate by our conduct our deep interest and concern for the welfare of the Chinese People I thought that this might be done by indicating in our handling of the situation that we were concerned for instance, that the Government actually did control all of China and that by early recognition we were sacrificing the interests of some portions of the country which were still attempting to maintain its independence of Communist control. Then, too, we should show our concern that the Government should establish some form of acquiescence by the Chinese people. While this might be something which could not be done, it was important that the Chinese people should know we were thinking in these terms. Finally, the Government should be required to state its international obligations. He asked how we could bring our own attitude to the attention of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done both through the Voice of America and by printed material which could be circulated. He doubted whether such material could be effectively circulated. His general attitude seemed to be that since recognition was doubtless inevitable, there was little purpose in postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers.
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