393.1115/9–349: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 6—12:46 p. m.]
Cantel 1067. Reference telCan 639, September 1. Chen Tai-chu, director American section Foreign Office, today stated his Government “preferred to adhere” to evacuation ship plan as originally arranged and asserted that permitting any Communists to leave on evacuation planes “could not possibly be acceptable” to Nationalist Government. He emphasized that only one exception to closure measure would result if ship called Shanghai, but if planes used, numerous exceptions would be required. For control purposes, Nationalists would also prefer an evacuation ship to planes. He expressed great surprise at possibility of evacuation ship not being used. Remarking that his government had “applauded” evacuation Ship project and was eagerly awaiting details of its implementation, he made very clear that only after great difficulty and delay, if then, would Nationalists consider [consent] to air evacuation and said that before further consideration could be given this new proposal his Government would like to know what difficulties had arisen with regard to evacuation ship, whether said difficulties created by Communists.
From foregoing conversation with Foreign Office it would appear highly probable that Nationalist Government would not be willing alter, without long delay, original basis of repatriation as discussed with them on several previous occasions. If “difficulties” raised over the entry of the Gordon into Shanghai had indeed been created by the Communists, Chinese Government might prove more willing discuss alternatives, but should they learn that US Government itself has at this stage changed its mind, it seems reasonable to believe that they would remain adamant in their stand Which allows one ship to make one call for repatriation purposes.
Although reaction Consulate General Shanghai to Department’s proposals in telCans 639 and 642, September 152 not yet received, no doubt Communists would be as unhappy at any change of original plans as Nationalists, changing procedure at this date would indicate to each party that we do not trust them and might lead to propaganda from which US could not benefit. To exhibit fear at this date of possible Communist violation of terms under which ship to enter Shanghai when principle of entry agreed on and when both written assurances probably forthcoming, seems a negative attitude which can only further antagonize Communists and render any future similar [Page 1328] negotiations much more difficult. Nationalists, unless aware of reasons for change in US attitude towards entry of Gordon into Shanghai, might well consider it based on distrust of themselves.
All in all, if adequate written assurances are received from both Nationalists and Communists, more can be duly publicized so that the general public is aware of the terms under which Gordon is to enter Shanghai, the pressure on both Nationalists and Communists to see repatriation trip through without incident will be heavy and will outweigh many advantages which either of them might consider gaining by interfering with the operation in any serious manner. Neither Chinese Government nor Communists will desire to give their enemies opportunity of accusing the other of violating agreement.
Reference penultimate paragraph telCan 642, employment of coastal vessels to operate Hong Kong–Shanghai would not meet Chinese Government requirement of one trip. Conversation with APL official indicates they believe such operation impracticable.
Sent Department Cantel 1067; repeated Shanghai 525.