393.415/4–2249: Telegram
The Consul General at Shanglvai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 22—7:11 a. m.]
1309. British ConGen informs me British as yet have no explanation for incidents on Yangtze involving British warships. Nevertheless repetition of incident in case of HMS London over 24 hours after first incident plus fact Chinese Nationals [Nationalists] have no warship of comparable class makes it clear Commies responsible for incidents must have known they were firing on British or at least not Chinese Nationalist warships.
Attitude Commies take would of course be vital in assessing significance of incidents. Nevertheless strong presumption incidents were deliberately provoked and Commie High Command could have prevented London incident if it had so desired requires very careful consideration [Page 1244] questions raised by Admiral Badger in my conference with him on April 20 and 21 re course US Navy should now pursue.
Admiral Badger is clearly right in feeling evacuation of hundreds American civilians in warships now available here if Commies were posted along lower reaches Whangpoo and acted as they did with British warships would be extremely serious affair which would probably result heavy bloodshed among both Navy personnel and civilians and which might have major international repercussions. Such incident would also presumably strengthen hands those in US demanding massive aid to Nationalists. On other hand withdrawal Navy unit before Commies had taken either Shanghai or lower reaches Whangpoo would undoubtedly give rise more insistent charges both in China and US that our policy here is one of scuttle. Such course would be the more difficult to pursue in view Admiral Badger’s broad statements made last December re Navy’s role in protecting American community Shanghai and after we had sent Marines here with all risks this involved for avowed purpose protecting American community during precisely period which seems be approaching. Also Whangpoo below Shanghai is, unlike Yangtze, international waterway.
Urgency reaching decision this matter is emphasized by reported massive crossings Yangtze in Wuhu-Nanking area, yet I feel two major questions on which decision should be based are still open: (1) what attitude will Commies take about incidents on Yangtze?; (2) what action will British take thereafter? Should I now issue third warning on basis incidents and Commie approach before British have taken any action whatsoever? I feel practical effects might not warrant criticism which this would probably entail. Reports reaching me notably of heavy demand for passage on President Wilson sailing April 27 suggest those who feel they can leave are doing so in any case. Question of issuance of another formal warning and final decision on withdrawal of ships from Whangpoo should nevertheless receive urgent consideration even before the above-mentioned points are cleared up since events might not permit effective action thereafter.
Sent Department, repeated Nanking 756.