Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.9111RR/10–849: Telegram

The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, October 8, 1949—1 p. m.
[Received October 11—4:47 a. m.]

1710. Re Contel 1619, September 27⁹⁷ re mooted recognition Communist regime, invite attention following factors.

1. Canton seems on verge collapse and in all probability authority Nationalist regime will shortly be further reduced from present bare minimum. Examples given by other militarists indicate further defections from Kmt⁹⁸ ranks to Communist side must be considered probable as Generalissimo’s⁹⁹ rule crumbles. Inclusion Lung Yun¹ in Peiping group augur[s] well for stability Yunnan under colleague Lu Han.² Szechuan generals were ever self seekers. It is even within bounds possibility Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi³ will find accommodation within bounds “People’s Republic of China”. Little of substance is now left besides Formosa where Kmt rule can hardly be deemed popular. In short, practically all of China proper will probably be found inside Communist camp within visible future. And if Nationalist Government presents its case against USSR in UN on basis same evidence it has adduced previously, and with same ineptitude it has shown in other post-war political matters, its political failure will be complete in all sectors.

2. Opposition to Communist economic fighting front has been in rapid decline for full year. To endeavor to stem that ebb tide of decline runs contrary to bitter lessons experience and is demonstrably useless. Opposition to Communists must now develop within their own camp in struggles over such matters as agrarian policy, attitude toward petty bourgeoisie, Soviet influence in Manchuria and Sinkiang, contradiction between international political orientation and need foreign trade for program industrialization, party power. Political orientation at present is clear cut enough, but strains really only begin with achievement military aims and establishment primary controls over same 450 million Chinese who have been bitterly fighting each other for decades. Communist pretense of unanimity in those conditions must be forced. Purges of party and suppression of dissident elements to be anticipated, but basic problems will remain unsolved for years. Communist rule in sum must long be attended by serious difficulties.

3. USSR early in field where conditions favorable for its plowing. It can be expected put much political force into effort but little material investment, this at any rate in China proper. Economic conditions therefore can only be improved slowly and laboriously which (even granted dominant role played by political factors in Communist thinking) will probably force both China and USSR recognize need for leaving some room for action by other nations, for China’s own salvation. Communist China’s political usefulness moreover would be reduced for USSR if China unable win acceptance in international arena, so as to vote for USSR. Countries with interests here will therefore probably be permitted retain and develop them for present, within narrow limits established by xenophobic regime highly conscious of its own authority [but of no one?] else[’s] interest. Nation with greatest economic stake is Britain, and difficulties it is now experiencing in many fields will presumably increase pressure for accommodation more agencies in China if such accomodation promises save something from the burning. With political channels established through recognition, Britain or other nations would have some possibility manipulating situation to own benefit. Without such channels any nation would be selectively debarred from influencing developments and its own nationals and interests in China probably subjected crippling restrictions.

4. Communists will soon be in effective power over all but periphery, where main conflict, and one which can be expected grow, is with USSR (Tibet probably safe for coming winter). Communists reputedly (see reftel) have already adjusted their position re international treaties, may be expected accept other realities as time goes on. This development should, of course, be watched. It should also be investigated by early approach to Communist side to discover their attitude re matters of interest to powers called upon to extend recognition. If Lo Lung-chi⁴ would say “recognition without bargaining,” it is still to be observed that Communists have exigent needs, and although they would surely prefer get good values for nothing it is highly probable that even as they pay to USSR for value received they would pay to others, as is fit and proper. Least effective way of influencing situation in China is by divorcing self from it; better procedure is to maintain contact, investigate possibilities as situation develops, and manipulate that situation to desired ends as far as possible. Possibilities offered by joint consultation with interested powers in UN suggest themselves naturally.

5. In circumstances would recommend following action: (a) continuation policy non-interference to benefit dying Nationalist regime; (b) maintenance for present non-committal (one way or other) position vis-à-vis new regime, but through present crack in door early endeavoring show some interest in planning, intentions and policies regime; (c) let Communists get glimpse of concrete benefits to be obtained through commerce (without slightest hint USA would give charity) and good relations with non-Soviet countries; and (d) if new government seems willing adopt more reasonable attitudes and indicates readiness follow usual standards international behavior, after presumed collapse Canton and hypothetical Chinese failure prove case in UNGA, recognize that government and maintain relations with it even as with USSR and East European countries.

Re (a), note uselessness trying prop up from outside regime unsupported by its own people; re (b), recommend particularly that we do not in fluid situation commit selves overtly as regards future policy, but instead quietly undertake exploration to discover what Communists have to offer, in meantime avoid adoption generally hostile position which would only make development contacts ultimately more difficult; re (c), believe Communists have to discover for selves that political and economic relations with USA and others on our side would promise more profit to China than dependence on USSR before they would feel urge to turn, and that in meantime USA can only view growing Soviet influence and presence Soviet technicians and political workers with best grace possible, appreciating that this very development may help develop schisms in China politics in favor independence from USSR; re (d), maxim in international law finds warrant for recognition new governments when they wield effective political power and are willing and able assume international obligations, this seems in line with position American delegation Bogotá⁵ that established diplomatic relations does not imply judgement of its domestic policies, and however unpleasant it seems that USA can hope play effective pacific role in contemporary China, and perhaps manipulate situation to its political advantage, only through establishment channel for direct dealing with present regime.

[Clubb]

97. Vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter VII.
98. Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).
99. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang, and President of China prior to his retirement on January 21 in favor of Vice President Li Tsung-jen as Acting President.
1. Governor of Yunnan, 1927–45.
2. Governor of Yunnan since 1945.
3. Military and Political Affairs Director for Central China.
4. A leader of the Democratic League.
5. See Department of State, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America With Related Documents, pp. 82–83 and Resolutions XXXV and XXXVI, p. 271.