893.01/10–749: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State

2538. Receipt by Consulate General [at] Peiping [of] letter from Foreign Minister CPG (Central People’s Government) indicates realistic approach new regime to problem recognition. Instead of leaving matter in air, CPG has passed ball directly to us and next move is ours. Chou’s technique of addressing Clubb personally seems immaterial, as inclusion title might have implied recognition Clubb’s status, a step which CPG could scarcely be expected to take now. While difficult to estimate CPG attitude toward continued residence China our consular officials in absence recognition, it appears probable [Page 107] to us that CPG will act to cut off their channels communication or will evict them, particularly if we slam door abruptly on recognition. Value reports from Consulate General, Peiping, this critical period need not be emphasized.

Several courses of action suggest themselves to us:

(1)
Ignore approach to Clubb:
(2)
Object to manner letter addressed;
(3)
Authorize Clubb to say we will give matter study;
(4)
Authorize Clubb informally request information CPG attitude toward existing treaties, debts, trade, US investments China, missionary activities, etc. In recommending fourth course for Department’s consideration, Embassy suggests that this dickering for information might not appear unreasonable to CPG, that it could drag out Clubb’s stay and freedom to utilize radio, and that it would inevitably cloak him with representative status in minds CPG officials he contacts, perhaps enhancing his chances to hang on indefinitely.

Embassy considers we hold at least two trump cards our hand: first, CPG anxiety to take China UN seat and to acquire attendant international prestige (USSR equally keen on this); second, CPG’s pressing need for foreign trade to ease economic and social problems. Both requirements difficult if not impossible without US–UK recognition although British may considerably weaken second by Hong Kong trade.

In further development Embassy’s views on recognition (Embtel 2155, August 26), we feel that recognition should be extended when CPG has established control over principal areas mainland, and recognition as such should be separate from basic problem policy toward China. Advantages to US in operating mission Peiping include following: on spot reporting, protection American property and citizens; some contact and inevitable influence of Embassy officers with personnel CPG, direct and indirect; dissemination, however informal, of western news not available in rigidly censored press; focal point in China for developing property and exploiting to our advantage USSR imperialism Manchuria and China, USSR responsibility for economic and social ills and restrictions on freedoms, and for encouragement and development pro-US elements. While VOA92 will be useful in publicizing USSR role, and can be furnished by our Embassy Peiping with material, relative shortage shortwave sets China increases importance direct contact.

In period commencing with establishment CPG we see as principal aim US policy to prevent China from contributing to strength USSR bloc, particularly in event future war. As outlined in OIR 5012, [Page 108] August 18,93 we must prevent trade which will enable China to industrialize. Besides doing what we can to limit western aid for industrialization China, we must work for split between CPG and USSR and for weakening of CCP and eventual overthrow by indigenous Chinese forces whose main strength would not be US intervention. We believe total absence official relations will work against our long range aims.

Sent Department; Department pass London 278, Paris 360.

Kirk
  1. Voice of America.
  2. Not printed.