740.00119 PW (Peace)/5–2749
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The problems raised by the Soviet renewal of their previous proposal for consideration of a Japanese peace treaty in the Council of Foreign Ministers and the questions raised in your telegram 17831 were to some extent anticipated as will be evident from the enclosed copies of communications to the Secretary of Defense and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.2 These were prepared just prior to your departure but in the rush of events it was impossible for them to reach you and they were forwarded by me.
I write now to supplement the information contained in the “Memorandum on Japanese Peace Conference” dated May 13, which you took with you. I hope to clear today with the National Military Establishment and White House a telegram recommending that you maintain our present position that the Soviet proposal for consideration of a Japanese peace treaty not be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers but that renewed explorations of the subject might be carried on through diplomatic channels. Incidentally, this recommendation would be made in the full realization that it would probably give the Soviets some propaganda advantage, at least for the time being. [Page 759] The position taken was based on the fact that a final determination has not yet been made:
- (1)
- of the minimum security needs of the United States in relation to Japan, nor
- (2)
- whether it is reasonable to suppose that these needs can be achieved by agreement through the media of a multilateral peace treaty with Japan, particularly under a procedure which would not give the United States a veto.
Subsidiary considerations influencing our decision were:
- (1)
- The probability that the Soviets would inject the question of what Chinese government should be represented at an early convocation of the Asiatic Council of Foreign Ministers, with a view to forcing early recognition of a Communist China;
- (2)
- The position taken by the British Commonwealth nations at the Canberra Conference in 1947 to the effect that any Japanese peace conference must be attended and participated in by all of them from the beginning, and finally
- (3)
- The volatile inconsistency in now suddenly agreeing to a Soviet proposal for early consideration of a Japanese peace treaty in view of the fact that as recently as April 3 you informed Mr. Bevin that no preparations were underway for such a treaty.
It may well be that our minimum security needs with regard to Japan will be found to be of such a nature that, in combination with the necessity from the viewpoint of our economic well-being of getting Japan on a self-supporting basis, it will prove impossible to attain general international agreement to a treaty which would secure United States objectives. Only after receiving replies to the enclosed communications to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council and after diplomatic talks with friendly powers associated with us in other parts of the world will it be possible to reach a decision on these matters.
Should it become apparent that attempts to reach a multilateral settlement which safeguards vital United States security and economic interests will be unsuccessful, it would be most unfortunate if we were committed to proceed with negotiations for a treaty. Not being so committed it would be possible to proceed with a vigorous implementation of the present or if necessary a revised NSC 13/3. Such action should include the possibility of dynamic changes in the regime of control in Japan looking toward the creation of conditions approximating those which would prevail under a peace treaty so that at some point it would be possible to obtain general international de jure recognition of a de facto situation. Obviously it might become necessary during this process to consider how the United States can disengage itself from the present international mechanism, involving SCAP, the FEC, Allied Council, et cetera, which was set up as a temporary expedient and not in the expectation that the United States [Page 760] would indefinitely continue to appropriate, aside from cost of the military occupation, some $400,000,000 a year for Japanese support), but which has now lost its raison d’être, at least so far as the interests of the United States are concerned and has in many respects become a straightjacket. The legal complications are, of course, sundry and require careful attention.
In view of all the above considerations we believe we should take no steps at this time which would start us down a road the end of which we cannot yet see and from which we could only turn back at the cost of grave embarrassment. We, therefore, believe our course of action should be to proceed rapidly with the determination of our own minimum desiderata in full consultation with the National Military Establishment followed by a study of the most feasible means of achieving them in the light of present world conditions. With the despatch of the enclosed communications a first step has been made. The officers concerned are giving urgent consideration to such other aspects of the question as can be studied prior to a reply to these communications. It is hoped that upon your return from Paris or shortly thereafter it will be possible to proceed to more definitive action.
Respectfully yours,