Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.0011 PW (Peace)/5–2749: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Huston) to the Secretary of State

restricted

Tokyo, May 27, 1949.

180. Cite C50343. ReDeptel 226, May 24.¹ Although the Japanese hope for an early peace treaty is deep and the reaction to the prospect of discussion by CFM is therefore enthusiastic, Japanese practical expectations arising from the proposal have been soberly tempered by doubt as to Soviet motives and the apparent necessity of Chinese participation. Some opinion believes proposal motivated by Communist success in China and Soviet intention to force United States recognition of Communist Government since no treaty settlement with Japan can be made without Chinese participation. Japanese Communists have repeatedly advocated early peace treaty since summer 1948 concomitant with withdrawal occupation.

Vishinsky proposal² believed to strengthen substantially propaganda position Japanese Communists. Japanese generally not concerned over 4-power peace discussions as opposed to 11-power FEC member plan so long as treaty concluded. Except for Communists, most Japanese heretofore believed that Soviet Union basically opposed to peace treaty and used 4-power plan as pretext to delay action. Sudden injection by Vishinsky of Japan peace proposal into Conference Foreign Ministers called primarily for European problems may convince Japanese that Soviet Union sincerely anxious for treaty.

While editorial comment has thus far been limited, better informed Japanese regard Soviet proposal as strictly propaganda move and do not understand why the United States in replying to Vishinsky did not set forth more fully and emphatically United States desire for Japan peace treaty and point out that previous American efforts failed largely because of Soviet attitude. In general, Japanese elated at prospect of peace treaty discussions at high level but doubt that accord on subject can be reached at Conference Foreign Ministers. Japanese Communist propaganda barrage to blame United States for failure is of course to be expected.

There is some thought here that useful ammunition for counteracting Communist propaganda might have been provided by admitting the Japanese treaty to the CFM agenda as a later item after agreement on other agenda points.

Huston

1. Not printed; it requested information.
2. Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Deputy (Assistant) Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. For documentation of Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris, where this proposal was made, see vol. iii, pp. 856 ff.