Attached is a paper designed to suggest the sort of program we feel
might be put in hand to create a new and hopeful atmosphere in our
East and South Asian policy.
Since the schedule embodied in this paper is only intended to be
illustrative, and does not represent any final Staff recommendation,
I am not making it a Staff paper. But I hope it will serve to show
what we have in mind as the sort of program
we consider possible and necessary, without committing us to certain
of the individual proposals (such as that for a three-power defense
treaty) which obviously require careful study and airing before they
could be seriously considered.
[Annex]
Paper Drafted by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of
the Policy Planning Staff
top secret
[Washington,] July 7,
1949.
Suggested Course of Action in East and
South Asia
1. It is apparent that in the American public mind our policy
toward Asia is suffering from an acute case of negativism. That
the objective situation in East and South Asia does not permit a
wide range of solid action on our part is not adequately
understood and, even if it were, would not satisfy the demand in
the American nature for “positive action”. The White Paper on
China2 may
do much to provide a rational explanation for our policy of
disengagement in China. We have little to be ashamed of in that
record and much of which to be proud. While the White Paper will
go far toward justifying our policy toward China and quiet most
of our critics, it will also probably provide some fuel for the
more extreme partisan critics of our policy in the Far East.
Furthermore, the issuance of that paper will be, essentially,
another negative act. The public may say, “Very well, you were
right in not doing anything, but where do we go from here?”
2. A change of climate is needed in our policy toward East and
South Asia. It is needed not only to win the confidence and
support of the American public. It is needed also to improve the
psychological atmosphere in East and South Asia, an atmosphere
which is becoming surcharged with nervous apprehension.
3. The course of action presented below is directed at bringing
about this necessary change in political climate. It is designed
to achieve, so far as is possible, certain tangible objectives.
But because there is so little that we can do in a concrete way
in East and South Asia, the true measure of our success will not
be in what we do but how we do it. The political climate in East
and South: Asia is going to be noticeably improved only if we
undertake the following actions with a real sense of theater. In
this oriental setting, the gesture and the show are as important
as the substantial deed.
4. The following proposed actions are cast in the form of a
detailed timetable. This has been done in an attempt, not to lay
down a hard and fast operational schedule, but to emphasize the
necessity of comprehensive and closely-timed actions on a wide
front if we are to create a new and hopeful atmosphere in our
East and South Asian policy. The following suggestions are
therefore subject to modification both in timing and in
substance.
[Page 1149]
July 1949
5. We should immediately:
- (a)
- discuss frankly with and seek the approval of key
Congressional leaders for the course of action set forth
below, telling them that in our opinion no lesser
program is likely to be effective in containing
Communism in East and South Asia;
- (b)
- discuss this paper frankly with the British and
Canadian Governments;
- (c)
- continue the implementation of the recommendations
contained in the Policy Planning Staff’s paper on
Southeast Asia.
6. President Quirino should be invited to visit Washington for
conversations regarding mutual American-Philippine interests in
the Far East. This invitation and the reason for it should be
publicly announced.
7. If in our present examination of the Japanese problem we find
that we can, within three or four months, move toward a peace
settlement with that country without jeopardizing our essential
security interests, we should do so. And as we do so, we should
prepare the American public for the forthcoming changes,
including those mentioned in paragraph 22. At the same time, we
should, through diplomatic means, thoroughly prepare the ground
with friendly FEC
Governments.
8. We should continue and intensify preparations for the
extension of economic and military assistance to Indonesia in
expectation of a possible success in the political negotiations
now taking place between the Dutch and the Indonesians.
9. We should continue our efforts to strengthen the Thai
Government by (1) expediting the transfer to Thailand of the
gold at Tokyo claimed by the Thai Government; (2) organizing
technical missions to assist the Thai Government in its
agricultural and industrial reconstruction programs; (3)
granting promptly a small amount of military aid as an emergency
measure and taking whatever steps as may be necessary to
facilitate future Thai procurement of military equipment in this
country; and (4) instituting periodic naval visits with naval
aircraft making good will flights into the interior of
Thailand.
10. The President should one day prior to the issuance of the
White Paper on China make a speech in which he points up the
main conclusions to be drawn from the White Paper and sets forth
in broad, affirmative, confident tones the future course of our
policy with respect not only to China but also to East and South
Asia.
11. Release of the White Paper.
12. Ambassador Jessup should start on a tour of the area,
visiting Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, Rangoon, New
Delhi, Colombo and Karachi for talks with Government leaders at
these capitals, regarding major issues of mutual interest.
[Page 1150]
13. If Quirino can visit Washington, his stay here should be
attended by wide publicity concluding with a joint communiqué
announcing close U.S.-Philippine collaboration in the Far East.
We should give Quirino:
- (a)
- Some greater degree of assurance than is now manifest
of American support of the Philippines against possible
external attack. What is necessary is simply that we
affirm to a greater degree than we have heretofore the
existing U.S. willingness to go to the aid of the
Philippines if they are subjected to external
attack.
- (b)
- A U.S.–Philippine Defense Board and a mutually
satisfactory solution of the base problem. Political
considerations here should override any technical
objections of the NME.
- (c)
- Executive support of additional funds to be
appropriated to the War Damage Commission or similar
economic aid.
14. Announce preparations for the establishment at Manila of a
regional university in which the various independent governments
of East and South Asia and the U.S. collaborate in training
native technicians for the development of their individual
countries in a spirit of mutual cooperation. Our contribution
should be on the basis of the President’s Point Four program.
While the attraction that such an institution would exert
throughout the region would be largely technical, it should be
our purpose that the university have a political significance
through developing a consciousness of interdependence within
East and South Asia and that area’s interdependence with the
Atlantic Community. In a subtle but perhaps no less effective
way, this institution, and any future branches of it in the
region, should be our counter-part, in our own terms, to
Moscow’s University of the Toilers of the East.
August 1949
15. The Chiefs of Mission at Delhi and Karachi should follow up
systematically with the governments to which they are accredited
topics of mutual interest raised by Ambassador Jessup on his
visit.
16. Provided that Congressional leaders and the National Security
Council favor such a security arrangement, we should sound out
the Philippines and Australia on the desirability of a Three
Power Defense Treaty, along the general lines of the Atlantic
Pact, composed initially of the U.S., the Philippines and
Australia, Eventually, this pact should embrace these three
countries plus Canada, Japan and possibly New Zealand.
17. If Australia and the Philippines are willing to go along with
us, we should begin conversations, looking toward the creation
of such a defensive arrangement and make public announcement of
that fact.
18. Provided that we have come to a conclusion that we can move
toward a peace settlement with Japan without greater risk to our
security than now exists, provided that a majority of the FEC countries
[Page 1151]
have indicated acceptance of our
minimum desiderata, and provided that we have firm reason to
believe that the Japanese Government and people would welcome an
invitation to join the three-power treaty, we should propose the
convocation of a peace conference composed of the FEC powers using the FEC voting procedure. If our
proposal is not accepted by all of the FEC powers or if a draft is not agreed upon, we
should promptly move to draft a treaty of our own and obtain the
concurrence of whatever powers wish to participate or, if none
do, on a basis of direct negotiation between the U.S. and
Japan.
19. If we decide that American bases should be retained in Japan,
we should have, in addition to assurances of Japan’s desire to
adhere to the three-power treaty, a clear understanding that
Japan will, as its contribution to the treaty obligations,
invite the U.S. to establish the bases which we seek.
September 1949
20. Conclusion of a U.S.–Philippine–Australian Defense
Treaty.
October 1949
21. If the conditions enumerated above have been met, we should
convoke a Japanese Peace Conference.
22. The signing of a peace treaty with Japan should be
immediately followed by an invitation to Japan, Canada and
possibly New Zealand to adhere to the three-power treaty.
23. Visit by Nehru. We should seize this occasion to dramatize
friendly and close relations between the U.S. and India and our
recognition of the important and constructive role which India
can play in a solution of East and South Asian problems.
