895.00/6–1149: Airgram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
A–196. 1. Reference is made to the Department’s A–68 April 13, 1949, requesting this Mission’s comment on certain reports from an unrevealed source concerning various potential political and military developments in Korea.
2. With respect to source’s expectation that “serious trouble” would develop within a 60-day period, in which the initiative would be taken by the South Koreans, it would appear that this expectation has not been borne out by actual developments. It is true, of course, that there occurred during this period the defection of elements of two battalions of the Eighth Regiment of the Korean Army, the defection of a yard mine sweeper, and the Kaesong and Ongjin incidents,2 but it would not appear that any of the foregoing developments could be considered as in the “serious trouble” category. Of course, these incidents had a disconcerting, if not unsettling, effect, but none of them could be regarded as comparable in scope or consequence with the Yosu–Sunchon incident of October 1948. Although source’s prognostication is far from specific, it would appear that he envisaged the mounting by South Korea of an invasion of North Korea. In spite of a certain [Page 1042] amount of discussion, public and private, in South Korean circles, some of it of a bombastic nature, it is the settled view of this Mission that no general invasion of North Korea is contemplated or is capable of being developed at this time.
3. This Mission offers the following further comment with respect to the items set forth under paragraph numbered 3 of the Department’s reference airgram:
- (a)
- In some respects the military situation in Korea has become more critical during the past few months. In certain other respects, the situation would appear to be less critical. It is evident, for example, that the development of communistic guerrilla forces and bases in parts of South Korea, especially on Cheju Island and in the Chiri Mountains has been dealt a severe blow in consequence of the successful anti-guerrilla operations conducted by the Korean Army during the months of March, April and May. In certain other areas of South Korea, however, especially in South Cholla and North Kyongsang Provinces, this problem has not been solved so successfully, with result that small guerrilla bands continue to operate and commit depredations. From another point of view the reported withdrawal at the end of 1948 of Soviet forces from North Korea, taken in conjunction with the completion of the withdrawal of United States occupation forces by the end of June will leave two native Korean forces facing each other across the long line of the 38th parallel. Assuming withdrawal will be substantially completed, both on the part of the Americans and the Soviets, it will be apparent that the restraining influence hitherto exercised by the occupying powers will have been largely removed. Nevertheless it is the considered view of this Mission that neither South Korea nor North Korea, with what would appear to be fairly evenly balanced military forces, is likely in the foreseeable future to assume the risks associated with a deliberate all-out invasion. It will be clear, however, as indicated above, that the confrontation of hostile forces along the 38th parallel offers numerous opportunities for incidents, whether premeditated or unpremeditated, which might burgeon into all-out warfare. From this point of view, there can be no doubt that the military situation is assuming a more serious posture coincident with the withdrawal of the United States forces. It cannot be ruled out that the removal of the stabilizing force may in the end contribute to the initiation of a general conflict.
- (b)
- Recent reports from North Korea suggest that North Korean military preparations are being appreciably intensified. It is consistently reported, for example, that the so-called “People’s Army” is being expanded (latest reports indicate an army of six divisions); that the training of the “People’s Army” has been and is continuous under the close supervision of Soviet advisors; and that a considerable effort is being made to strengthen the now small North Korean navy and air force. There is no evidence available that there has been any substantial stockpiling of military equipment and supplies (which would obviously have to come from Soviet or Manchurian communist sources). Several recent reports from North Korea indicate, however, that the Soviets may have brought in some military equipment including a few Soviet manufactured planes, tanks and artillery. No reports have been received pointing to any important inflow into North Korea [Page 1043] of military equipment and supplies from Manchuria. In this connection, it may be recalled that the bulk of the Manchurian communist forces have been moved into China Proper, presumably with supporting military equipment. In the light of this reported movement, it seems doubtful whether Manchuria is at present in a position to supply any important amount of military equipment and supplies to North Korea. This Mission has received no information tending to support the report that plans are afoot to remove the capital of the Northern regime from Pyongyang to a point nearer Manchuria. The North Korean Army has during the past two or three years been erecting defensive fortifications north of the 38th parallel, and it would appear that this work continues. Earlier in the present year, numerous reports were received to the effect that pronounced defensive measures were being taken, such as the removal of military supplies and equipment to back areas; but more recent reports suggest a strengthening of North Korean military dispositions along and just back of the 38th parallel. According to reports available locally, the double-track railway line leading from the 38th parallel to Pyongyang has not been taken up, but only a short section of one track leading from the parallel north to the city of Nanchonjom [?].
- (c)
- It is generally recognized, both in American and Korean circles, that the spirit and morale of the South Korean Army has increased appreciably during the past several months. This is the result of the steady growth of the Army, continuous training, improvement in organization and operating procedures, the gradual elimination of inefficient officers and subversives, etc. Moreover, the Army has achieved excellent results in operations against communist guerrilla forces which were strongly entrenched on Cheju Island and in the Chiri Mountains. On the other hand, the defections from the Eighth Regiment came as a disconcerting, if temporary shock. It is generally felt, from the overall point of view, that the Korean Army has made such progress during the past six months that it would give an excellent account of itself against the North Koreans.
- (d)
- As has been reported from time to time, incidents continue to occur daily along the 38th parallel. Most of these incidents are of a minor character and possess no real significance. However, during the past six weeks two important incidents have occurred—those at Kaesong and at Ongjin. It now seems clear that both incidents were precipitated by the North Koreans. It would appear further that both incidents were local in character, despite the relatively large number of men engaged. In all probability, the North Koreans attacked either to test South Korean defenses and capabilities or to intensify the “war of nerves” which long has been prevalent along the parallel. No doubt, the future will see a continuation, if not an acceleration, of these border incidents.
- Mailed on June 14 and received in the Department on June 27.↩
- Telegram 640, June 2, from Seoul (not printed) reported that during the period since May 28 fighting had been taking place on the Ongjin Peninsula following a penetration south of the 38th parallel by North Korean forces estimated at battalion strength. The telegram stated that the incident had received little publicity in Seoul and had not created undue alarm. The North Korean invasion seemed to be primarily a continuation of the war of nerves along the 38th parallel. (895.00/6–249)↩