740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1249: Telegram
The Special Representative in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
priority
374. From US Mission Seoul. Info to CINCFE remytel 362, April 9, 2 p. m. In long discussion with President Rhee last evening, I outlined conclusions of NSC 8/2, omitting only date given in Part I–C and numbers in F–l, 2 and 3 of Warx 86359 March 31.1 Rhee finally agreed that with military assistance assured therein that Korean Security Forces would be competent to maintain stability and defend country. He agreed that psychologically and politically it would be advantageous for him to announce this publicly; and in doing so say that he was, therefore, suggesting to American authorities that timing of withdrawal be reviewed in light of December 12 Resolution. He said he would issue such a statement “in day or two”.
USAFIK and CINCFE rapidly finalizing plans for transferral of equipment, supplies and consumption requirements envisaged in D.2 Study is also being made of availability of dies, special tools, et cetera, to facilitate repair of Japanese rifles and arms and also for making ammunition therefor. This latter is essential as I understand there are only 3 million rounds of Japanese cartridges on hand.
I have been anxiously awaiting information from Washington regarding patrol boats and other items direly needed by Korean Coast [Page 987] Guard (see mytel 15, January 7).3 Special impetus would be given to Koreans if I could tell President Rhee just what is contemplated in line of equipment to be transferred for repair and rehabilitation of American arms.
I am also eagerly awaiting information as to decision regarding observer and liaison planes and few air transports (C–46, or C–47) to be made available. 5 to 10 of the latter are essential as no American military planes now based here and there are no commercial domestic air facilities.
- Telegram Warx 86359 not printed. The date referred to was June 30, 1940 (see paragraph 3c of NSC 8/2, March 22, p. 977) and the numbers are contained in paragraphs 3f (1), (2), and (3) of NSC 8/2, p. 978.↩
- See paragraph 3d of NSC 8/2, March 22, p. 977.↩
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The pertinent portion of this telegram read as follows:
“I am particularly concerned status of Korean Coast Guard (Navy). This arm of Korean security forces relatively neglected and possesses virtually no vessels or equipment of value. With long coast line to be secured, with adjacent North China coast in Communist hands and smuggling by sea on the increase, special efforts should be made immediately to strengthen Coast Guard in terms of suitable small craft and auxiliary equipment. Out smuggling of rice jeopardizing rice collection program and relatively favorable food situation.
“We are separately recommending that additional small Navy group be attached PMAG to accelerate over-all training and instruction Coast Guard.” (895.20/1–749)
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