Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2749: Telegram

The Special Representative in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Seoul, January 27, 1949—2 p. m.

69. ReDeptel 28, January 18.¹ Following appraisal current situation in Korea. On balance conditions improved since mytel 197 November 12.² Major points reviewed below along with subsequent significant developments.

1. Political. Infant Korean Government still basically weak but stronger than two months ago. Favorable influences as follows:

a. Reshuffling cabinet has eliminated incompetent Home and Foreign Affairs Ministers and resulted in installing in Home Ministry Sihn Sung Mo who has brought spearhead probity, earnestness, and patriotism into cabinet and awareness changes vitally needed his ministry.

b. Merger youth groups progressing favorably, with consequent increase unity effort and purpose, with diminution feuding among rival groups, and with greater possibilities government control.

c. UNGA, US, UK, Chinese recognition has improved morale and raised government prestige throughout country.

d. National Assembly has passed important legislation and by voicing some grass roots sentiments and criticism of government, has tended keep executive somewhat in check. There has recently been some improvement in relations between legislative and executive.

e. Greater awareness since Yosu uprising³ of need for outside assistance and Koreans generally more willing accept US advice.

Against foregoing favorable aspects, government continues evidence following deficiencies:

a. Government administration generally poor. National level administration inefficient, but even worse at provincial and lower levels. Maladministration impairs relations between government and people which especially serious in view widespread government involvement industries, communications, transportation and utilities.

b. Rivalries exist within cabinet with jurisdictional disputes arid responsibility vacuums frequent. Generally felt replacement Agriculture and Commerce Ministers necessary strengthen cabinet.

c. Lack of civil service system and inadequate salaries make for instability government jobs and tendency make much as possible from graft while in office.

d. Vigorous prosecution pro-Japanese by Assembly established special tribunal under National Traitors Act likely cause considerable dissension, bitterness, and spitefulness throughout governmental organization and social structure. If vindictively used, campaign could also seriously weaken security forces.

e. National Assembly will probably continue have quarrels with Executive despite recent improvement relations though dissension may be mitigated by presence UN Commission.⁴

f. Political parties generally continue competition for power and government positions with repeated attempts at unification making no appreciable headway.

2. Economic. General economic conditions little changed from last November. Facts at hand do not suggest immediate and cataclysmic collapse. Favorable aspects of present situation are:

1. Farm population representing two-thirds population still relatively well off.

2. ECA program will be bringing in wealth raw materials and supplies which should retard inflationary forces. Large proportion 1948 supplies still in pipeline. Accelerated arrivals will be most helpful in coming months.

3. Large variety domestic goods in small towns and villages suggests highly important homecraft industries are still sustaining large elements population.

4. Many had considered cut off electric power from north would completely disrupt economy. However, worst of winter weathered and hope exists for gradual improvement both coal and power output coming months with resultant increase industrial production.

Unfavorable economic aspects are:

1. Inability put over rice collection program constitutes serious threat price structure and preservation law and order late spring. Potentially this exceedingly dangerous situation. Unknown factor in this picture is actual rice consumption and effectiveness of nongovernmental distribution.

2. Continued budgetary deficits together with deterioration of economic controls are making for further inflation. These factors coupled with impact rice shortages could touch off uncontrollable inflationary spiral. Offsetting factor in this regard is increased quantity ECA foods flowing in and hope more efficient collection thereof.

3. Continued inability Korean officials grapple effectively with problems of economic administration. Coal production at Yongwol could be increased and more power obtained. Rice could be collected. Consumer goods pile up because they are not allocated and distributed.

3. Military. Korean security forces improving in quality and quantity. Weeding out subversives since Yosu uprising has improved morale and reliability.

Army has reached 65,000, police 45,000, navy 4,000. US weapons furnished to arm force of 50,000 by US standards considered generally sufficient for present force 65,000 since Koreans cannot handle as effectively as Americans. It is essential for us to provide the additional weapons and equipment needed to round out supplies we committed ourselves to provide original components of Army, and fill request additional special items requested by CG USAFIK. We should also furnish certain items essential for arming police recently requested by President Rhee⁵ and being forwarded Department for consideration.⁶ We should also furnish patrol boats and other items requested for navy (see letters November 22 and December 10 and telecon).⁷ Basic training new army elements scheduled be completed by March 31 and at battalion and regimental level by June 30. Rivalry within and between services has eased, although competing factions Chinese trained versus Japanese trained officers matter continued concern.

4. Psychological. General attitude people towards future and government has improved. UNGA decision and US, UK, Chinese formal recognition have raised morale and increased feeling of security. Absence major disturbances plus army’s offensive operations Cheju Island and South Cholla Province have increased popular faith in and support of security forces. North Korean failure institute invasion also instilling sentiment “peoples army” not invincible. Worry also lessened re complete withdrawal United States troops since release official announcement some remaining.⁸ Cities generally quiet and will probably remain so provided ration system continues function and inflation held in check. However failure by farmers receive consumer goods and fertilizer as promised tends break down faith in government. Sporadic guerrilla raids and Communist mob actions still affect significant proportion farm areas by keeping peasantry in constant state uncertainty and fear. Further unfavorable factor is preoccupation literate segments population with progress of events China and fear march of Red tide over East Asia unstoppable.

5. Communism South Korea. Although guerrilla activity still widespread mountainous regions South Korea progress being made in containing and eliminating rebel forces. Also South Korea Labor Party organization hard hit, especially in urban centers, by arrests thousands persons suspected leftist activities. Purge of Communists especially active in security forces and among teachers and students. Important factor these crackdowns has been stringent provisions National Security (public peace) Law enacted November by Assembly.⁹ But Labor Party still potent since major leaders have thus far escaped apprehension and support continues flow into South Korea across 38 parallel.

6. North Korea. Failure Peoples Army invade South Korea since Soviet troop evacuation¹⁰ has built up belief sudden invasion unlikely in absence considerable scale co-existing disturbance and turmoil South Korea. However, estimated 64,000 men Peoples Army largely deployed near parallel plus 9,000 man border constabulary reportedly keyed up for fight. This army already trained three years with perhaps 25 percent personnel having experienced Manchurian battle participation. Additional Korean units with Chinese Communist armies estimated total minimum 100,000. Relatively few of latter reported now in North Korea but potentially available. Also, though, these units will not have hesitation about fighting civil war which Peoples Army might have since South Koreans hardly considered “racial brethren” to Koreans born and resident in China and Manchuria. Peoples Army fully equipped with Soviet arms and equipment; other Korean units have mixed Soviet-American-Japanese supplies. Although South Korean Army probably equal opposing forces man for man, it outnumbered and outtrained at regimental and brigade level. Peoples Army furthermore dependent for military supplies on nearby Soviet territory. South Korean Army can be resupplied only from American Army in Japan and ultimately across Pacific. North Korean civil affairs believed reasonably stable although economy operates at marginal consumers level. People still believed firmly under Communist control and, after three years, many non-believers in communism apparently ready to go along opportunistically with regime.

7. Comment. Foregoing presentation suggests calmer attitude people and slightly improved feeling confidence prospects Korean Government. Barring food crisis which possible May through June, and all out armed invasion from north which believed unlikely, I feel power and authority Korean Government will grow during next few months. In expressing foregoing view I do not minimize weakness and inexperience of government and its officials, nor do I ignore efforts which will be continued by Communists to promote chaos in South Korea. Economically, long term view is as bleak as ever. South Korea by itself can scarcely be made viable economy even at great cost. Under existing circumstances long range program of economic rehabilitation and development involving heavy capital expenditures is of dubious merit. In case world conflagration, they would be lost. All efforts therefore should be directed towards immediate program of rehabilitating key industries—coal, power, textiles, fisheries, etc.—in order reduce cost of US support. Short term view is not hopeless. In this economy, key immediate future lies in supply and distribution of rice through June. At worst, we may be forced to rush supplies of grains to urban centers in May and June.

Militarily present South Korean forces considered adequate maintain internal stability, cope with infiltration from north and before long adequate prevent even open invasion known North Korea forces. They would not be adequate should Korean forces battle-trained in Manchuria be utilized. To sum up, with US and UN guidance and sustained support, I believe Korean government has good chance of survival over next few most critical months of its existence.

8. Objectives. In light foregoing, I feel broad objectives US policy in Korea as defined NSC 8¹¹ are still applicable today and should be adhered to as basic policy. I consider record of Korean Government is such today as to suggest those objectives possible of attainment. Moreover, those objectives seem in harmony with UNGA resolution¹² and US action according formal recognition Korean Government.¹³ Additionally, pursuance those objectives would appear to render more secure US position in Japan, discharge our moral obligations toward Korean people and government, preserve democratic showcase in northeast Asia as contrast to conditions outside sphere in contiguous Communist sphere and thereby in measure restore faith of Asiatic people in US professions of interest and help.

9. Recommendations. US continue assist in maintaining independence and integrity of government Republic Korea in all circumstances short of global conflict with Soviet Union. Militarily, foregoing recommendation involves retention Korean military advisory group, intensified and improved training of Korean security forces, and provide adequate equipment and supplies. Regarding US task force, this should be retained in Korea through June 1949, by which time it expected Korean security forces will be sufficiently organized and trained to cope with internal subversion and any act of aggression from north exclusive of overt Soviet or Manchurian involvement. I feel presence US task force here now mostly important for its psychological and stabilizing value and for preservation overall US control for next few critical months of KSF pursuant military agreement and retention in US hands ammunition stocks. Also feel it important any decision remove task force not be taken until UN Commission on Korea has had opportunity express views on withdrawal. In this connection suggest situation may be sufficiently clarified by May 1 to determine whether task force may be withdrawn by July 1. On political side, attainment our objectives involves closest relationship and understanding between Korean and American officials, tactful but persistent American efforts to achieve political unity among Korean political groups and leaders, recruitment top-flight American advisors government administration, personnel management, education, finance, etc., to assist inexperienced Korean officials in performance of functions. On economic side, recognizing economic viability impossible in truncated Korea, we should proceed with implementation present ECA relief-rehabilitation policy, stressing increased coal and power output. In event food crisis arises, threatening existence government, we should be prepared import adequate grain makeup deficiency. Finally, in view fluid situation and intangible internal and external factors affecting future, recommend reappraisal NSC position on Korea in about six months in order reevaluate altered conditions governing food situation, strength and efficiency Korean security forces, Korean Government trends, economic situation, effectiveness ECA program, UN Commission developments, North Korean and Chinese developments, etc.

Muccio

1. Not printed. The Department of State had requested the appraisal in the light of its recommendation that U.S. policy toward Korea be re-examined at the N.S.C. level (740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1248).
2. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 1325.
3. See bid., pp. 1317–1318 and also Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 39.
4. See the editorial note under date of February 2, p. 952.
5. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.
6. Not printed; see the memorandum of conversation by Secretary of the Army Royall, February 8, p. 956.
7. None printed.
8. In the previous year, the State Department had denied the validity of reports of a mass withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea (see the New York Times, November 21, 1948).
9. An English translation of the National Security Law of December 1, 1948, is printed in U.N. document A/936/Add.1, p. 32.
10. The Soviet Union had announced on December 30, 1948, the completion of withdrawal of its occupation forces from North Korea as of December 25, 1948; for background, see telegram 2044, September 19, from Moscow, and telegram 35, September 20, to Seoul, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 1306 and 1307, respectively.
11. April 2, 1948; the text is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 1164.
12. December 12, 1948; see bracketed note, ibid., p. 1334.
13. See the editorial note under date of January 1, p. 940.