740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–1049

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

With reference to my memorandum of December 171 concerning the postponement of the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces from Korea, there is attached (Tab A)2 a copy of CINCFE’s reply to Army telegram No. Warx 81599 of December 21 on that subject. You will recall that the latter telegram, a copy of which was included as an attachment to my reference memorandum, undertook inter alia to define the mission of the military force to be retained in Korea.3

There is also attached (Tab B)2 a copy of the Department of the Army’s reply of January 7 to CINCFE, the text of which was cleared in advance with this Department. This message authorizes CINCFE, in the light of certain considerations advanced in his telegram, to regard the applicability of the mission defined in Warx 81599 as suspended pending a review of basic U.S. objectives in Korea and of the question of the duration of the U.S. military occupation of that country. In this connection, it will be noted from paragraph 1 of Part II of the telegram at Tab A that CINCFE interprets the basic occupation mission under which he has been operating as not requiring him “to secure or to make plans to secure southern Korea”.

The attached exchange of messages points up the importance of an early and thoroughgoing re-appraisal of U.S. policy in Korea by the National Security Council in the light of developments since the approval by the Council and the President of the policy set forth in [Page 943] NSC 8 of April 2, 1948.4 Although the formulation of a firm State position on this subject has not yet been finalized, it is believed that the Department should nevertheless propose forthwith to the National Security Council, in the terms set forth in the attached memorandum to the Executive Secretary (Tab C),5 that the Council take this problem under consideration.

In the meantime, in pursuance of a suggestion made by Major General Almond, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, during the course of a luncheon which I attended at the Pentagon on Saturday,6 a coordinated Army–State message will be despatched to General Mac Arthur7 requesting the latter’s views on the broad question of U.S. withdrawal from Korea, in terms of its political as well as its military aspects and with particular reference to the possible repercussions of such withdrawal on our position in Japan.8 It is not believed, however, that the transmittal of the attached memorandum need await the receipt of such views.

Recommendations

It is recommended that you transmit to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council the memorandum at Tab C requesting that that body undertake as a matter of urgency to re-appraise, and if necessary redefine, the policy of the U.S. with respect to Korea.9

W. W[alton] B[utterworth]
  1. See Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 1337 and 1343 (footnote 4).
  2. Not printed.
  3. The portion of telegram Warx 81599 dealing with the mission of USAFIK read in part as follows:

    “A United States Force retained in Korea for an indeterminate period should, by its presence, act as a deterrent to external aggression and internal subversion and contribute moral support and stability to the Government of the Republic of Korea. This force is symbolic of the sponsoring powers determination to insure the continued existence and progressive development of a newly elected and inexperienced government invested with the popular will of its people. Maintenance internal order should be left to Korean security forces who should be impressed with full weight of their responsibilities, and no involvement of United States Forces therein should be authorized except on higher authority. It is hoped Korean security forces, with assistance of United States training and equipment and backed by mere presence United States Troops, would in addition to maintaining internal order be able effectively to cope with any attempted invasion. It must be borne in mind, however, that so long as United States retains a tactical military force in that area, ultimate responsibility for defense of Korea south of 38 parallel will continue to fall on United States. This force should therefore be prepared, in event of extreme emergency involving demonstrated inadequacy of Korean security forces, to take appropriate action to repel attack by external hostile forces, such action to be taken upon direction by higher authority unless time and exigencies of the situation will not permit delay.…” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/12–2148)

  4. Not printed.
  5. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 1164.
  6. Not printed.
  7. January 8, 1949.
  8. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP); Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE).
  9. See the letter from Secretary of the Army Royall to Secretary of State Acheson, January 25, p. 945.
  10. The memorandum was transmitted by Acting Secretary of State Lovett to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Sidney W. Souers, under date of January 17.