740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–2449
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador |
| The Secretary | |
| Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary, FE |
Following my talk with General Bradley and General Burns, I asked the British Ambassador to come to see me. I explained that in view of the imminence of Mr. Bevin’s departure by boat for Ceylon, I wished to discuss with him what could be explained to Mr. Bevin about the nature of the problems with which we were faced in considering a possible Japanese peace treaty. I read him the prepared statement1 and emphasized its informal nature and the fact that it was addressed to him. I pointed out the adverse repercussions which would flow from any publicity emanating from the Ceylon Conference to the effect that the United States was holding back on proceeding with a Japanese peace treaty; that it was in all of our interests that it should be fully appreciated by everyone, including the Japanese, that it was the predatory and uncooperative attitude of Soviet Russia that was at the root of our difficulties. It was essential that the Japanese should understand this clearly and not be misled by any contrary propaganda. I also pointed out the undesirability of Mr. Bevin becoming at the Ceylon Conference the spokesman of the American point of view as defined in this memorandum. To all this the British Ambassador readily assented. He volunteered to send a telegram to Mr. Bevin explaining the whole situation to be followed by a letter enclosing the memorandum, it being understood that the memorandum was given to the British Ambassador personally and on the condition its use would merely be for Mr. Bevin’s background and as guidance to him in leading the discussion at the Ceylon Conference into constructive channels. Sir Oliver Franks indicated he was sending the memorandum by mail so that it would not pass through the normal [Page 930] distribution channels and would merely be a personal communication from him to his Secretary of State.
Sir Oliver Franks went on to say that he thought the memorandum was a very helpful document and should be much appreciated by Mr. Bevin. He felt it would be useful in assisting Mr. Bevin in his conduct of the discussions at the conference; he felt he should say personally regardless of the trouble to which one went, in the last analysis how well the Ceylon Conference determinations went depended a good deal upon Mr. Bevin’s state of health and vigor at the moment a matter over which he, of course, had no control.
I told him of my desire to apprise Ambassador Wrong for transmission to Mr. Pearson2 of the contents of this memorandum for Mr. Pearson’s background. Sir Oliver Franks felt this was a desirable thing and perceived no objection to the procedure.
As he was leaving, the British Ambassador asked whether he could put this memorandum in the context of a remark that the U.S. conceived its interest in that area of the world as an arc which stretched from Japan through to India and that our interest was not merely a line so to speak drawn from California through Japan to China. I said that the arc concept fitted other discussions that we had had and at my invitation Mr. Butterworth elaborated by pointing out that some thought had been given in the Department to the desirability of discussing more precisely how that arc was made up in terms of the community of interests between the British Empire and the United States. In terms of that community of interests in the Japanese and Philippine area of that arc, we found ourselves bearing the major responsibility. We were likewise prepared to give a helping hand in Indonesia but that in the area north of Singapore, in Burma in particular, in a lesser degree in Thailand, and to some extent in French Indochina, the physical location of power points, custom, knowledge and circumstance made this area of primary United Kingdom and Empire concern; that however was not to suggest that the U.S. was not prepared to play a helpful role. Mr. Butterworth pointed out that perhaps at times the situation in that area of the arc suffered from the fact that there might be an inadequate realization on the part of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth or the U.S. as to the role of the other.