740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–2949
Informal Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks)1
I asked you in today in further reference to the subject of the Japanese peace treaty. As you know, since Mr. Bevin left we have been working intensively exploring possibilities to see whether we could come up with a preliminary United States position and whether we could find a way for going ahead with a treaty at this time. On a good many aspects we have been able to reach tentative conclusions, but unfortunately in the very important matter of security we have not as yet been able to find satisfactory answers to certain basic problems confronting us. I regret therefore that we are unable to meet the contemplated schedule. I feel it might be helpful for Mr. Bevin to know the general nature of some of our difficulties.
The United States has been acutely aware that the basic problem underlying a treaty is security; that is, to avoid any peace settlement which would weaken the United States security position in the western Pacific and therefore the security of all other like-minded powers in that area. The United States also appreciates that security clauses in the treaty must be dual in purpose: security against renewed Japanese aggression and security for Japan against Soviet-Communist aggression. The two aggressive threats appear closely related, however, for in its present state of complete disarmament Japan can be realistically regarded as a future threat only if allied or in cooperation with Soviet military might. Several background factors render this contingency serious.
The USSR is the great and expanding power in Asia, with its influence spreading well beyond the actual areas now under Soviet control. This situation has been abetted by Japan’s defeat which, ending the long-standing balance of power in East Asia, has paved the way for the striking extension of Soviet influence over continental East Asia witnessed in the past four years. Soviet pressures are certain to be intensified against Japan itself, for were Japan added to the Communist bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the balance of world power.
To this end, the Soviets are already pursuing the familiar Communist patterns of infiltration, subversion and propaganda in Japan, backed up by important psychological advantages: (a) intimidation—playing upon disarmed Japan’s fear of Communist power which has already expanded to points within a few miles of Japan; (b) self– [Page 928] interest—playing upon Japanese desires to trade with areas upon which it is traditionally dependent for a sizable proportion of its raw materials and markets; (c) the structure of the Japanese society which is not antithetical to totalitarian doctrines, since the Japanese are communal people long accustomed to passive acceptance of leadership and subordination of individual interests to the state’s.
The United States therefore believes Soviet potentialities toward Japan must be given the most serious consideration and that, however much a treaty may be desirable, one which fails to give Japan adequate protection against Communist aggression, outright or subversive, may well be worse than no treaty at all.
In the present circumstances in Asia, we feel that it would be essential that there be retained United States forces in Japan, including the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. If arrangements for the retention of these forces were to be concluded with Japan in a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, as suggested by Mr. Bevin, it would be necessary to specify the period of time for their retention and, possibly, their size. Because of uncertainties in the whole Far Eastern picture, the time limit and size of forces would have to be on the maximum side. This in turn raises the serious question of unfortunate psychological reactions in Japan and other Far Eastern countries.
No alternative desirable means for Japan’s security exists. Neutrality is illusory in the context of East-West tensions. Thus, while Western Powers honored their obligation to observe Japanese neutrality, the Soviets would continue to pursue infiltration tactics, permitting them ultimately to turn Japan into an aggressive military threat. There are no United Nations security forces. The rearming of Japan for self-defense is not under present circumstances an acceptable alternative.
United States security requirements of the nature outlined rule out, in our opinion, any real prospect that the USSR or Communist China would be party to the treaty. At the present time, United States forces are in Japan performing security functions on the basis of agreed international instruments to which the USSR and China are parties. To sign a new agreement to which those two countries would not be parties and which would alter the existing legal basis raises the question of a less secure legal basis internationally for the continued presence of our forces.
These security points are not conclusions, but represent problems to which we have been unable as yet to find adequate answers. In view of the unsettled political and military conditions in Asian continental areas near Japan and in Southeast Asia, it is, of course, highly important that wise and soundly conceived conclusions be arrived at.
The United States and British Governments, as well as others, attempted in 1947 to bring about a peace conference and failed. When [Page 929] Mr. Bevin was here in September, we renewed consideration of methods of accomplishing this and concluded that since procedure might well be closely connected with the desired content of a treaty we should exchange views on the latter. For reasons indicated above we are not yet able to do this concretely. Within the United States Government we intend to continue to work intensively at formulating a definite United States Government position. We propose to keep in the closest possible touch with the British Government about the matter.
- Handed by Mr. Acheson on December 24 to Sir Oliver Franks.↩