Subject: Department of Defense Policy Toward
Japanese Industry
[Annex 1]
Staff Study Prepared by Joint Army–Navy–Air
Working Group2
top secret
[Washington, 9 September
1949.]
Department of Defense Policy Towards
Japanese Industry
problem
1. To determine the position of the Department of Defense with
respect to the restrictions, if any, which should be imposed on
peaceful but possibly war supporting industries in Japan,
particularly civil aircraft operation and manufacture, merchant
shipbuilding and ship repair, and the merchant marine.
facts bearing on the problem
2. Reasons for considering the problem at this time are set forth
in the letter of 8 July 1949 from the Secretary of State to the
Secretary of Defense, Appendix A hereto. (Also reproduced as
appendix to JCS 1380/69.) This
letter requested the views of the Department of Defense with
regard to restrictions to be imposed in the post-occupation
period on non-armament industries in Japan.
[Here follow three numbered sections on policies pertinent to the
problem in NSC 13/3, FEC policy decisions pertinent to
it as well as proposed policies and U.S. recommended action
toward them, and SWNCC policy
decisions establishing U.S. positions but not controlling on
SCAP, pertinent to the
problem.]
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discussion
6. Although Paragraph 4, NSC
13/3, states that a final U.S. position concerning the post
treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be
formulated until the peace negotiations are upon us, and it
should then be formulated in the light of the prevailing
international situation and the degree of internal stability
achieved in Japan, nevertheless to assist in solving the present
problem it is necessary to make three basic assumptions:
-
a.
- That the United States will not permit Japan to become
Soviet dominated either through conquest or
subversion.
-
b.
- That, in the event of war between the United States
and the U.S.S.R., Japan will be a country occupied by
U.S. forces, a friendly non-belligerent, or an active
ally of the United States.
-
c.
- That, if there should be an enduring peace between the
United States and the U.S.S.R., Japan would not be
permitted to have any military establishment or primary
war facilities which would constitute a threat to the
security of any country.
7. Obviously, if the United States is unwilling to take all steps
necessary to satisfy the first two assumptions, Japan could go
to the U.S.S.R. by default and would become a serious threat to
the security of the United States and to all other non-Soviet
nations. If the United States should decide not to protect
Japan, then from a strategic point of view U.S. interests would
best be served by seeking the closest approximation possible to
a depopulated and devastated Japan. Otherwise, any Japanese
potential would be available for use against the United States
and our friends. However, failure to protect Japan would be
illogical and such a course is not considered here.
8. An economically strong, friendly and western-oriented Japan
would be of great value to the security of the United States.
Consideration will need to be given to the eventual
establishment of limited Japanese armed forces to maintain
internal security and to assist in local defensive action in
event of an emergency.
9. “Second only to U.S. security interests, economic recovery
should be made the primary objective of United States policy in
Japan.” The two objectives go hand in hand. As long as the
United States is responsible for Japan, any deficits in its
economy will ultimately be paid for in dollars by the U.S.
taxpayer. Japan has been stripped of its colonies, and access
has been closed to many of its nearest and best markets. Many
large, fast ships are needed to reach more distant markets and
sources of raw materials. Civil air transport in a modern
society has become as much an essential service as rail or road
transport and therefore is necessary to Japan in promoting trade
and accruing foreign exchange. If a reasonable prosperity can be
created, not only will the burden on the U.S. taxpayer be
removed, but representative
[Page 885]
government in Japan will have a more
fertile field in which to grow.
conclusions
10. It is concluded that:
-
a.
- There should be no limitations or restrictions on
Japan’s commerce, communications or peaceful industries.
In answer to specific questions couched by the
Department of State, the position of the Department of
Defense is as follows:
- (1)
- Manufacture of civil aircraft—Manufacture
should be limited to types and numbers which would
not constitute a threat to the security of the
United States.
- (2)
- Operation of civil aircraft—Operation should
be limited to an extent which would not constitute
a threat to the security of the United
States.
- (3)
- Merchant marine—No limitations.
- (4)
- Merchant shipbuilding and ship repair—No
limitations.
-
b.
- So far as practical, the foregoing should apply both
to the present and the post-occupation period.
-
c.
- All pending policy papers which have been introduced
by the United States into the FEC which are inconsistent with the
foregoing should be withdrawn.
-
d.
- The United States should propose to the FEC, regardless of the
improbability of favorable consideration, that FEC policy decisions which
are inconsistent with the foregoing should be amended to
conform or be repealed.
-
e.
- All SWNCC and SANACC policies
inconsistent with the foregoing should be superseded by
new controlling documents.
-
f.
- Where inconsistent with the foregoing, NSC 13/3 should be
amended.
recommendations
11. It is recommended that:
-
a.
- This study be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for comment from the military point of view.
-
b.
- Upon receipt of the comments from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, this study be amended in light of such comments,
and, if approved, that the study be then transmitted by
the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State as
indicative of the views of the Department of
Defense.
[Annex 2]
Memorandum by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Bradley) to the Under
Secretary of the Army (Voorhees)
top secret
Washington, 12 October
1949.
Subject: Department of Defense Policy Towards
Japanese Industry
This memorandum is in response to your memorandum to the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army, dated 9 September 1949,3 on the subject of
Department
[Page 886]
of Defense
policy towards Japanese industry, in which request was made that
an attached staff study4 be called to the attention of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and that they be asked to comment thereon from the
military point of view.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection from the military
point of view to those conclusions in the staff study which
contain military implications, namely, subparagraphs a and b of
paragraph 10. They suggest, however, that in implementing these
conclusions appropriate safeguards be established to preclude
any possibility of the restrictions, when enforced, jeopardizing
our national security interests in Japan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff invite attention to their strategic
evaluation of United States security needs in Japan which was
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 9 June 1949 (copy
enclosed).5 The following summarizes views
contained in the evaluation which are pertinent:
-
a.
- It is essential, from the military point of view, that
Japan be denied to the Soviets and that Japan maintain
her orientation toward the Western Powers.
-
b.
- The terms of the peace treaty for Japan should not be
such as to preclude bilateral negotiations for base
rights in the Japanese main islands;
-
c.
- In order that the Far East communistic expansion of
the Soviets may be held in check, at least as far as
Japan is concerned, Japan’s internal security forces
must be adequate not only for maintenance of order but
also for protection against sabotage of vital
installations. This may involve stronger internal
security forces than were thought to be essential prior
to the current overrunning of China; and
-
d.
- Japan’s capacity for self-defense must be developed
against the time when it may be determined by the
Soviets that overt aggression by them or their
satellites is their only means for gaining control over
Japan.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
