Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2049

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

top secret
No. 568

Tokyo, August 20, 1949.
[Received August 29.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to various conversations with officers of the Department during my recent period of consultation in Washington, on the subject of summoning a conference for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace with Japan. Pursuant to these conversations, I had a lengthy interview with General MacArthur on August 15, 1949, on this subject. His views and my own observations are set forth below.

General MacArthur said that he is of the opinion that the United States should immediately seize the initiative from the Soviet Union on this question, and once again invite the Far Eastern Commission Powers to a peace conference for the negotiation of a treaty. General MacArthur said that while it is doubtful that such a conference would be successful and a treaty of peace concluded at this time, even if the Soviet Union were one of the participating powers, he nevertheless feels that the United States should take full advantage of the attendant play of publicity to inform Japan and the world of its desire to enter into normal, peaceful relations with Japan.

With regard to the attitude of the Soviet Union, General MacArthur stated that, as he views the triangular problem of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, he finds that both the Soviet Union and ourselves have nearly identical strategic objectives in Japan, namely, the United States does not wish Japan to enter the Soviet orbit or to become an armed ally of the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, does not wish Japan to be used by the United States as a base of operations against Russia. He therefore concludes that it is to the mutual advantage of the United States and Soviet Russia to have a disarmed Japan, neutralized by common consent and guarantee of all the interested powers.

I suggested to the General, for the purpose of our discussion, the concept that it might be well to have incorporated into any treaty of peace which may be concluded, if feasible, a provision for United States troops to remain in Japan on a garrison basis (on the premise that this is necessary to carry out the terms of the treaty), the period of tenure to last until Japan is admitted to membership in the United Nations, withdrawal to take place immediately upon Japan’s admission. The United Nations would thenceforth insure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Japan. General MacArthur agreed that such a provision would place Soviet Russia in a dilemma: by vetoing Japan’s admission into the United Nations, she would automatically continue the garrisoning of Japan by United States troops, a situation which presumably would be unpalatable to Soviet Russia. It would therefore appear to be in her interests not to oppose Japan’s admission to the United Nations.

I asked General MacArthur whether in his opinion Japan is ready for a treaty. He replied that in so far as reform is concerned, the taxation reform recommended by the Shoup Mission will complete all reforms. Furthermore, he said that he is implementing NSC 13/3 as rapidly as possible, thus preparing Japan for the eventual return of her sovereignty. In any event, however, he estimated that it would take a minimum of two years before a treaty of peace could be negotiated and the Occupation completely withdrawn from Japan.

General MacArthur again reverted to his previous recommendation that Japan should become the responsibility of the United Nations rather than the sole burden and obligation of the United States. He feels that, if Japan were admitted to the United Nations, a continuation of United States occupation of Japan would be unnecessary and undesirable.

Above all else, General MacArthur stressed the necessity, in his opinion, of the United States taking the initiative in pressing for a treaty of peace, or at least in the summoning of a conference for this purpose. He feels that the Soviets presently have the initiative because of Vishinsky’s proposal at the last Council of Foreign Ministers and the recent Japan Communist Party propaganda peace campaign. He counseled, however, against any change in the present regime of control—he would provide for the continuation of SCAP until Japan is admitted to the United Nations—on the theory that to have American troops here without at least a semblance of Allied authority would give the Soviets and their communist stooges too good a propaganda weapon against the United States.

Apropos of the above conversation, while I am aware that the Department is presently engaged in a restudy of Far Eastern policy, I wish hereinafter to add my observations on the subject of an early treaty of peace with the hope that they may be useful to the Department in resolving its policy on this question.

A. Factors Which Favor an Early Peace Treaty

1. The Psychological Factor: The Japanese people have already too long been torn by a deep psychological conflict between “the new”, as represented by the directives of the Occupation and the Occupation itself, and “the old”, representing the product of Japan’s long history, culture, and distinct way of national and international life. That the Occupation will leave behind much constructive and lasting work cannot be denied: the insular, thoroughly nationalistic Japanese approach to internal and international problems has been severely shaken and in many respects shattered. But neither can it be denied that the Occupation will leave many deep scars upon the Japanese national consciousness, scars which cannot be healed by an undue and indefinite prolongation of the dictatorial, often tactless, and sometimes slip-shod methods of a military regime. To numerous Japanese the Occupation, despite its benevolence and well-meaning do-goodism, represents an alien substitution for Japanese militarism, bureaucracy, and social cleavage. Our insistence that our way is right and the Japanese way is wrong does not make sense to many Japanese who detect a latent ignorance and lack of understanding of the Oriental in our endeavors to impose American methods and way of life upon a people who, psychologically and socially, are still living in the Middle Ages. It is mistaken to say that the Japanese “resent” the Occupation. While some resentment does exist in individual cases, it is more correct to say that collectively the Japanese “tolerate” the Occupation because it is in Japan’s self interest to allow the United States to carry the burden of reconstruction, security, and maintenance of internal order during this period of total defeat. If the Japanese were consulted, by referendum, regarding the termination of the Occupation, it is my estimate that the upper and middle (business) classes would vote solidly to continue the Occupation; and that the laboring and farmer classes would in general vote against continuation, notwithstanding the fact that these classes have, from our point of view, gained most from the Occupation.

2. The Internal Political Factor: The overwhelming majority of the Japanese people are strongly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Russia. Although the Japan Communist Party is well organized, led by a hard core of Moscow-trained Communists, and has until recently considerably increased its popularity among practically all classes of Japanese, recent tactical mistakes and excesses have demonstrated to the Japanese people the inherent dangers of flirting with international communism. While the danger of Communist infiltration is not past and will continue to be very real so long as the Japan Communist Party is legally recognized and while conditions in Japan are ripe for exploitation by the Communists, it is my considered estimate that, left to themselves, the Japanese would react violently from the present “liberalism” of the Occupation, which, in Japanese eyes, protects the communists and makes possible the spread of their influence and power. Part of the communist appeal to certain Japanese lies in its anti-Occupation tinge—a flavor which is most palatable to those Japanese who believe they have nothing to lose by the withdrawal of an alien rule. This factor is important in an appraisal of the Japanese picture. Educated Japanese—especially the large purged Army and Navy officer class—fear communism; the lower classes do not. In consequence, articulate Japanese prefer an indefinite Occupation until such time as internal conditions in Japan are stable, the economy has become self-supporting, and the law-enforcement arm has become sufficiently strong to ensure domestic tranquility, i.e., to suppress the trouble-making communists. There is an unexpressed hope among these Japanese that the police forces will be strengthened, an armed constabulary and coast guard established, and measures permitted to outlaw the trouble-makers. As United States policy already envisages the establishment of a well-armed, mobile, and centrally controlled police force, we have apparently preferred to take the calculated risk that such a force might form the nucleus of a resurgent, effective militaristic state (which under the most favorable circumstances I believe to be impossible for several decades). We thus ensure that the Japanese may be enabled, even though at the price of some reactionism, to keep order in Japan.

On balance, it would appear that upon the withdrawal of the Occupation, the Japanese would be capable of maintaining internal order (provided their police forces are strengthened); that we must expect a swing to the right with a partial return to reactionary internal policies; and that the prevailing sentiment of the Japanese articulate class would be in favor of an anti-communist, anti-Soviet policy. We might also anticipate a growing suppression of the communists and the eventual elimination of the Japan Communist Party as a legal entity. It would nevertheless be foolhardy to assume that the Communists do not have dangerous capabilities for creating difficulties for any Japanese government and even, in favorable circumstances, of making a serious attempt to seize power.

3. External Political Factors: In any attempt during the pre-treaty period to remove in part the shackles placed upon Japan’s intercourse with foreign nations, the question immediately arises whether the acceptance by any given country of Japanese representation—for example, trade representatives and consuls—would not be a one-way concession to the Japanese. On the other hand, SCAP is faced with the difficult problem of whether to allow foreign representatives direct access to the Japanese Government with the attendant risks that such permission under present conditions would entail. Similar considerations arise in connection with Japan’s admission to international conferences and organizations. Experience to date has indicated that the United States, almost alone, has carried the burden of attempting to restore some semblance of sovereignty to Japan in its foreign relations, a task which will become more difficult as the scope becomes broader. It therefore appears almost self-evident that unless the attributes of sovereignty can be restored to Japan through the negotiation of a treaty of peace, there is little hope for the establishment of even semi-normal relations with other countries. Without such relations, I see little prospect of restoring Japanese self-confidence, self-respect, or rehabilitation of Japan’s shattered international relations. Only Japan can accomplish these difficult tasks—we cannot undertake them for Japan. Not until the Japanese are able to maintain their own establishments abroad, no matter how modest, will the people of the world begin to accept the Japanese, and their trade, on an unequivocal basis.

4. Economic Factors: The future of Japan’s economy is one which I view with great pessimism, shorn as is Japan of all her overseas colonies and investments, overseas shipping, and international banking and insurance facilities. The rapid and continued rise in population, an obsolete and worn-out industrial plant, insulation for almost a decade from foreign markets, loss of know-how in selling techniques, and the strong if natural antipathy to the acceptance of Japanese goods—all combine to temper even the most rabid optimist who claims to foresee a balanced economy within the near future. The Occupation, and Washington, must share part of the blame for the grand-scale tinkering with Japan’s economy which has taken place during the past four years. While the story is not all black, it is my opinion that the sooner we stop advocating, and enforcing, economic nostrums, and attempting with a woefully inadequate and ill-equipped staff to conduct a highly complicated economy such as is Japan’s, the more quickly will there be some semblance of economic order and at least a possibility that the woods may be seen rather than the trees. While I foresee many difficulties ahead and believe that continued economic assistance by the United States (perhaps under an ECA principle of operation) will be necessary, I nevertheless am convinced that unless and until the economy of Japan is returned to the Japanese Government and people, Japan will continue to be a mendicant nation ripe for internal disorder and political exploitation. I therefore envisage as prerequisites: a formal lifting of ceilings on peaceful industry, the word “peaceful” to be broadly and liberally defined; immediate resumption of Japanese overseas shipping (even in the face of protests by domestic shipping interests and FEC nations); the abolition of the GARIO A type of appropriation and substitution therefore of an ECA-type operation; and an immediate contraction of all economic operations by GHQ, SCAP, and return of economic power to the Japanese Government. In the treaty itself there should be a broad and liberal statement of economic principles under which Japan would be allowed to breathe and regain a semblance of economic health.

5. American Foreign Policy Objectives: If we may accept the proposition that United States objectives in the cold war with Soviet Russia envisage a containment of the Soviets along the perimeter of Soviet influence, Japan would appear to be an important anchor of a line extending from Hokkaido to Scandinavia. Of more localized interest is the importance of that anchor in East Asia, specifically as part of the line Japan-Formosa-Philippines. In discussion of this problem, it appears to me that undue emphasis is in most cases placed upon the strategic importance of Japan in a military sense, with the result that the political implications of Japan’s importance in the anti-communist “line of containment” are relegated to a minor position if not forgotten altogether. I view, and I believe correctly, the line of containment first and foremost as a political problem. Unless each and every link in that line is in itself a politically stable unit capable of contributing its share to our burden of containment, a local weakness exists which jeopardizes the entire operation. As an occupied country, defeated in war, economically weak, without voice in the shaping of its own foreign policy, Japan, politically, is a hindrance and burden rather than a healthy link in our first line of political defense in East Asia. It is my view that a friendly Japan to which full sovereignty has been restored can be of inestimable assistance to the United States as well as to the other “free” countries of Asia. Because of the self interest involved, and on the basis of my estimate expressed above that the Japanese people are anti-communist and anti-Soviet, it is my considered opinion that Japan will align herself on the side of the Democracies. With the loss to us of China, at least for the foreseeable future, it would appear wise for the United States to avail herself of the political assistance which a rehabilitated and sovereign Japan can offer. In the difficult problems of the Far East still to be surmounted, a friendly, politically and economically stable Japan may yet be the catalyst which will enable us to achieve our objectives. For these reasons alone, I believe that a treaty of peace should be negotiated without further delay, as time is of the essence in shaping durable political alignments in the Far East.

6. The Fallacy of U.S. Supremacy in Japan: It appears to me that the American people are wont to delude themselves into believing that the United States alone is supreme in Japan and that United States foreign policy objectives are, in consequence, carried out in simple fashion because of this supposed supremacy. In fact, the complicated regime of control of Japan makes the accomplishment of United States long-term objectives difficult because of the varied compromises and give-and-take solutions which each major policy decision entails. There can be no straight-forward and strong, publicly announced United States policy vis-à-vis Japan. We are, therefore, in the invidious position of carrying the political, financial, and military burdens of the Occupation, but without the means directly to advance United States objectives in our world-wide struggle against Soviet Russia. Scarcely any major policy which we have proposed for Japan has escaped the pruning knives of one or more of the FEC nations. We are, it seems, caught in our net of immediate post-war internationalism, of relying upon multilateral efforts rather than upon our own. A treaty of peace with Japan would, or should, end this complex and (in Japan’s case) unworkable regime of control. Japan’s relations with the FEC nations would then again be restored to a bilateral basis, and outstanding problems solved on a mutual basis without directly involving the United States. In the post-treaty period there is no apparent reason why the United States, by virtue of its great-power position, should not increase its influence over Japan’s foreign policy and thus align Japanese policy to parallel our own. Under the present treaty less, technical state-of-war situation, this is impossible.

B. Factors Against an Early Peace Treaty

1. Loss of American Prestige in the Far East: Representative Japanese are fearful that the United States will withdraw from Japan and that such withdrawal would open wide the flood-gates of Communism. They point to what happened in China, and reinforce their position by saying that our military withdrawal from Korea has made Soviet control of all Korea inevitable. While this viewpoint is in part based upon purely military considerations and on the assumption best expressed by the epigram that “One cannot stop a bullet with an idea”, these Japanese observers genuinely feel that so long as the United States has a military force in Japan, American prestige in the Far East is maintained and Communism, at least in Japan, held at bay. The fear felt in Japan is based not so much upon lack of internal security as upon the belief that the Communist movement in Japan will be aided and fostered by subversive activities engineered and controlled externally. It can, of course, be argued that Communism has thrived in Japan in spite of, perhaps because of, the “American” Occupation, but this does not mitigate a real concern by many Japanese regarding the future, should the Occupation in fact withdraw.

Assuming that a treaty of peace is negotiated and that such treaty would provide for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Japan, there is the danger that the United States might lose considerable prestige not only in Japan, but in the Far East as a whole. Such withdrawal would undoubtedly result in growing uneasiness in Japan and a suspicion that the United States was shirking its commitments and responsibilities in the Far East, particularly in the face of the deteriorating situation in China. That the communists would change their propaganda line and take full advantage of our withdrawal to increase their membership and influence is a foregone conclusion.

These fears have, in part, developed in consequence of irresponsible public statements, chiefly by high-ranking military officers, to the effect that Japan is considered the outpost of the United States defense against Soviet Russia. It would therefore seem natural to expect that our withdrawal would be construed as an abandonment of our Far Eastern line of defense. Any withdrawal must accordingly be accompanied by a serious publicity campaign to counteract the thought that the United States is “writing off” Japan as we have in effect the Chinese National Government.

2. Japan’s Internal and External Security: An unarmed Japan in the face of strong external pressures, particularly from Soviet Russia, Red China, and North Korea, offers tempting bait for exploitation and seizure of control by international communism. A strong nucleus of Moscow-trained communists already exists in Japan and offers a ready medium of operation for the Soviets. Given further centralized control and direction, it may be anticipated that the Japan Communist Party will increase its covert activities and make a strong bid for power at the first sign of withdrawal of the Occupation. It may be expected, as from the time of withdrawal, that illegal infiltration into Japan from the continent will increase, a situation which is already almost out of hand, even under the Occupation. In the absence of a strong police force and coast guard (see paragraph 2 under A, above), grave doubt exists that the Japanese could adequately cope with this problem.

3. Possible Reactions Against Occupation-inspired Reforms: One of the intangibles that would confront the United States and other signatories to a treaty of peace would be the difficulty of pre-judging the permanency of the numerous reform measures that have been forced upon the Japanese people during the Occupation. Many of these reforms have been enacted by fiat and without taking into consideration even to the slightest degree Japanese susceptibilities or wishes in the matter. In many cases, the reform has been enacted for reform’s sake, doing violence to basic Japanese social custom or concepts evolved through many centuries. We have, in numerous instances, forced the Japanese Government to change, amend, abolish, or enact laws, with the result that age-old customs and institutions have been swept aside on the theory that they are undemocratic and not consistent with the American democratic way of life. Without citing specific examples, of which there are many, the question immediately arises whether the change to “democracy” has become sufficiently deep-seated and palatable to overcome an inherent desire of millions of Japanese to return to the old way of life. We are thus faced with the problem of whether it is possible to draw a line beyond which “reaction” should not pass, or whether to trust to the basic common sense of Japan’s leaders and people in the hope that a compromise solution will evolve. I definitely favor the latter course, and feel that if the general principles of democracy can be preserved, even in part, the Japanese should be allowed to fashion their own concepts of how that democracy can be made to work. We must therefore be prepared to decide the extent to which Occupation-made reforms may be changed, relaxed, or abolished entirely by the Japanese when they have again assumed full sovereignty. We should, I believe, not become unduly alarmed at changes which will take place; rather, by force of advice and example should we encourage broad democratic principles to take firm root. There will, of course, be criticisms by those FEC nations which now have the position of enjoying authority without obligation of any kind. We should also be prepared for a partial reversion in Japan to the exercise by Japanese officialdom of the many minor irritants which equality with the Westerner in Japan will again bring. Life in post-treaty Japan will not be pleasant for Occidentals, but the country will at least belong to the Japanese. In the absence of discrimination, however, there would appear to be no reason why the super-extraterritoriality developed under the Occupation should not be abolished.

4. Unresolved Problems: As already touched upon above, several important problems, among many lesser ones, remain unresolved and until solutions are found, it might appear preferable to withhold attempts at negotiating a peace treaty. Some of these problems are:

(a) The establishment of an adequately armed, mobile police force.

(b) The necessity that Japan be allowed a reasonable transocean merchant marine.

(c) Formal removal of all restrictions upon levels of peaceful industry.

(d) Establishment of procedures for, or abolition of, claims for reimbursement by United Nations nationals of damage and loss caused as incidents of the war.

(e) Preparation of Japanese governmental machinery for full resumption of sovereignty.

(f) Establishment of an armed coast guard to prevent smuggling and illegal entry into Japan.

(g) Development of an adequate program of assistance to Japan to hasten economic rehabilitation and, as a minimum, to maintain a reasonable standard of living by bringing imports and exports into near balance.

(h) Some amelioration in SCAP’s hitherto adamant position on the purge question.

None of the above problems, however, is insoluble. Their solution, it appears to me, calls for increased exchange of viewpoints between Washington and SCAP, mutual concessions, and, above all else, the will to settle and implement policy decisions by full use of existing procedural means, unilaterally, if necessary.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations

I have only touched upon the more important problems and considerations which must be faced in reaching a decision regarding the timing for a treaty of peace. The easiest course of action would be to continue the present regime of control, not to force the issue, and to hope that the Japanese situation will become stabilized through the efforts of the Occupation and by the working of time. It is my opinion, however, that the situation in the Far East is such that mere negativeness or passivity will not resolve the basic question of what is best for the United States. I concur with General MacArthur that a courageous and strong foreign policy is needed in handling the Japanese situation and that only by grasping the political initiative which is available for the taking, now, can we hope to stabilize a deteriorating and unbalanced situation in Northeast Asia. The Japanese people, no less than all peoples, desire peace, security, freedom from want and fear. The fact that they have brought their present lamentable condition upon themselves does not, unfortunately, decrease the need for American leadership in Japanese affairs. The Japanese cannot take the lead—only the United States or Soviet Russia can.

The Japanese people are tired from the demands which have been made upon them during the past twelve years, first by their own leaders, and then for four years by the Occupation. The struggle against the almost overwhelming odds of deprivation, scarcity, uncertainty, continued change, and an alien rule, forces many Japanese to view further effort as futile. The word “peace” to millions of Japanese connotates renewed hope, opportunity, and a chance to be left alone to lead their lives in their own way. In a military and material sense, the Occupation has been a success, but it is now rapidly outliving its political usefulness. It may yet become an embarrassment to United States objectives in the Far East. I believe it is time to leave well enough alone.

I strongly recommend that the Department renew its efforts to convene a conference for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace with Japan. In consulting the officers of this Mission concerned with political affairs I have found complete agreement that such a move would be highly desirable. I do not see that we have anything to lose, even if the conference were to founder upon the rocks of procedural difficulties. On the contrary, the gain in initiative and consistency of record in Far Eastern affairs would amply repay any effort that might be entailed. The considerations and problems are great. They will not, however, decrease in size and complexity in consequence of delay.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald