This position has always puzzled us, as we perceive no conflict
between the NSC provisions and the
passages in existing FEC decisions
dealing with the purge. Although I hesitate to burden you with
another matter in anticipation of your visit to Japan, it appears
that discussion between yourself and General MacArthur offers the
only hope of clarifying this longstanding question. As of possible
assistance for this purpose I am enclosing a memorandum in which all
FEC policy provisions on the
purge are quoted and analyzed in relation to the NSC purge decisions.
For reasons which I know are already familiar to you it appears to us
of ever more pressing importance that modification of the purge as
specified in the NSC paper be
carried out.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State
secret
[Washington, August 17,
1949.]
Modification of the Purge in Japan
Paragraph 13 of NSC 13/3 provides
that the purge in Japan should be modified along the following
lines:
“(1) Categories of persons who have been purged or who are
subject to the purge by virtue of their having held
relatively harmless positions should be made re-eligible for
governmental, business and public media positions; (2)
certain others who have been barred or who are subject to
being barred from public life on the basis of positions
occupied should be allowed to have their cases re-examined
solely on the basis of personal actions; and (3) a minimum
age limit should be fixed, under which no screening for
public office would be required.”
In his telegram No. C–51666 of July 28, replying to a series of
questions regarding implementation of NSC 13/3, SCAP
states in reference to the purge that “there has as yet been no
reconciliation between
[Page 828]
NSC 13/3 and the pertinent
controlling policy decisions of the FEC”. This statement indicates that SCAP continues to regard the purge
provisions of the NSC paper as
being inconsistent with existing FEC policy provisions on the purge and as requiring
a new and superseding FEC
decision for their effectuation. It has been the State
Department’s view that there is no conflict between any FEC policy decision and the NSC purge provisions, and that anew
FEC decision along the lines
of these provisions is unnecessary and could not be sought
without important attendant disadvantages.
Existing FEC decisions contain
four references to the purge. These references are quoted in
full below, with comments in each instance:
I. “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” (FEC–014/9, June 19, 1947)
From Part III, paragraph 1
“Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and
militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from
public office and from any other position of public or
substantial private responsibility.”
From Part IV, paragraph 2
“… it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:
- “a. To prohibit the retention in important
positions in the economic field of individuals who
because of their past associations or for other
reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese
economic effort solely towards peaceful and
democratic ends.”
These provisions are in general terms. Definition of an “active
exponent of militarism and militant nationalism” is left to
SCAP as the administering
authority in Japan. There is no restriction on SCAP’s power, with the passage of
time or otherwise at his discretion, to alter the definition
which he applied in 1946 and 1947. Adaptation of the occupation
programs to developing circumstances within the terms of such
broadly phrased FEC provisions
as the above would seem to be a prime responsibility of SCAP.
II. “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of
Japanese Military Equipment” (FEC–017/23, February 12, 1948)
Paragraph 13
“For the purpose of prevention of the revival of Japanese
militarism persons who have at one time fallen within any of
the following categories should not be nominated or employed
in the government service, public office, or educational
institutions except as they may be necessary in performing
duties essential to the demobilization of repatriated
military and naval personnel.
- “a. Generals, Admirals, and all other senior officers,
and all career officers of the Army, Navy, and
gendarmerie;
- “b. Other officers of the Army, Navy, and gendarmerie,
including members of the reserve, if their employment
would harm the cause of peace and security; and
- “c. Officials of ex-officers’ and other military and
para-military associations and of bodies closely
associated with the armed forces.
“The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may authorize
the nomination or employment of a person coming within
categories a and c if his record shows that he has been an
opponent of Japanese expansionism and totalitarianism.”
The restrictions imposed by this paragraph are quite clear. The
NSC purge provisions and the
suggested spelling-out of those provisions in War 80453,
November 10, 1948,1 were
drafted so as not to infringe those restrictions in any way.
III. “Principles of Japanese Trade Unions” (FEC–045/5, December 6, 1946)
From paragraph 12
“No person who is subject to the purge directive of 4 January,
1946, or to subsequent purge directives, should be allowed to
hold office in a trade union.”
The clear intent of this provision is to exclude from office in
trade unions persons subject to the overall purge program in
Japan. There was no intention through this passage in a policy
decision on trade unions to freeze the purge as a whole to the
language of the January 4, 1946, directive. Inclusion of the
phrase, “or to subsequent purge directives”, makes this doubly
clear. Representatives of the British and other FEC governments have stated that
the requirements of the passage would be fully met if persons
still purged under any modification of the 1946 directive were
prevented from holding office in trade unions. Even under a
contrary interpretation, however, it would seem that this
passage in the trade union paper could have reference only to
eligibility for office in trade unions. Modifications of the
1946 directive could be effective for all other activities.
IV. “Principles for Japanese Farmers’ Organization” (FEC–277/19, December 9, 1948)
From paragraph 13
“No member should hold office in a cooperative if … he is
subject to the purge directive of January 4, 1946, or
subject to subsequent purge directives by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers.”
The above comment on the similar passage in the FEC trade union decision is
applicable also to this passage.
Although it seems clear from the texts of the decisions as quoted
above that modification of the purge would not contravene any
existing FEC decision, it may be
asked why an FEC policy decision
should
[Page 830]
not
nevertheless be sought to remove any possibility of doubt. There
are two reasons why this would be unwise:
- 1.
- Although there is every indication that the proposal
would be approved by many FEC members, it would almost certainly be
vetoed by the Soviets.
- 2.
- Submission of a policy proposal to the FEC on a matter which seems
clearly within SCAP’s
administrative discretion (and which has always been
considered by the FEC
itself as falling within SCAP’s discretion subject to the broad
provisions of the Basic Post-Surrender Policy and the
specific limitations contained in the three other
decisions just cited) would be contrary to U.S. policy
as stated in paragraph 9 of NSC 13/3. Such a proposal, calling for
modification of SCAP’s
previous purge orders, would invade a previously
recognized area of SCAP
executive authority, which, in line with that paragraph,
we desire to build up, and would expand the field of
FEC activity, which,
also in line with paragraph 9, we desire to
restrict.
Use of a U.S. interim directive would be subject to the second of
the above disadvantages. It is doubtful, however, whether this
procedure could in any event be desired by SCAP since it would run directly
contrary to his expressed position that the present purge
program is fixed by FEC
decisions;—the U.S. is forbidden under the Moscow Agreement of
December, 1945, from issuing interim directives on matters
covered by policies already formulated by the Far Eastern
Commission.
