851G.01/6–249: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Brace) to the Secretary of State
secret priority
Paris, June
2, 1949—7 p. m.
2258. Following discussion of considerations arising from Embtel 2230, June 2 (repeated Saigon 86) may, together with Saigon’s comment, be helpful formulation Department’s policy and US public attitude [Page 37] toward developments which are rapidly coming to head in Indochina.
- 1.
- Quite apart from probabilities success or failure Bao Dai experiment in Indochina, creation of Vietnam as associated state of French Union with wide attributes of internal and external sovereignty is important event in development and evolution France’s relations with its far-flung and widely variegated dependent peoples. It is first major step taken by France in recognition of native nationalism to give autonomous status and international standing other than purely nominal to overseas territory. As such it is milepost and measure of France’s willingness to implement principles of French Union. While conception underlying these principles contemplates closer control by Metro-pole in such matters as foreign relations and army than would perhaps be theoretically desirable, they are those which will govern France’s future relationships with other dependent territories, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. While implementation for latter will be slower developing and different in degree, Vietnam accords may be expected have considerable influence both on Nationalist movements these areas and French thinking regarding them. The new Vietnam, even though created under extreme pressure events, represents maximum to which present government or foreseeable successor can be expected to go until French public opinion on colonial questions evolves. Therefore it would appear to be clearly consonant with Department’s policy of encouraging development French imperial policy along more progressive lines to take due public note this important event with such degree of approval its essential elements as seems appropriate.
- 2.
- Insofar as Indochina itself is concerned and on continued assumption based on Department’s telegrams that US desires success Bao Dai experiment without being expressly committed at outset to support it, birth of new state would appear to be appropriate moment for public statement on our part phrased in general terms and applying to state of Vietnam rather than Bao Dai or new government. Neither French nor Vietnamese with whom we have talked expect major powers to rush into any overall endorsement of Bao Dai regime until it has started functioning and given some signs of viability and public support. Bao Dai’s advisors and Bao Dai himself have on numerous occasions over past months emphasized to us, however, the great weight which some degree of international acknowledgment of new state’s existence will carry in local popular opinion and stabilizing function it will perform in early weeks when considerable fumbling may be expected as grim task of governing a people rent by civil war gets underway. From our point of view such statement would avoid for moment juridical aspects of recognition de facto or de jure of a government or regime though Bao Dai’s people would find it helpful if [Page 38] its terms were so conceived as to permit favorable construing by them. Furthermore such general statement could be unilateral although Department would no doubt wish previously to inform other interested Governments of its intentions in this respect.
- 3.
- Formal recognition and assumption diplomatic relations would presumably call for study and consultation particularly with UK, India, Burma, Siam, Philippines. Our first thoughts lend themselves towards Bao Dai schedule of de facto recognition of new regime and representation of US in Vietnam by minister or chargé d’affaires taking place in late summer if conditions then appear warrant such action.
Sent Department 2258, repeated Amconsul Saigon 87.
Bruce