851G.01/6–249: Telegram
The Ambassador in Frame (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
2230. Following tentative Indochina timetable obtained French-Viet sources: Second [reading] Cochin China bill in Assembly scheduled for today. Bao Dai arrives Saigon June 10 to exchange instruments March 8 agreements with Pignon. Agreements to be published following day.
Following ceremonies Saigon: Bao Dai will go to Hue and Hanoi making important policy statements all three cities. Composition government may not be announced until June 15 or June 20. In the meanwhile provisional government will have resigned and new government will take over at Hanoi. Not clear whether new government will be announced before trip or when he reaches Hanoi.
Regarding recognition, Foreign Office holds exchange instruments will constitute France’s acknowledgement existence new state, but Auriol will send message Bao Dai on date exchange. Foreign Office is opposed French de jure recognition new government as long as it remains provisional but is recommending that de facto recognition, implied by its being instituted under French auspices, be underlined by second Auriol telegram this time to new Prime Minister.
After publication accords, current Foreign Office’s plan is to inform foreign powers by note of coming into being new state together with statement Vietnam’s ability to receive foreign diplomatic missions. Foreign Office idea is that each foreign power in its reply (or absence thereof) to note will indicate degree acceptance new status Vietnam and its views regarding entering into formal relations therewith.
Bao Dai will be chief of state not emperor or monarch pending popular consultation. Bao Dai advises state government is to be clearly provisional pending physical possibility popular consultation on national basis. It will be composed of representatives of all major non-Viet Minh Nationalist groups but some important portfolios will be in hands secretaries of state, thus leaving these ministerships open to Nationalist elements now in Viet Minh.
Two close advisers of Bao Dai, who accompanied Buu Lee [Loc] on his tour of Vietnam and have just returned Paris, state that Bao Dai’s people have been in contact with all major Nationalist groups and with certain non-Communist elements Viet Minh. They report general acceptance of March 8 agreements (whose terms are better than offered Ho) on satisfactory basis from which independent Vietnam can evolve. In Viet Minh circles contacted, however, the expected skepticism exists as to honest implementation agreement and positions [Page 36] reserved until French declarations of intention are confirmed by performance. Source said there would be no “psychological shock” in Viet Minh territory. Only gradual growth of pro-Bao Dai sentiment could be expected. What was important was emphasis on factors which did not exist on other side of lines. Transfer of administration from French to Viet hands, although it would be closely scrutinized for French reneging, would impress Viet Minh elements less than international status (not possessed by Ho) granted Bao Dai government by agreements and degree recognition accorded it by foreign government, particularly US.
Sources emphasized that this was one of principal psychological factors on which Bao Dai counted in building his prestige throughout Vietnam and an important element in stimulating defections from Viet Minh particularly among educated elements whom he needs to swell ranks of people capable to help him govern. Limitations on conduct diplomatic relations provided in agreements were described by our informants as creating little adverse comment among people they consulted.
Our Viet informants in conclusion gave us the optimum program of what Bao Dai hoped the US could do for him and his new regime. Points in chronological order are:
- 1.
- Shortly after exchange instruments, public statement welcoming creation Vietnam state. Hope statement can be phrased so as to constitute indirect endorsement Bao Dai himself.
- 2.
- About two months later, de facto recognition Vietnam government.
- 3.
- Favorable reception “goodwill mission” (Embtel 2121, May 24).
- 4.
- Creation of US Legation in Vietnam.
- 5.
- Economic assistance taking form direct ECA aid Indochina without necessarily increasing amount of aid now given.
- 6.
- Military assistance via France in form of light arms (rifles, machine guns, mortars and ammunition) to help equip national Vietnam army of 50,000–60,000.
- 7.
- De jure recognition after approval regime by popular consultation.
Embassy comments follow separately.
Repeated Saigon 86.