Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1

856d.00/3–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Reed)

secret

[Washington,] March 7, 1949.

Mr. Graves called to make available a summary of a telegram from Mr. Bevin to the British Ambassador at Washington relative to a suggestion by the Netherlands Ambassador at London¹ as to the terms on which the Netherlands Government might be willing to agree to the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta. Mr. Graves related that the Netherlands Ambassador’s views were communicated to Mr. Bevin shortly after Mr. Stikker had been told by Mr. Harriman that MAP would be implemented so far as the Netherlands was concerned only after there had been a settlement of the Indonesian dispute. Mr. Graves agreed that the communication by Mr. Harriman had evidently shaken the Netherlands Government considerably and he believed that that government now appeared to be somewhat more amenable as regards the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta than it had been hitherto. Mr. Graves stipulated, however, that the views which the Netherlands Ambassador had communicated to Mr. Bevin were entirely personal and that the Netherlands Ambassador had said that he could not guarantee that the Netherlands Government would agree with and act in accordance with those views.

In reading the summary of the above-mentioned telegram it was noted that there was no substantial departure from the suggestions given in last week’s telegram from Mr. Bevin to the British Ambassador, which Mr. Graves had made available on March 3 and which was discussed in our aide-mémoire of March 4 to the British Ambassador.

It would appear the Netherlands Ambassador at London has suggested that the Dutch would be prepared to permit the Republican Government to return to Jogjakarta, but not to re-establish itself as a government of the status quo ante, if the US and the UK would give certain assurances to the Netherlands Government:

(a) Inform other governments that we thought the Dutch plan should be given a trial;

(b) The British Consul General at Batavia be instructed to urge the Republicans to accept the Dutch invitation to The Hague;

(c) Express the view in the Security Council that, though the Dutch plan does not conform to the letter of the Council’s resolution, it does offer a possible solution and should be tried;

(d) If the Republicans should nevertheless stand out, we should be prepared to say to the Security Council and to the public generally that we think they are wrong.

I pointed out to Mr. Graves that it would appear from recent communications from Mr. Cochran that the Republicans had already accepted to negotiate at The Hague provided that (1) UNCFI would assist at The Hague negotiations under the same terms of reference as provided by the Security Council for negotiations at Batavia, and (2) that it be restored as a government to Jogjakarta. I told Mr. Graves the foregoing would appear to dispose of point (b). I then remarked to Mr. Graves that so far as points (a) and (c) were concerned I believed they were substantially the same and further I could see no virtue in publicly preferring any plan to the Security Council resolution until the parties to the dispute agreed to negotiate on the basis of that plan; that if they so agreed there could be no great objection raised as to the lack of strict conformity of the Netherlands plan with the Security Council resolution. So far as point (d) was concerned decision regarding thereto did not appear to be necessary at this time since it was a development which might or might not materialize and then only in the future.

I reiterated to Mr. Graves that, on the whole, the above-mentioned telegram did not appear to depart greatly from the previous telegram and that the Department’s position as regards the suggestions in the previous telegram and as regards similar suggestions in the present telegram was set forth in our aide-mémoire of March 4. In sum, the United States Government, as a member of the Security Council could not take any action nor could it advocate taking any action which recommended a departure from the Security Council resolution of January 28 unless the parties to the dispute agreed to negotiate under a plan differing from that resolution, and even in the latter case the United States Government would be bound by the majority opinion of the Security Council. I expressed my personal opinion that as the Republicans had apparently agreed to negotiate at the Hague it would appear that the Netherlands Government should make an effort to meet the Republican’s conditions so as to put the parties in a negotiating position as soon as possible.

Mr. Graves explained that his Ambassador had been instructed to seek the views of the Secretary of State on this matter and I said that I would make the foregoing information available to my superiors and that I would inform him of their views at the earliest possible moment.

1. Jonkheer E. Michiels van Verduynen.