501.BC Indonesia/3–749
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Nolting)
| Participants: | Mr. Helb, Counselor, Netherlands Embassy |
| Mr. Ogburn, SEA | |
| Mr. Barco, UNP | |
| Mr. Scott, EUR | |
| Mr. Nolting, NOE |
Pursuant to Mr. Helb’s request that he be advised of the position to be taken by this Government on the Indonesian question in the Security Council, he was requested to call and was read pertinent passages of the telegram of instruction to USUN,1 which had been repeated to our Embassy at The Hague for transmission to the Netherlands Foreign Office. Mr. Helb expressed appreciation for the information and for the favorable light in which we viewed the Dutch proposals for a conference at The Hague. However, he was specific in stating that he felt the condition precedent to such negotiations as set by the Republican leaders, namely restoration of the Republican Government at Djocjakarta, was impossible of acceptance by the present Netherlands Government or by any Netherlands Government likely to be formed. He reiterated his view that further pressure on this point from the Security Council would cause the fall of the present Netherlands Government. The Department’s officers answered Mr. Helb’s questions with regard to the telegram of instruction, indicating that if the Netherlands took a position in the Security Council amounting to an inflexible rejection of the proposal for restoration, the U.S. representative could obviously not put forward the point of view contained in [Page 303] the telegram, but would be forced to revert to support of the Security Council’s resolution of January 28 in its entirety.
In discussing the question of restoration, Mr. Helb was informed that according to our information the Federalist organization (BFO) had passed a resolution unanimously supporting in principle the Republican demand for restoration to Jogja; that later, according to our information, certain BFO members were influenced by Mr. Beel to change their positions; that it had been our understanding that one of the principal objections of the Netherlands Government to the idea of restoration was based on the belief that it was opposed by the Indonesian Federalists. We pointed out that the acceptance by the Netherlands Government of the proposal re restoration might be greatly eased by their placing face value upon the resolution of the BFO, rather than trying to oppose it. Mr. Helb said that his information differed from ours with respect to the degree of unanimity prevailing among the Federalists; and further stated that, in view of the pressures prevailing from many quarters upon the Indonesians, he saw no reason why Mr. Beel should not have counseled the Federalists with regard to their stand re restoration of the Republic.
Mr. Helb then raised the question of the information recently given Foreign Minister Stikker in Paris by Mr. Harriman relative to the Military Assistance Program. He inquired whether the caveat we had entered was timed as a “big stick” to influence the Netherlands’ decision re restoration of the Republic, expressing his personal anxiety lest it be so interpreted by the Netherlands Government. He was assured that the timing on this matter was the result of the natural sequence of events in planning the Pact and the Military Assistance Program and that it was not devised as a means of pressure; he was further advised that the information was given to Mr. Stikker in an effort to be entirely forthright, in order to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding at a future date.