501.BC Indonesia/2–1049
The Department of State to the British Embassy 1 Aide-mémoire
The United States Government is in full agreement with the conclusions of the note handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on February 10, 1949;2 that is, that the Dutch should be urged to give every facility to the United Nations Agency and to the Indonesians in the task of proceeding with the steps which must be taken before the transfer of power in Indonesia takes place and that the Indonesians should be brought to understand the paramount necessity of reaching agreement among themselves in order that this task may be carried out.
In the telegram received by the British Ambassador from Mr. Bevin, which the British Embassy was generous enough to make available to the Department of State,3 Mr. Bevin expresses the hope that the Secretary of State will be disposed to ask Mr. Cochran to use his influence with the Republican Indonesians to induce them to accept the Dutch invitation to the proposed Round Table Conference at The Hague in exchange for some specific assurances regarding Dutch intentions.
The United States Government, which is acutely aware of the implications of the crisis impending in the Security Council, agrees that acceptance by the Republican Government of the Netherlands invitation is greatly to be desired and that the utmost efforts to bring about this end are necessary.
[Page 298]In this connection, the United States Government regards the following aspects of the situation as most relevant:
- 1.
- The new Dutch proposals are extremely broad and beyond offering a resumption of negotiations looking toward an early transfer of sovereignty barely suggest a basis upon which the issues which have heretofore divided the parties may be resolved.
- 2.
- Republican elements appear convinced that the consistent Netherlands intention in Indonesia has been to transfer a highly qualified and merely nominal sovereignty to a government of subservient Indonesians which will agree to the retention of a large Netherlands army in Indonesia as a defense against the nationalist movement represented by the Republic. The military action initiated by the Netherlands on December 18 has of course had the effect of reinforcing this concept, in addition, it might be added, to disrupting the degree of law and order previously prevailing in Java and Sumatra.
- 3.
- The Republican resistance forces, far from eagerly seeking a formula which would permit them to cease hostilities, have enlarged their demands in the past month and profess to find the present military situation markedly to their advantage. A pliant attitude on the part of Sukarno and Hatta will be of little avail if they cannot carry a major part of the resistance forces with them. Indeed, concessions by these officials which the so-called Emergency Government in Sumatra and the non-Communist guerilla leaders in Java could not be persuaded to accept would tend to discredit the former moderate Republican Government and bring die-hard fanatics to the leadership of the nationalist movement.
For these reasons, the present situation would appear to require in the first place that the Dutch (1) give full freedom to the Republican leaders, (2) afford these leaders a seat of authority to the end that they may have access to the resistance forces in order that the Republican movement may be re-integrated and made answerable to the authority of these leaders, and, (3) elucidate their new proposals to demonstrate to the reasonable satisfaction of the Republican Indonesians that the objective is identical with that of the Security Council’s resolution of January 28—the transfer of full sovereignty within the period laid down in the Security Council’s resolution to an Indonesian government in which the Republic will be guaranteed its due role—even if the means of achieving the objective are somewhat at variance.
In any case, the essential requirements of the situation confronting the Dutch would appear to be plain. If these requirements are met, Mr. Cochran could look forward with some hope to prevailing upon the Republican Indonesians to accept the Netherlands proposals. But the task of presenting proposals which offer the basis of a reasonable solution falls primarily upon the Dutch. Mr. Cochran will exert himself to the utmost, as he has in the past, to find a way out of the impasse [Page 299] which threatens. But he must have something substantial with which to work.
A report received on March 4 from Mr. Cochran states that the Republican Government on Bangka Island is disposed to accept the new Netherlands proposals to negotiate at The Hague on the strength of the explanations given by Mr. Koets, acting as emissary of the Government of Indonesia, provided that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia assist at those negotiations under the terms of reference laid down by the Security Council and that the Republican Government be restored to its seat of authority in Jogjakarta in order that it may be in a position to issue a cease-fire order and bring about a peaceful situation. These conditions, which seem reasonable to the United States Government, appear also to have the support of the Federalist Indonesians.
Should the Dutch fail to give the required minimum assurances on the points which are obviously critical, it is difficult to see how, through Mr. Cochran’s efforts or by any other means, the Security Council can avoid being faced with a clear case of Netherlands non-compliance with its resolutions, with consequences of the most unwelcome nature, whatever form they take.