Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1
856d.00/3–349
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 8.]
No. 86
Sir: With reference to my telegram 208 of March 2, 1949,1 I have the honor to enclose copies of the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitting documentation on the consequences of a restoration of Republican authority in Djokjakarta and its vicinity, together with various exhibits concerning the alleged subversive activities of the Republican Government.2 The enclosures to Mr. Stikker’s letter [Page 292] are sent in only one copy as the Embassy has not sufficient staff to copy these lengthy papers.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy
The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stikker) to the American Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch)
No. 22271–2416 G.S.
My Dear Ambassador, During our discussions concerning the new proposals of the Netherlands Government for an accelerated transfer of sovereignty, the question of the return of the Republican leaders to Djokjakarta appeared to be the main although not the only difficulty preventing an acceptance of the plan by the Republic and a wholehearted support of our proposals by the governments of the Atlantic nations. I have tried to explain orally to you the fatal consequences of a return of the Republican Government to their capital for an effective and lasting solution of the present difficulties. In case the Republic would definitely and irrevocably refuse the invitation which has been transmitted to them, the question of the return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta will undoubtedly figure in the report which the UNCI has to make to the Security Council.
I feel very strongly that your Government should have at its disposal all relevant information concerning this question before making a final decision. On the other hand I am very reluctant to give publicity to incriminating evidence concerning persons with whom we have negotiated in the past and with whom we are anxious to resume negotiations.
After considering this matter I have decided in consultation with my colleagues to send you for your personal information a short memorandum on some of the documents found in the archives at Djokjakarta which illustrate the policy followed by the Republican Government, in the hope that these documents will help you to understand the difficulty for the Netherlands Government to agree to a return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta at the present time.
Djokjakarta is not only the capital of the Republic: it is also the source of inspiration for those Republican elements, which refuse any form of cooperation with the Netherlands and which will continue guerrilla action no matter what happens.
[Page 293]Although we have not taken any repressive action, we know that the Republican leaders, who are now in Djokjakarta or vicinity continue to support subversive elements, who prevent the restoration of orderly conditions.
It has been said that the Republican Government can only order its adherents to cease guerrilla warfare, when it has been reestablished in Djokjakarta and has sufficient facilities for communication. The enclosed documents indicate unmistakably the use which responsible Republican leaders have made of their authority and the facilities of Djokjakarta during the period when the truce agreement was in force. There seems little ground for the assumption that after their reinstallation in Djokjakarta they would follow a different course of action. The public declarations of the Republican emergency government, the authority of which has been expressly recognized by Mr. Hatta, that they would continue guerrilla warfare until victory was achieved only confirm the conclusion of the Netherlands Government, that a restoration of republican authority in Djokjakarta would inevitably result in a further deterioration of the situation, which is already extremely difficult.
In sending you the enclosed memorandum I wish to reiterate that this is not done in a spirit of bitterness or revenge, but only to enable your government to make a decision on their future attitude on the basis of a knowledge of the information which is available on the subject to the Netherlands Government.
Sincerely yours,
The Consequences of a Restoration of Republican Authority in Djocjakarta and Vicinity
No. 21204–2299 G.S.
The paramount question asked in the recently occupied territories is whether or not orderly conditions will be reestablished. Indonesians and Chinese, intellectuals and the man in the street alike, all ask whether the Netherlands troops will remain, or whether the TNI will return to resume its reign of terror. The Dutch answer to these questions is that the Netherlands army will stay as long as it is needed and that the TNI will not be allowed to return. The restoration of orderly conditions takes time. The confidence of the people, that they may resume their normal activities without fear of oppression or compulsion, can only be gained gradually.
[Page 294]The confidence of all those who have faith in our promises is based on the assumption that a restoration of Republican authority would not be permitted. Any indication to the contrary would cause those whose confidence is wavering to think twice before expressing willingness to cooperate, and would create doubt in the minds of those who have resumed their work as to whether they have made the right choice. Political and social reconstruction, for which confidence in Netherlands’ protection is an indispensable prerequisite, would be slowed down considerably.
Everywhere in Indonesia even far outside Republican territories, the restoration of Republican authority would be interpreted as proof that Republican supremacy will ultimately return and in many federal territories this will create confusion and dismay.
The considerations described above with regard to individuals apply equally to political organisations. Extremists on the Republican side would receive encouragement, for they would rightly come to the conclusion that tenacity is profitable and this would stiffen them in their attitude.
A still more serious fact is, however, that Tan Malakka’s group would gain by the restoration to an even greater extent, as it is their avowed purpose to put an end to all Netherlands influence in Indonesia and to promote Communism. Consequently it is to be expected that guerilla warfare, in which this group plays such a prominent party would receive a new impetus. During recent weeks the military and political situation has improved, in some regions even considerably, mainly because various bands see no further use in armed resistance.
It is obvious that this guerilla warfare would flare up anew if Sukarno c.s. were to be vested with governmental authority and allowed to return to Djokjakarta. Loss of human life would inevitably result.
It cannot be expected that the Republicans would agree to the presence of Netherlands forces in Djokjakarta, even assuming that under those circumstances Netherlands forces would be able or willing to perform their task.
A new demarcation line, however short, would revive economic, financial and traffic chaos. A Republican Government would wish to set up its own financial and communications systems, including postal, telegraph and telephone services. This would artificially complicate the situation and render the future unity of Indonesia forever impossible.
All security would disappear and the same terrorism with which the Republican Government has been totally unable to cope in the past, and which it has even encouraged, would prevail. The Republican [Page 295] Government would be completely at the mercy of Extremist groups and thus unable to continue negotiations.
From the situation briefly outlined above it appears that the Dutch efforts to introduce in the whole of the Indonesian archipelago a policy aiming at an early transfer of sovereignty to a federated state would again have to make way for the divergencies which have so far stood in the way of this unity.
A restoration of Republican authority would inevitably lead to a dualistic policy. Restoration of the Republican Government at Djokja—however small its territory may be—would in fact bring the parties back to their previous position, which for two years has prevented the conclusion of a real agreement. Even supposing the Republican Government would be prepared to order the guerilla bands to cease all fighting, and that these troops would carry out their orders—both improbable suppositions as the record shows—the first point of discussion after this cease-fire would be the consideration of a truce agreement and the establishment of new demarcation lines etc. In these circumstances, instead of passing from truce negotiations to political negotiations, the parties to the dispute would return to a previous stage which could only delay the final solution. The Republican army would be reconstituted and the existence of two opposing armies, both having legal status, would again lead to armed clashes with fatal consequences for the future of Indonesia.
The Netherlands have reluctantly been obliged to assume in practice exclusive responsibility for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in the whole of Indonesia, and they cannot renounce this responsibility until a settlement has been made which provides for political cooperation and integration of the federal and republican territories under one government to which the Netherlands can transfer responsibility.
The artificial controversies between republican and other territories should at last come to an end. These controversies have been fomented neither by the Netherlands nor by the federal territories, but only by the Republic. Cooperation of the population for the common cause cannot be expected until the people have an assurance that the Republic will not be restored in its former shape. A restoration of the Republic would force them again to make their choice.
The Netherlands are therefore obliged to continue their efforts towards the establishment of a central authority, which, in fact, they would rather entrust to the Indonesians today than tomorrow. This authority must not again be split in two, as would be the result of a restoration of Republican authority at Djokja.
The Republican leaders would be welcome in a central Indonesian [Page 296] Government which would also have authority over the former Republican territories. They cannot be allowed any longer as a separate political entity aiming at domination of the whole archipelago, in the interest of finance and economy, political development, social welfare, communications and all other common problems. Integration and not disintegration should prevail. The recommendation of the Security Council to reestablish the conditions which created the previous difficulties is unacceptable to the Netherlands in the interest of Indonesia. The interests of Indonesia are and should be paramount in all our decisions.
No sinister Dutch interests are being pursued; the Netherlands are concerned only with the necessity to create a United Indonesia to which complete sovereignty can be transferred with confidence.
As long as there is no guarantee of a United Indonesia, the restoration of a separate Republican administration in Djokjakarta is out of the question. The Netherlands cannot run the risk of a Republican Government continuing its old tactics.
Experience has taught a lesson which is not easily forgotten. Even before the political discussions envisaged in the Renville Principles began, the Republican authorities organized subversive activities by means of radiopropaganda, secret armyorders and infiltration tactics. Few people believed this at the time, but the documents included in this survey prove it only too clearly.
It should be reiterated here that an all-Indonesian Government has to be created as soon as possible, but a situation in which the Central Government has no authority over Djokja cannot be allowed to arise again.
The Republican leaders have now been released and the Netherlands Government is fully prepared to come to an understanding with all parties, without attaching undue importance to formalities and procedure.
It is, however, only prepared to transfer its authority over the whole achipelago, including the Republican territory—and Djokjakarta—to one federal Indonesian Government.
Apart from evidence already published, these conclusions are borne out completely by the examination of the Republican archives which have been found after the occupation in Djokja and elsewhere in Republican territory.
The nature of the Republican activities during the period between the Renville agreements and the second Police action will be dealt with below under the following headings:
- 1.
- Infiltration and subversive activities contrary to the Renville Truce Agreement;
- 2.
- Opiumtraffic;
- 3.
- Double-dealing of the Republic in the negotiations;
- 4.
- The fictitious demobilisation and rationalisation scheme for the Republican army;
- 5.
- Contact of the Republic with the Malayan Communist Party;
- 6.
- Difficulties to reach binding agreements with the Republic.
The originals of the documents quoted are in the possession of the Government of Indonesia. In a number of cases photographic copies are available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The reference numbers are those of the Central Military Information Service.