501.BC Indonesia/3–249: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
217. Gocus 612. Indian ConGen called. Finds UNCFI March 1 report fair and balanced. Said his govt disturbed over Netherlands proposal lest this draw Indos to conference where dilatory tactics and divide and weaken policy will be followed. He insists Repubs cannot participate unless preliminary restoration authority and arrangements toward cessation hostilities. As military man (ConGen is Major General with service in both world wars), he considers Netherlands military effort has not been success. Thinks Netherlands in tight place and must find way out soon.
ConGen said understood views his govt on Netherlands proposal and present Indo situation shared by Australian Govt and mentioned Evatt’s2 visit New Delhi. Asked if I thought his govt should do anything now. I suggested let SC take lead and thought SC might desire see what parties themselves may accomplish in their talks of next few days.
Schuurman dropped in at noon. Said UNCFI March 1 report not bad. He asked explanation one or two points.
Schuurman expanded confidentially story Koets’ visit Repubs (Gocus 6113). Said although Roem participated in two day conversations, his cable to UNCFI (Gocus 6094) never mentioned and Koets did not see it until return Batavia, Said Repubs stress return Jogja. Said I had very properly informed and warned NethDel on this point. Said this and few other questions have been referred Hague. Repubs concentrated discussion on conditions preliminary rather than on Hague round table, although some reported to have considered latter “grand idea”.
Schuurman stressed to me loss of face to Netherlands and other difficulties involved yielding Jogja. I reminded him Netherlands has used maximum pressure, namely, warfare against Repubs but latter [Page 286] still held strategic position with respect any plans leaking [leading] to USI. For example, UNCFI could not participate roundtable without Repubs. Probably BFO and surely certain delegations therein would not participate without UNCFI and Repub.
Re Jogja, Schuurman said their information indicated Repub favor in former capital has declined, certain elements being sharply critical of manner in which old régime was carried on and of surrender Repub leaders. He thought even if Repubs return Jogja they might have difficulty regaining influential position and might even move to left in order satisfy strong elements now existing. I said Repubs had gained strength through putting down Communist uprising in September and we had hoped Netherlands would consummate agreement with conservative Hatta régime thereafter, I admitted Hatta group has suffered in prestige through Netherlands military action and deterioration continuing. Netherlands should give conservative Repub leaders best possible opportunity now appeal effectively to their followers rather than take them directly Hague and consummate agreement which followers would not accept. I deemed entirely impractical Schuurman’s suggestion every one go ahead with Hague conference and place Jogja problem as first item on agenda.
Told Schuurman I thought present exploratory talks between Netherlands, Repubs and BFO should continue. When he said Repubs did not desire come Batavia and hinted UNCFI might desire go Bangka, I said we entirely prepared make trip if and when Repubs may desire. I thought initiative should still be left interested parties to problem at this point. I would probably hear from Repubs and BFO after both return from Bangka tomorrow and would desire exchange further ideas with Schuurman then. Finally he said that in Koets’ discussions Sukarno ventured suggest possibility establishing Repub Govt in Atjeh, unoccupied north Sumatra, if Jogja impossible. Schuurman said Netherlands would agree to this.5 I said ideas this sort might conceivably lead to workable compromise. I told Schuurman I realized from observations Hague and Batavia how serious their situation is and desire as UNCFI member and representative of friendly power do everything possible assist in settlement. Signed Cochran.
- Repeated in telegram 183, March 4, noon, to The Hague.↩
- Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.↩
- Telegram 213, March 1, p. 281.↩
- Telegram 211, March 1, p. 277.↩
- Telegram 209, March 2, 7 p. m., from The Hague, reported that the Netherlands Cabinet had confirmed this plan which “was official Dutch position. Beel is being accordingly informed.” (856d. 00/3–249)↩