501.BC Indonesia/3–249: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 1
secret us urgent
New York, March
2, 1949—4:30 p. m.
251. The following ideas are put forward for the consideration of the Department in dealing with the next phase of the Indonesian case.
- 1.
- It seems likely that we shall face in New York a considerable effort to hold US firmly to the position taken in the SC resolution of. January 28. The six SC delegates who joined us in support of that resolution have given us their full confidence by delegating to UNCFI implementation powers. We are anxious, therefore, to avoid any action which would appear to be a unilateral change from the SC position. (Conclusions of UNCFI report seem helpful.2) If such a change should seem wise, we would like to have full opportunity to consult with them and to make the action joint.
- 2.
- When the matter returns to the SC, we would hope to be able to avoid a situation in which we had simply to choose between two alternatives: acceptance of the Beel plan or imposition of sanctions. It does not appear to us necessary to let the matter rest with a negative reaction to the Beel plan. In our view, emphasis should remain on pacific settlement. We doubt that consideration of sanctions now would advance us toward solution.
- 3.
- Furthermore, it seems to us urgent to avoid the possibility that the Dutch hold The Hague roundtable conference even without the Republicans present. Such a course would appear to be impossible for the SC to accept and might well close the door to all possibilities of peaceful solution.
- 4.
- There appears to us to be some value in pursuing the possibilities indicated in The Hague’s No. 193, February 25, particularly if this can be done in such a way as to avoid an appearance of change from the SC resolution. Has Department considered the possibility that the commission should give the SC notice that within a short time it will present recommendations for a solution of the existing difficulties as required by the proviso in paragraph 3 of January 28 resolution. Notice of this intention would greatly help us keep the situation fluid and avoid efforts to concentrate SC attention on the question of sanctions. The framing of these recommendations by the commission in consultation with the Dutch, the Republicans and the Federalists would give Cochran an opportunity to negotiate the marriage of the Beel plan to the SC resolution without the US retreating from the principles in the Council’s resolution. Early notice of the foregoing course of action might make it extremely difficult for the Federalists to attend The Hague conference, despite the refusal of the Republic to do so. The recommendations themselves would presumably take basic principles from Renville, Cochran plan, SC resolution and the principles which were agreed between the parties last fall, together with concessions which the Dutch have recently told Cochran they are now prepared to make. If the parties could be brought within reach of agreement on (1) a set of recommended principles, (2) return of Republic to Jogja, the Republic might feel sufficient confidence to accept the Dutch invitation to a roundtable conference at The Hague to negotiate on the basis of such recommendations. The conclusion in the third sentence of paragraph 25 of UNCFI’s report may present a technical objection to this course of action. We believe the proviso to paragraph 3 of the SC resolution means that SC wants UNCFI recommendations on how to break deadlock which actually exists regardless of its cause, and not solely if caused by lack of agreement on structure of interim government. In other words, if scope of deadlock is across the board, scope of recommendations should be equally broad.
- 5.
- With reference to The Hague’s compromise proposal and the Department’s favorable comment on this to Cochran, there is one point which we should like to bring to the Department’s attention. Paragraph 3 of the SC resolution requires negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic on the basis of Renvile, and that the interim government be a result. As the Department knows, the Netherlands made a special effort to eliminate these provisions from the resolution before its adoption. At a meeting of seven supporters in our offices on January 25, all seven supporters unanimously rejected Dutch amendments eliminating these provisions. Department will have noted that [Page 285] the Beel plan avoids these basic elements of the SC resolution. If there is to be a marriage of the Beel plan and the SC resolution, we feel it is important that the principle that the Dutch must negotiate an agreement with the Republic be adhered to.
Austin