ECA Telegram Files, Lot W–131, Paris Torep: Telegram
The Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Hoffman) to the Embassy in France
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Torep 6118. In connection with Military Assistance Program, a paper1 has been prepared on existing East-West trade restrictions for policy guidance in Congressional hearings. This paper has been cleared by ECA, State and NME at working level and will be submitted to Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee for final draft this week. Your comments and recommendations are urgently requested on following conclusions of paper:2
- “1. The current negotiations for the control of exports carried on by State and ECA through established channels seem adequate to cover the export of items that might be of particular interest under the MAP. It does not appear necessary to initiate any new negotiations with ERP countries or Canada to secure restrictions over the export of such items.
- 2. The present U.S. lists of totally or partially embargoed items include substantially all items of interest under MAP. If it is found necessary to include additional items, they may be added thru existing procedures, to the lists, which are under continuous review by the Advisory Committee on Requirements.
- 3. Agreement should be obtained on an ad hoc basis from non-ERP recipients of MAP to institute controls over their significant exports of military or strategic articles to the Soviet Bloc.
- 4. Where MAP strengthens the position of the, U.S. in its continuing negotiations with the ERP countries, the U.S. should take advantage of this fact thru appropriate channels.
- 5. Where exports of some items on the I–A list are not satisfactorily controlled by some MAP recipient, the FMA Directors, in deciding [Page 130] upon the extension of military aid, will exercise administrative discretion in accordance with the best interests of the U.S.”
Under point 1, it is understood that Harriman assumes these responsibilities in his capacity as the representative of the US Govt for East-West trade negotiations, which extends beyond his responsibilities in the ERP.3
At present time that part of U.S. satellite aviation policy relating to the State Dept’s munitions and I–A list is being negotiated by State Dept air attaches. Do you believe it desirable to have separate paragraph indicating responsibility for satellite aviation policy relating to export restrictions, or should Harriman as U.S. representative in all of these matters assume responsibility for policy coordination and negotiation?4
- The reference here is to document MAP D–G/32, approved by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee on June 24, not printed (Department of State Committee Files, Lot 54 D 5). The Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee consisted of representatives of the Department of State, the National Military Establishment, and the Economic Cooperation Administration and served as the advisory inter-Departmental organization for the coordination of the position of the Executive Branch of the government on plans, policy, and legislation relating to foreign military assistance. Approved FACC documents of the MAP DG series were included in the briefing book used by officers of the Executive Branch in hearings before Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. For documentation on the Military Assistance Program, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.↩
- In his telegram Repto 4991, June 30, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Harriman expressed basic concurrence with the five points listed here (ECA Telegram Files, Lot W–130, Paris Repto).↩
- In his telegram Repto 4991 (see footnote above), Ambassador Harriman stated that inasmuch as the facilities at his disposal for direct discussions with governments were limited to ERP countries, he assumed that generally the Department of State would carry on direct negotiations with non-ERP countries.↩
- In his telegram Repto 4991, Harriman stated that it was not desirable currently to shift responsibility for satellite aviation policy to his office. For the documentation on United States civil aviation policy with respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see pp. 184 ff.↩