Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

[Washington, September 12, 1949.]

P.P.S. 60

Yugoslav-Moscow Controversy as Related to U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

Analysis

Possible courses of action open to the Soviet Union in its present endeavor to liquidate the Tito régime fall into four categories:

1. Direct armed attack by Soviet military forces assisted by the armies of the satellite countries bordering on Yugoslavia.

2. Armed attack by the military forces of the satellite states not supported directly by the Soviet Army.

3. Intensive guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia directed and supported from the outside.

4. Continuation and intensification of the present political, economic and psychological pressures linked with attempts to instigate internal revolt within Yugoslavia and possibly accompanied by endeavors to assassinate Tito and his principal lieutenants.

Soviet success in destroying the Tito régime in Yugoslavia and supplanting it by a puppet government completely subservient to Moscow, by any one or a combination of the methods stated above, would represent to Greece and Italy an immediate threat to their security and to the United States and the Western European nations a serious reverse in their world position. The Western position in Trieste and Italy would immediately become more difficult and the present possibilities of a Yugoslav-Italian agreement on a Trieste solution would undoubtedly disappear. In addition, with Soviet power reestablished along the northern frontiers of Greece, the recent Western gains in Greece would be seriously jeopardized. While the limits of the area of Soviet control would merely be restored to what they were before the Tito-Kremlin break, the strategic situation would in fact be worse in that recent Western gains would have been lost and increased momentum given to Soviet expansionism.

The suppression of the Tito heresy could not fail to have a profound and perhaps decisive influence upon all those elements within the Communist world which are presently resisting the absolute control of the Kremlin under the leadership and inspiration of Tito’s successful resistance. It is, of course, in the important interests of the West that Tito be kept afloat as his continuing success represents a profound rift in the Kremlin control of international communism as an instrument of Russian expansion.

The four possible courses of action mentioned above are examined below in the light of (a) the likelihood of their adoption in accordance with the best present estimates based on information available at this time and (b) their implications, if adopted, as related to U.S. security and national interests. There follow, in each case, policy recommendations and suggested courses of action open to the United States.

i. armed attack by soviet military forces assisted by satellite forces

Although Tito’s heresy represents an intolerable challenge to Soviet authority, the Soviet Government is not likely to risk a direct military attack on Yugoslavia which might develop into a general conflict. Without doubt the Kremlin will exploit all possibilities short of war to liquidate the Tito regime. Our knowledge of Soviet methods indicates that Moscow will probably exercise patience and restraint in this operation, resorting to direct and overt force only under conditions where there exists little or no risk of a general war which the Soviet Union desires at this time to avoid. It is the considered view of U.S. diplomatic missions in Moscow and in southeast Europe as of this date that the present Soviet threats accompanied by troop movements in the satellite areas represent one phase of the war of nerves against Tito rather than preparations for an actual military attack. The increasingly hysterical tenor of Soviet accusations against Tito, however, and the extent to which Moscow is staking its prestige on the early elimination of the Tito regime may lead the U.S.S.R. to launch a blitzkreig with the aim of destroying Tito’s power in Yugoslavia and replacing him with a puppet regime completely subservient to Moscow. It should be constantly borne in mind that the Kremlin regards the Yugoslav problem as a Communist family affair rather than a conflict between two sovereign states. This Soviet view coupled with the extreme importance which the Politburo undoubtedly attaches to an early solution of the Yugoslav problem may well distort its appreciation of the international consequences of overt military action on the part of the Soviet Union against the Tito regime.

Should the Soviet Army undertake a full scale attack on Yugoslavia, it could probably overrun the flat northern part of the country and take Belgrade. The Yugoslav forces, however, should be able to maintain resistance for some months in the mountainous central area, and in any case to continue widespread guerrilla operations for a long period.

A direct Soviet military attack on Yugoslavia would represent an open violation of the United Nations Charter (Article 2) which requires all members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. In addition, such aggression would raise certain questions relating to the right of the U.S.S.R. to use the territory of other states for the purpose of attacking Yugoslavia. Inasmuch as Russian territory is not adjacent to Yugoslav territory, any Soviet attack would probably come through Hungary and Rumania and possibly Bulgaria.

Under the peace treaties, the Soviet Union is entitled to keep in Hungary and Rumania “such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria”. If Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania were used for another purpose, i.e., aggression against Yugoslavia, such would represent a violation of treaty obligations which the U.S. might protest. Our legal grounds, however, would be considerably weakened should the Rumanian and Hungarian Governments consent to such use of their territories by Soviet forces, which they would of course do. The situation is somewhat different in Bulgaria as under the Bulgarian peace treaty the Soviet Union was required to withdraw all of its occupation forces, but here again the Bulgarian Government would undoubtedly invite the Soviet Army to return.

Although the Soviet Zone in Austria is not contiguous to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Army might well be expected to make use of the Russian Zone in connection with an attack on Yugoslavia probably as a military staging area and as a base for air attacks. In such event, the U.S., the U.K. and France would have legal grounds to protest such action as a violation of the inter-allied agreements which form the basis for the allied occupation of Austria.

Recommendations

In the event that the Soviet Army should attack Yugoslavia, the U.S.:

1. Should take the position that it is concerned that a breach of the peace should have taken place;

2. should denounce any violation of the peace treaties or of Allied agreements relating to Austria;

3. should vote for consideration of the question if brought before the Security Council by Yugoslavia or by any member of the UN;

4. in case it is not raised by Yugoslavia or any other state, should take the initiative in acting together with other states to bring the question before the Security Council, not in the form of a charge against the Soviet Union for aggression but by way of calling attention to a condition involving a breach of the peace;

5. should make clear in taking such action under 3 or 4 above that this Government is acting solely in accordance with its obligations as a member of the UN and that such action has no relation to the principles and practices of either of the parties to the dispute or to the origins of the conflict.

6. should participate as seems appropriate at the time in devising a resolution in the Security Council which includes the condemnation of the aggression;

7. should cooperate in carrying out the resolution adopted by the Security Council in the unlikely event that such adoption is not blocked by Soviet veto; and

8. should, in the event of a military conflict of some duration, permit Yugoslavia to purchase arms in the U.S. and be prepared to furnish arms directly to Tito if political and military considerations should so warrant.

ii. armed attack on yugoslavia by military forces of soviet satellite states

Yugoslavia armed forces should be able to defeat any attack by neighboring satellite states (Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary) not given substantial support by the U.S.S.R. In numbers, quality and morale the Yugoslav forces are stronger than the combined forces of the four satellites. It is not likely, therefore, that the U.S.S.R. would direct the satellite states to attack Yugoslavia unless it were sure of their success. Thus, any such military campaign by the satellites would certainly have Soviet direction, Soviet support, and probably the assistance of Soviet military forces in satellite uniforms.

If Soviet participation in such an attack by the satellites were sufficiently open and large-scale, the U.S.S.R. itself could be charged as a party to the aggression, and the same considerations would apply as are set forth under Section I above. If Soviet participation were veiled (which is assumed here), the satellites might succeed, after a relatively extended struggle, in winning a military victory over Tito, unless he could replenish his military equipment from Western sources. In following this course, the Russians could hardly count on a blitz victory. They would incur the risk that the satellite armies would suffer some military reverses and that a long drawn out struggle would bring increasing possibilities of a general conflict. The West would be given time to take stock of the developing situation, and the United Nations probably would have time to take up the question before military operations terminated.

For the U.S., the implications of a military conquest of Yugoslavia by the Soviet satellites would be the same as in the case of a military campaign waged by the Soviet Army itself. If the conflict were not quickly won, however, the United States and other Western powers would have to consider the desirability of providing Yugoslavia with military assistance. A decision on this point would depend largely on (a) the military situation in this area and in the world; and (b) decisions by the UN or by signatories to the peace treaties.

Three of the satellite states in question (Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania) were Axis states in the last war, and the peace treaties with them have been in effect only two years. The fourth satellite (Albania) was considered neither an Allied nor an Axis state during the war, but since the war it has a record of treaty violations and of aggression against Greece, An attack by these four states on Yugoslavia, an Allied state during the war, would create a situation enabling other states signatory to the peace treaties to contemplate corrective action against the aggressors. Such action could be justified under Article 106 of the United Nations Charter and would not, like Security Council action, be subject to Soviet veto. The United States, as a signatory to the treaties, would be entitled to take such action as was agreed to in concert with other signatories.

Recommendations

In the event of an armed attack on Yugoslavia by one or all of the satellite states, the U.S.:

1. Should take action in the UN along the lines of the recommendations set forth in Section I above;

2. should consult with other treaty signatories with a view to possible common action against the former enemy states;

3. should, in the event of a military conflict of some duration, permit Yugoslavia to purchase arms in the U.S. and be prepared to furnish arms directly to Tito if political and military considerations should so warrant.

iii. extensive guerrilla operations within yugoslavia supported from the outside

The most likely development in the intensified Soviet offensive against Yugoslavia, along with increased political, economic and psychological pressures, is a campaign of guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia directed and supported by the U.S.S.R. from neighboring states. Present indications are that the guerrilla effort against Tito will be focused on Yugoslav Macedonia, the weakest spot in the present Yugoslav political structure. It would be based chiefly on Bulgaria and Albania. Probably the remnants of the Greek guerrilla forces would be utilized and would operate, alongside “Macedonian” formations, from bases in these two countries. Troop movements, “frontier incidents”, and lesser guerrilla activities are likely along the borders of Rumania and Hungary. (Guerrillas could not operate, except by air, from the Soviet Zone of Austria, which is not adjacent to Yugoslavia.)

Yugoslav security forces are presently able to protect the Tito regime from attack from within and the Yugoslav army should be able to deal with guerrilla operations unless they are on a large scale and supported by Soviet direction and supplies. Yugoslavia, however, would soon run short of military equipment, since its military establishment was largely built up with supplies from the Soviet Hoc from which it has now been cut off for months. Tito would need arms from the West as well as economic and financial support. In a long struggle, his increasing dependence upon the West would make possible greater accommodation with Greece and also with Italy and thus increase the possibilities for a Yugoslav-Italian settlement of the Trieste problem. In the eventuality of such a protracted guerrilla campaign, in which Tito would have a good chance of maintaining his position, the U.S. and the West would have the possibility, by helping him to maintain Yugoslavia’s independence, of drawing Yugoslavia closer to the West.

The use of Albania by the Soviets as a base against Tito would raise questions concerning counteraction by Tito against Albania, the future of the Albanian regime, the interests of Yugoslavia, of Greece and of the Western powers in Albania, and the possibilities which are open to the U.S. and other Western powers in that strategic area. At present there appear to be four alternative solutions to the Albanian problem:

1. the continuance of the present Soviet-controlled regime of Enver Hoxha;

2. a revolt which would bring in a pro-Tito regime;

3. a revolt which would bring in an anti-Communist and pro-Western regime;

4. occupation and partition of Albania by Greece and Yugoslavia.

There are presently between two and four thousand Russians in Albania who are in complete control of the Government. The U.S.S.R. desires to maintain this control as long as possible as a menace with at least nuisance value against Greece and Yugoslavia. Internal disaffection and economic distress have reached a point where the present regime faces revolt, thus inviting intervention from both Yugoslavia and Greece. A pro-Tito group of Albanians in Yugoslavia has been formed and is ready at the proper moment to enter Albania in an attempt to seize power. Should such a Tito-backed intervention occur, there would be a danger of direct Greek intervention with a view to occupying at least southern Albania, which the Greeks claim as “Northern Epirus”. Such events might have grave international consequences possibly leading to a general conflict; in addition, they would seriously complicate the Balkan picture and might operate to arrest and reverse the Yugoslav-Greek trend toward mutual cooperation against the Cominform. Direct Yugoslav or Greek intervention in Albania, moreover, would operate to prevent the seizure of power by anti-Communist, pro-Western Albanian elements.

Recommendations

If the U.S.S.R. and its satellites should undertake a campaign of guerrilla operations against Yugoslavia, the U.S.:

1. Should afford increased economic and financial support to Yugoslavia;

2. should, if requested by Tito, make it possible for him to obtain military supplies from the U.S. on an ad hoc basis adjusted to developments in the Yugoslav situation, which should be kept constantly under review;

3. should take no initiative to bring the question before the United Nations, but should support the right of Yugoslavia or any other state to do so if it desires;

4. should, if the question is brought before the UN, stand on the principles of the Charter and support the condemnation of acts which threaten the independence and integrity of Yugoslavia;

5. should support any resolution which is approved by the SC (no resolution directed against the U.S.S.R. or its satellites is likely to be passed in view of the Soviet veto):

6. should support such appropriate action as may be taken by the General Assembly, such as the use of UNSCOB for observation;

7. should approach Tito on the Albanian question with a view to preventing action in Albania which would endanger or unduly complicate our policy on the Yugoslav question or our world position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. (This matter is now a subject of study by the Department in consultation with our Embassy in Belgrade, and we expect to work out a coordinated policy with the U.K. at the time of Mr. Bevin’s visit to Washington. It is therefore impossible to make a more specific recommendation with regard to Albania in this paper²); and

8. should warn the Greek Government again, if necessary, to refrain from direct military intervention in Albania.

iv. continuation and intensification of the present political and economic pressures, linked with attempts to stir up internal revolts within yugoslavia and possibly with attempts to assassinate tito and his chief lieutenants

Tito has shown his ability to withstand political, economic and psychological pressure. With the assurance of economic and financial support from the West, he should continue to hold his own. His security forces should be able to thwart any attempts at internal revolution. Although the possibility of assassination cannot be overlooked, even the removal of Tito from the scene would not be likely to change the basic situation since the other Yugoslav Communist leaders are equally committed to his policies and involved in his heresy.

Recommendations

The United States

1. Should continue its present limited economic support of the Tito regimé under NSC 18/2,³ with such added help as is necessary to attain the objectives laid down in that paper;

2. should, if Tito requests arms, make it possible for him to obtain them in this country on an ad hoc basis, keeping the situation in Yugoslavia under continuous review; and

3. should not take the initiative in referring the Moscow-Belgrade dispute to the UN, leaving that decision to the judgment and initiative of the Yugoslav Government.

1. As document UM D–60, September 14, 1949, this paper was considered by the Under Secretary’s Meeting of September 16; see the record of that meeting, p. 959.
2. British Foreign Secretary Bevin was in Washington in mid-September in connection with the First Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council. For documentation on United States policy with regard to Albania, including the record of Bevin’s discussion with the Secretary of State, see pp. 298 ff.
3. Not printed; see editorial note, p. 868.