Editorial Note
In his eight-page airgram A–113, June 8, from Geneva, not printed, United States Deputy Representative to the Economic Commission for Europe, Paul R. Porter, presented his appraisal of United States trade policy toward Eastern Europe. Porter expressed the belief that the West could bring great pressure to bear on the Soviet Union and its satellites if available ideological and material resources were fully utilized. While not minimizing Soviet strength, Porter felt that the West had overestimated the ability of the Soviet Union to consolidate its grip on Eastern Europe. Porter pointed to four factors working in the West’s favor: (1) the appeal of cultural and religious ties; (2) the ancient grudges and fears of the USSR; (3) the persistent nationalism in Eastern Europe and example of Western recovery; (4) the fact that although Eastern and Western Europe were interdependent, the West had the advantage of alternative sources of supply, while Eastern Europe had much less flexibility in obtaining essential capital equipment. Porter pointed out that trade with Eastern Europe, currently governed principally by the American desire to curb the growth of Soviet war potential, had been in equipment for heavy industries. He felt that such trade should be reduced with a commensurate increase made in the export of consumer goods, some raw materials, and equipment for light industry. Porter acknowledged the security dangers in such trade increases, but he felt that it was a calculated risk that ought to be taken, since there was every likelihood that such a policy would significantly retard the Sovietization of Eastern Europe (611.60C31/6–849). In his telegram 532, June 27, from Sofia, not printed, Minister in Bulgaria Donald Heath thoroughly [Page 125] approved the analysis and proposals set forth by Porter (611.60C31/6–2749).